3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
134 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
136 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num);
143 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
145 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
147 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
149 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
151 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
152 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
154 s->packet = rdata->packet;
155 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
156 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
157 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
159 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
160 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
167 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT *priority)
169 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
172 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
173 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
176 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
177 item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata);
178 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
180 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
181 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
183 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
187 rdata->packet = s->packet;
188 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
189 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
190 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
194 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
195 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
203 s->packet_length = 0;
204 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
205 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
207 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
224 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
227 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
229 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
239 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
241 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
242 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
243 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
245 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
246 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
247 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
248 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
251 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
255 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
258 /* Check if epoch is current. */
259 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
260 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
262 /* Process all the records. */
263 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
265 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
266 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
268 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
269 &s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
273 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
274 * have been processed */
275 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
276 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
285 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
289 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
290 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
292 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
297 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
298 if (item && item->priority == priority)
300 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
301 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
303 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
304 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
305 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
307 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
308 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
310 s->packet = rdata->packet;
311 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
312 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
313 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
315 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
318 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
328 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
334 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
335 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
340 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
341 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
343 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
345 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
346 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
347 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
348 * the decryption or by the decompression
349 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
350 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
352 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
353 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
355 /* check is not needed I believe */
356 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
358 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
363 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
366 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
368 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
369 * 1: if the padding is valid
370 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
373 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
375 s->packet_length = 0;
380 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
381 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
385 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
386 if ((sess != NULL) &&
387 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
388 (s->read_hash != NULL))
390 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
391 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
392 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
393 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
394 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
396 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
397 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
399 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
400 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
401 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
402 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
404 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
405 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
406 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
407 orig_len < mac_size+1))
409 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
414 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
416 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
417 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
418 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
419 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
422 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
423 rr->length -= mac_size;
427 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
428 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
429 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
430 rr->length -= mac_size;
431 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
434 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
435 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
437 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
443 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
445 s->packet_length = 0;
449 /* r->length is now just compressed */
450 if (s->expand != NULL)
452 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
454 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
458 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
460 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
461 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
466 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
468 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
474 /* So at this point the following is true
475 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
476 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
477 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
478 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
482 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
484 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
488 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
494 /* Call this to get a new input record.
495 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
496 * or non-blocking IO.
497 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
498 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
499 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
500 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
502 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
503 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
505 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
508 unsigned char *p = NULL;
509 unsigned short version;
510 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
511 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
515 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
516 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
517 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
519 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
520 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
523 /* get something from the wire */
525 /* check if we have the header */
526 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
527 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
529 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
530 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
531 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
533 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
534 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
536 s->packet_length = 0;
540 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
544 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
548 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
550 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
553 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
558 /* Lets check version */
559 if (!s->first_packet)
561 if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
563 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
565 s->packet_length = 0;
570 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
571 (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
573 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
575 s->packet_length = 0;
579 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
581 /* record too long, silently discard it */
583 s->packet_length = 0;
587 s->client_version = version;
588 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
591 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
593 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
595 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
597 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
598 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
602 s->packet_length = 0;
606 /* now n == rr->length,
607 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
609 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
611 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
612 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
616 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
617 goto again; /* get another record */
620 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
621 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
622 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
623 * since they arrive from different connections and
624 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
626 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
627 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
628 ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num)))
631 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
632 goto again; /* get another record */
635 /* just read a 0 length packet */
636 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
638 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
639 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
640 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
641 * anything while listening.
645 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
647 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num);
650 s->packet_length = 0;
654 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
657 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
658 goto again; /* get another record */
665 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
666 * 'type' is one of the following:
668 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
669 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
670 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
672 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
673 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
675 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
676 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
677 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
678 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
679 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
680 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
681 * Change cipher spec protocol
682 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
684 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
686 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
687 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
688 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
689 * Application data protocol
690 * none of our business
692 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
697 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
699 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
700 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
703 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
704 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
705 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
706 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
712 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
713 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
716 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
718 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
720 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
721 i=s->handshake_func(s);
722 if (i < 0) return(i);
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
731 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
733 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
734 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
735 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
736 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
739 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
740 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
741 * in advance, if any.
743 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
746 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
749 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
751 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
756 /* Check for timeout */
757 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
760 /* get new packet if necessary */
761 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
763 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
766 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
767 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
775 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
781 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
783 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
784 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
785 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
787 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
788 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
789 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
790 * than dropping the connection.
792 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num);
797 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
798 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
799 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
802 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
807 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
809 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
810 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
811 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
812 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
814 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
819 if (len <= 0) return(len);
821 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
824 n = (unsigned int)len;
826 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
833 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
841 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
842 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
844 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
845 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
848 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
849 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
850 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
852 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
854 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
855 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
856 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
858 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
860 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
861 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
862 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
864 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
865 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
867 /* Application data while renegotiating
868 * is allowed. Try again reading.
870 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
873 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
875 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
876 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
877 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
881 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
882 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
889 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
890 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
891 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
893 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
895 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
896 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
897 * non-existing alert...
