3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
134 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
136 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num);
143 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
145 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
147 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
149 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
151 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
152 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
154 s->packet = rdata->packet;
155 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
156 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
157 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
159 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
160 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
167 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT *priority)
169 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
172 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
173 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
176 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
177 item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata);
178 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
180 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
181 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
183 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
187 rdata->packet = s->packet;
188 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
189 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
190 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
194 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
195 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
203 s->packet_length = 0;
204 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
205 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
207 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
224 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
227 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
229 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
239 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
241 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
242 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
243 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
245 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
246 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
247 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
248 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
251 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
255 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
258 /* Check if epoch is current. */
259 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
260 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
262 /* Process all the records. */
263 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
265 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
266 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
268 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
269 &s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
273 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
274 * have been processed */
275 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
276 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
285 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
289 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
290 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
292 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
297 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
298 if (item && item->priority == priority)
300 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
301 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
303 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
304 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
305 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
307 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
308 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
310 s->packet = rdata->packet;
311 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
312 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
313 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
315 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
318 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
328 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
334 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
335 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
340 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
341 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
343 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
345 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
346 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
347 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
348 * the decryption or by the decompression
349 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
350 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
352 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
353 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
355 /* check is not needed I believe */
356 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
358 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
363 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
366 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
368 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
369 * 1: if the padding is valid
370 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
373 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
375 s->packet_length = 0;
380 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
381 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
385 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
386 if ((sess != NULL) &&
387 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
388 (s->read_hash != NULL))
390 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
391 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
392 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
393 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
394 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
396 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
397 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
399 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
400 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
401 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
402 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
404 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
405 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
406 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
407 orig_len < mac_size+1))
409 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
414 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
416 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
417 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
418 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
419 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
422 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
423 rr->length -= mac_size;
427 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
428 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
429 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
430 rr->length -= mac_size;
431 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
434 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
435 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
437 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
443 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
445 s->packet_length = 0;
449 /* r->length is now just compressed */
450 if (s->expand != NULL)
452 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
454 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
458 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
460 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
461 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
466 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
468 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
474 /* So at this point the following is true
475 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
476 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
477 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
478 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
482 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
484 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
488 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
494 /* Call this to get a new input record.
495 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
496 * or non-blocking IO.
497 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
498 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
499 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
500 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
502 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
503 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
505 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
508 unsigned char *p = NULL;
509 unsigned short version;
510 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
511 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
515 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
516 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
517 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
519 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
520 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
523 /* get something from the wire */
525 /* check if we have the header */
526 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
527 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
529 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
530 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
531 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
533 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
534 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
536 s->packet_length = 0;
540 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
544 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
548 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
550 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
553 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
558 /* Lets check version */
559 if (!s->first_packet)
561 if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
563 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
565 s->packet_length = 0;
570 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
571 (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
573 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
575 s->packet_length = 0;
579 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
581 /* record too long, silently discard it */
583 s->packet_length = 0;
587 s->client_version = version;
588 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
591 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
593 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
595 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
597 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
598 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
600 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
604 s->packet_length = 0;
608 /* now n == rr->length,
609 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
611 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
613 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
614 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
618 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
619 goto again; /* get another record */
622 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
623 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
624 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
625 * since they arrive from different connections and
626 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
628 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
629 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
630 ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num)))
633 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
634 goto again; /* get another record */
637 /* just read a 0 length packet */
638 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
640 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
641 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
642 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
643 * anything while listening.
647 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
649 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num);
652 s->packet_length = 0;
656 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
659 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
660 goto again; /* get another record */
667 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
668 * 'type' is one of the following:
670 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
671 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
672 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
674 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
675 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
677 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
678 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
679 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
680 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
681 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
682 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
683 * Change cipher spec protocol
684 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
686 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
688 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
689 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
690 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
691 * Application data protocol
692 * none of our business
694 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
699 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
701 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
702 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
705 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
706 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
707 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
708 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
714 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
715 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
718 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
720 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
722 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
723 i=s->handshake_func(s);
724 if (i < 0) return(i);
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
733 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
735 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
736 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
737 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
738 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
741 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
742 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
743 * in advance, if any.
745 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
748 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
751 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
753 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
758 /* Check for timeout */
759 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
762 /* get new packet if necessary */
763 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
765 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
768 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
769 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
777 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
783 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
785 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
786 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
787 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
789 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
790 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
791 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
792 * than dropping the connection.
794 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num);
799 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
800 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
801 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
804 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
809 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
811 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
812 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
813 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
814 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
816 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
821 if (len <= 0) return(len);
823 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
826 n = (unsigned int)len;
828 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
835 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
843 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
844 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
846 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
847 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
850 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
851 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
852 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
854 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
856 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
857 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
858 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
860 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
862 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
863 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
864 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
866 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
867 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
869 /* Application data while renegotiating
870 * is allowed. Try again reading.
872 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
875 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
877 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
878 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
879 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
883 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
884 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
891 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
892 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
893 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
895 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
897 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
898 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
899 * non-existing alert...
