3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
183 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
199 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
200 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
207 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
209 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
212 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
213 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
216 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
217 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
218 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
220 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
221 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
223 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 rdata->packet = s->packet;
228 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
235 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
236 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
237 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
238 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
242 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
243 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
251 s->packet_length = 0;
252 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
253 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
268 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
272 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
275 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
277 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
287 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
289 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
290 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
291 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
293 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
294 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
295 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
296 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
299 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
303 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
306 /* Check if epoch is current. */
307 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
308 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
310 /* Process all the records. */
311 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
313 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
314 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
316 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
317 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
321 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
322 * have been processed */
323 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
324 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
333 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
337 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
338 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
340 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
345 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
346 if (item && item->priority == priority)
348 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
349 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
351 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
352 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
353 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
355 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
356 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
358 s->packet = rdata->packet;
359 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
360 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
361 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
363 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
366 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
376 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
382 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
383 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
388 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
389 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
391 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
393 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
394 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
395 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
396 * the decryption or by the decompression
397 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
398 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
400 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
401 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
403 /* check is not needed I believe */
404 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
406 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
411 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
415 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
417 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
418 * 1: if the padding is valid
419 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
422 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
424 s->packet_length = 0;
429 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
430 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
434 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
435 if ((sess != NULL) &&
436 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
437 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
439 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
440 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
441 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
442 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
443 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
445 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
446 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
447 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
448 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
450 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
451 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
452 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
453 orig_len < mac_size+1))
455 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
460 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
462 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
463 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
464 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
465 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
468 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
469 rr->length -= mac_size;
473 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
474 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
475 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
476 rr->length -= mac_size;
477 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
480 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
481 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
483 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
489 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
491 s->packet_length = 0;
495 /* r->length is now just compressed */
496 if (s->expand != NULL)
498 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
500 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
501 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
504 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
506 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
507 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
512 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
514 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
515 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
520 /* So at this point the following is true
521 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
528 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
530 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
540 /* Call this to get a new input record.
541 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
542 * or non-blocking IO.
543 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
544 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
545 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
546 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
548 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
549 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
551 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
554 unsigned char *p = NULL;
555 unsigned short version;
556 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
557 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
561 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
562 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
563 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
565 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
566 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
569 /* get something from the wire */
571 /* check if we have the header */
572 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
573 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
575 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
576 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
577 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
579 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
580 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
582 s->packet_length = 0;
586 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
590 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
594 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
596 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
599 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
604 /* Lets check version */
605 if (!s->first_packet)
607 if (version != s->version)
609 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
611 s->packet_length = 0;
616 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
618 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
620 s->packet_length = 0;
624 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
626 /* record too long, silently discard it */
628 s->packet_length = 0;
632 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
635 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
637 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
639 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
641 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
642 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
644 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
648 s->packet_length = 0;
652 /* now n == rr->length,
653 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
655 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
657 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
658 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
662 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
663 goto again; /* get another record */
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
667 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
668 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
671 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
672 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
673 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
674 * since they arrive from different connections and
675 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
677 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
678 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
679 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
682 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
683 goto again; /* get another record */
685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
689 /* just read a 0 length packet */
690 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
692 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
693 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
694 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
695 * anything while listening.
699 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
701 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
704 s->packet_length = 0;
708 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
711 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
712 goto again; /* get another record */
719 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
720 * 'type' is one of the following:
722 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
723 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
724 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
726 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
727 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
729 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
730 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
731 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
732 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
733 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
734 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
735 * Change cipher spec protocol
736 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
738 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
740 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
741 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
742 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
743 * Application data protocol
744 * none of our business
746 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
751 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
753 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
754 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
757 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
758 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
759 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
760 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
766 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
767 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
770 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
773 /* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
774 * app data with SCTP.
776 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
777 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
778 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
779 s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
781 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
784 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
785 i=s->handshake_func(s);
786 if (i < 0) return(i);
789 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
795 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
797 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
798 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
799 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
800 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
803 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
804 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
805 * in advance, if any.
807 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
810 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
814 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
815 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
817 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
818 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
822 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
824 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
829 /* Check for timeout */
830 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
833 /* get new packet if necessary */
834 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
836 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
839 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
840 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
848 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
850 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
851 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
852 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
854 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
855 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
856 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
857 * than dropping the connection.
859 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
864 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
865 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
866 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
869 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
874 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
876 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
877 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
878 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
879 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
881 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
886 if (len <= 0) return(len);
888 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
891 n = (unsigned int)len;
893 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
900 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
906 /* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
907 * belated application data first, so retry.
909 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
910 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
911 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
913 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
914 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
915 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
918 /* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
919 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
920 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
922 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
923 s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
925 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
933 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
934 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
936 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
937 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
940 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
941 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
942 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
944 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
946 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
947 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
948 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
950 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
952 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
953 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
954 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
957 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
959 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
961 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
963 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
964 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
965 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
969 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
970 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
972 /* Application data while renegotiating
973 * is allowed. Try again reading.