901 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
906 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
907 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
909 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
912 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
916 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
917 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
918 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
920 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
922 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
923 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
924 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
926 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
928 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
929 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
930 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
932 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
937 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
940 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
941 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
943 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
944 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
947 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
949 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
951 i=s->handshake_func(s);
952 if (i < 0) return(i);
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
959 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
961 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
964 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
965 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
966 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
967 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
968 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
970 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
971 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
977 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
978 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
982 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
984 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
985 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
987 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
990 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
991 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
993 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
995 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
996 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1000 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1001 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1004 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1006 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1007 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1009 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1013 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1014 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1015 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1018 unsigned int frag_off;
1019 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1024 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1025 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1027 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1029 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1030 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1031 send an alert ourselves */
1032 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1033 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1038 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1042 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1043 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1045 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1046 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1047 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1048 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1053 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1061 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1063 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1068 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1070 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1071 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1073 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1075 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1076 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1077 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1078 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1081 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1083 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1090 if (s->msg_callback)
1091 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1092 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1094 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1095 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1097 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1102 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1104 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1105 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1108 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1109 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1111 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1112 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1117 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1118 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1121 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1123 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1124 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1125 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1131 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1132 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1134 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1136 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1139 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1144 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1145 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1147 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1148 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1149 * protocol violations): */
1150 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1154 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1158 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1159 if (i < 0) return(i);
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1166 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1168 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1171 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1172 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1173 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1174 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1175 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1176 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1177 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1178 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1189 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1190 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1196 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1199 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1201 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1202 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1203 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1204 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1205 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1209 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1210 * but have application data. If the library was
1211 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1212 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1213 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1214 * we will indulge it.
1216 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1217 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1219 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1220 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1221 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1223 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1224 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1225 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1229 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1234 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1242 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1248 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1252 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1254 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1255 if (i < 0) return(i);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1263 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1269 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1274 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1277 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1281 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1282 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1284 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1285 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1290 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1293 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1296 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1297 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1298 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1308 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1309 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1311 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1315 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1316 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1317 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1321 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1323 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1324 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1331 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1332 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1333 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1335 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1336 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1339 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1340 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1342 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1345 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1348 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1355 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1356 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1357 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1363 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1365 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1367 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1368 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1369 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1371 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1372 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1375 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1377 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1378 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1379 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1380 * together with the actual payload) */
1381 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1382 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1385 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1387 /* insufficient space */
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1393 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1397 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1399 /* write the header */
1404 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1405 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
1406 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
1408 *(p++)=(s->version>>8),
1409 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1411 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1415 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1417 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1418 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1420 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1421 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1422 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1426 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1427 wr->length=(int)len;
1428 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1430 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1433 /* first we compress */
1434 if (s->compress != NULL)
1436 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1444 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1448 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1449 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1450 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1454 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1455 wr->length+=mac_size;
1458 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1463 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1464 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1466 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1467 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1468 * the rest of randomness */
1472 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1474 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1475 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1476 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1478 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1480 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1484 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1486 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1488 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1490 /* we should now have
1491 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1492 * wr->length long */
1493 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1494 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1496 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1497 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1498 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1499 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1500 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1503 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1505 if (create_empty_fragment)
1507 /* we are in a recursive call;
1508 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1513 /* now let's set up wb */
1514 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1517 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1518 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1519 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1520 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1521 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1523 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1524 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1531 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
1534 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1535 PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
1537 PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp;
1539 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1540 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1542 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1543 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1546 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1547 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1549 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1550 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1551 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1552 return 1; /* this record is new */
1555 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1557 if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length)
1559 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1560 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1561 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1564 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1567 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1568 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1569 offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1570 if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset))
1572 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1573 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1578 mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
1579 if (bitmap->map & mask)
1580 return 0; /* record previously received */
1583 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1584 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1585 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1590 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1597 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1598 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1600 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1602 /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support
1603 * on 32-bit machines */
1604 if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1605 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1607 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num));
1608 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1);
1610 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1612 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift);
1613 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp);
1615 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0);
1616 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1);
1617 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1619 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1);
1620 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length);
1621 ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx);
1622 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx);
1623 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx);
1627 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1628 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1629 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1631 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift);
1634 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1635 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1639 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1642 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1643 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1644 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1646 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1648 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1649 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1650 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1652 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1653 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1655 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1657 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1660 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1664 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1666 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1670 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1673 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1674 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1678 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1679 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1680 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1683 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1685 if (s->msg_callback)
1686 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1687 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1689 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1690 cb=s->info_callback;
1691 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1692 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1696 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1697 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1704 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1705 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1710 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1711 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1712 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1714 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1715 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1716 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1717 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1720 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1728 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1729 unsigned long *offset)
1732 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1733 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1734 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1737 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1738 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1740 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1742 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1743 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1744 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1745 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1747 unsigned short seq_num;
1748 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1749 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1751 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1753 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1754 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1755 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1759 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1760 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1764 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1765 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1766 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1767 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1769 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1770 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1771 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1773 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1774 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1775 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1779 *priority = seq_num;
1783 else /* unknown record type */
1792 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1795 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1797 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1799 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1802 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1803 s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length;
1804 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num),
1805 &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1807 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1808 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1809 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1810 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1811 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1815 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1816 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1820 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1823 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1825 bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num)
1829 _num = (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[0]) << 56) |
1830 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[1]) << 48) |
1831 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[2]) << 40) |
1832 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[3]) << 32) |
1833 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[4]) << 24) |
1834 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[5]) << 16) |
1835 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[6]) << 8) |
1836 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[7]) );