903 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
908 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
909 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
911 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
914 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
918 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
919 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
920 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
922 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
924 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
925 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
926 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
928 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
930 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
931 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
932 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
934 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
939 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
942 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
943 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
945 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
946 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
949 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
951 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
953 i=s->handshake_func(s);
954 if (i < 0) return(i);
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
961 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
963 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
966 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
967 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
968 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
969 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
970 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
972 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
973 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
979 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
980 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
984 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
986 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
987 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
989 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
992 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
993 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
995 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
997 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
998 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1002 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1003 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1006 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1008 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1009 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1011 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1015 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1016 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1017 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1020 unsigned int frag_off;
1021 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1026 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1027 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1029 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1031 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1032 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1033 send an alert ourselves */
1034 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1035 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1040 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1044 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1045 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1047 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1048 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1049 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1050 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1055 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1063 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1065 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1070 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1072 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1073 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1075 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1077 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1078 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1079 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1080 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1083 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1085 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1092 if (s->msg_callback)
1093 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1094 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1096 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1097 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1099 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1104 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1106 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1107 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1110 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1111 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1113 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1114 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1119 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1120 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1123 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1125 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1126 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1127 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1133 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1134 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1136 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1138 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1141 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1146 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1147 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1149 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1150 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1151 * protocol violations): */
1152 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1156 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1160 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1161 if (i < 0) return(i);
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1168 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1170 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1173 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1174 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1175 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1176 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1177 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1178 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1179 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1180 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1191 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1192 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1198 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1201 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1203 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1204 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1205 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1206 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1207 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1211 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1212 * but have application data. If the library was
1213 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1214 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1215 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1216 * we will indulge it.
1218 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1219 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1221 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1222 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1223 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1225 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1226 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1227 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1231 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1236 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1244 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1250 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1254 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1256 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1257 if (i < 0) return(i);
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1265 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1271 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1276 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1279 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1283 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1284 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1286 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1287 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1292 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1295 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1298 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1299 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1300 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1310 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1311 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1313 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1317 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1318 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1319 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1323 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1325 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1326 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1333 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1334 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1335 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1337 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1338 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1341 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1342 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1344 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1347 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1350 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1357 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1358 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1359 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1365 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1367 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1369 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1370 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1371 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1373 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1374 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1377 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1379 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1380 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1381 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1382 * together with the actual payload) */
1383 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1384 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1387 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1389 /* insufficient space */
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1395 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1399 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1401 /* write the header */
1406 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1407 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
1408 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
1410 *(p++)=(s->version>>8),
1411 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1413 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1417 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1419 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1420 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1422 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1423 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1424 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1428 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1429 wr->length=(int)len;
1430 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1432 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1435 /* first we compress */
1436 if (s->compress != NULL)
1438 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1446 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1450 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1451 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1452 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1456 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1457 wr->length+=mac_size;
1460 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1465 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1466 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1468 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1469 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1470 * the rest of randomness */
1474 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1476 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1477 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1478 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1480 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1482 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1486 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1488 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1490 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1492 /* we should now have
1493 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1494 * wr->length long */
1495 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1496 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1498 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1499 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1500 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1501 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1502 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1505 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1507 if (create_empty_fragment)
1509 /* we are in a recursive call;
1510 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1515 /* now let's set up wb */
1516 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1519 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1520 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1521 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1522 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1523 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1525 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1526 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1533 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
1536 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1537 PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
1539 PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp;
1541 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1542 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1544 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1545 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1548 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1549 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1551 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1552 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1553 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1554 return 1; /* this record is new */
1557 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1559 if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length)
1561 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1562 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1563 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1566 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1569 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1570 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1571 offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1572 if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset))
1574 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1575 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1580 mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
1581 if (bitmap->map & mask)
1582 return 0; /* record previously received */
1585 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1586 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1587 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1592 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1599 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1600 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1602 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1604 /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support
1605 * on 32-bit machines */
1606 if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1607 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1609 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num));
1610 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1);
1612 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1614 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift);
1615 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp);
1617 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0);
1618 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1);
1619 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1621 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1);
1622 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length);
1623 ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx);
1624 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx);
1625 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx);
1629 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1630 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1631 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1633 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift);
1636 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1637 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1641 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1644 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1645 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1646 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1648 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1650 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1651 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1652 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1654 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1655 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1657 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1659 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1662 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1666 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1668 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1672 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1675 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1676 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1680 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1681 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1682 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1685 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1687 if (s->msg_callback)
1688 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1689 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1691 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1692 cb=s->info_callback;
1693 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1694 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1698 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1699 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1706 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1707 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1712 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1713 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1714 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1716 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1717 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1718 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1719 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1722 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1730 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1731 unsigned long *offset)
1734 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1735 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1736 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1739 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1740 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1742 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1744 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1745 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1746 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1747 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1749 unsigned short seq_num;
1750 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1751 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1753 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1755 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1756 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1757 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1761 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1762 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1766 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1767 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1768 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1769 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1771 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1772 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1773 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1775 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1776 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1777 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1781 *priority = seq_num;
1785 else /* unknown record type */
1794 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1797 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1799 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1801 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1804 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1805 s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length;
1806 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num),
1807 &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1809 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1810 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1811 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1812 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1813 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1817 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1818 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1822 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1825 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1827 bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num)
1831 _num = (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[0]) << 56) |
1832 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[1]) << 48) |
1833 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[2]) << 40) |
1834 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[3]) << 32) |
1835 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[4]) << 24) |
1836 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[5]) << 16) |
1837 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[6]) << 8) |
1838 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[7]) );