975 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
978 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
980 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
981 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
982 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
986 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
987 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
994 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
995 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
996 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
998 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1000 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1001 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1002 * non-existing alert...
1006 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1011 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1012 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
1014 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1017 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1021 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1022 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1023 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1025 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1027 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1028 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1029 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1031 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1033 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1034 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1035 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1042 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
1044 if (s->msg_callback)
1045 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1046 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1048 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1049 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1050 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1053 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1054 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1056 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1057 if (i < 0) return(i);
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1064 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1066 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1069 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1070 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1071 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1072 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1073 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1074 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1075 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1076 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1082 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1083 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1087 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1089 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1090 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1092 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1094 if (s->msg_callback)
1095 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1096 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1098 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1099 cb=s->info_callback;
1100 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1101 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1105 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1106 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1109 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1111 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1112 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1115 /* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1116 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
1117 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
1119 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1120 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
1122 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1123 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1124 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1125 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1129 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1133 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1134 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1135 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1138 unsigned int frag_off;
1139 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1144 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1145 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1147 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1149 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1150 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1151 send an alert ourselves */
1152 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1153 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1158 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1162 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1163 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1165 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1166 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1167 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1168 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1173 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1181 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1183 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1188 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1190 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1191 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1193 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1195 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1198 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1199 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1200 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1201 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1202 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1204 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1211 if (s->msg_callback)
1212 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1213 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1215 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1216 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1218 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1223 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1225 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1226 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1229 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1230 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1232 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1233 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1236 /* Remember that a CCS has been received,
1237 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
1238 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
1239 * if no SCTP is used
1241 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1247 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1248 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1251 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1253 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1254 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1255 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1261 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1262 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1264 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1266 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1269 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1274 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1275 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1277 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1278 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1279 * protocol violations): */
1280 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1284 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1289 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1290 if (i < 0) return(i);
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1297 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1299 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1302 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1303 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1304 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1305 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1306 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1307 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1309 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1320 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1321 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1327 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1330 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1332 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1333 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1334 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1335 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1336 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1340 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1341 * but have application data. If the library was
1342 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1343 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1344 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1345 * we will indulge it.
1347 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1348 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1350 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1351 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1352 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1354 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1355 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1356 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1360 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1365 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1373 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1379 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1384 /* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
1385 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
1387 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1388 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1389 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1391 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1394 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1395 if (i < 0) return(i);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1403 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1409 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1414 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1417 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1421 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1422 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1424 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1425 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1430 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1433 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1436 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1437 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1438 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1448 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1449 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1451 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1455 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1456 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1457 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1461 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1463 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1464 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1471 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1472 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1473 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1475 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1476 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1479 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1480 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1482 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1485 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1488 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1495 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1496 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1497 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1504 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1509 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1511 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1512 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1513 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1515 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1516 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1519 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1521 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1522 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1523 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1524 * together with the actual payload) */
1525 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1526 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1529 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1531 /* insufficient space */
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1540 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1542 /* write the header */
1547 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1548 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1550 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1554 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1556 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1557 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1559 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1560 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1561 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1565 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1566 wr->length=(int)len;
1567 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1569 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1572 /* first we compress */
1573 if (s->compress != NULL)
1575 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1583 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1587 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1588 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1589 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1593 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1595 wr->length+=mac_size;
1598 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1603 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1604 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1606 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1607 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1608 * the rest of randomness */
1612 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1614 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1615 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1616 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1618 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1620 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1624 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1626 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1628 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1630 /* we should now have
1631 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1632 * wr->length long */
1633 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1634 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1636 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1637 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1638 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1639 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1640 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1643 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1645 if (create_empty_fragment)
1647 /* we are in a recursive call;
1648 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1653 /* now let's set up wb */
1654 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1657 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1658 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1659 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1660 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1661 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1663 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1664 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1671 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1675 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1677 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1680 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1681 return 1; /* this record in new */
1684 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1685 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1686 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1687 return 0; /* record previously received */
1689 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1694 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1698 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1700 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1704 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1705 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1708 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1712 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1713 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1718 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1721 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1722 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1723 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1725 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1727 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1728 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1729 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1731 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1732 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1734 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1736 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1739 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1743 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1745 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1749 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1752 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1753 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1757 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1758 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1759 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1762 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1764 if (s->msg_callback)
1765 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1766 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1768 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1769 cb=s->info_callback;
1770 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1771 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1775 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1776 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1783 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1784 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1789 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1790 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1791 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1793 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1794 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1795 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1796 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1799 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1807 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1808 unsigned long *offset)
1811 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1812 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1813 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1816 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1817 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1819 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1821 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1822 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1823 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1824 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1826 unsigned short seq_num;
1827 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1828 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1830 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1832 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1833 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1834 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1838 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1839 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1843 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1844 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1845 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1846 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1848 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1849 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1850 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1852 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1853 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1854 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1858 *priority = seq_num;
1862 else /* unknown record type */
1871 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1874 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1876 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1878 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1880 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1881 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1885 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1886 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1890 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);