3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
134 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
136 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num);
142 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
144 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
146 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
148 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
150 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
152 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
153 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
155 s->packet = rdata->packet;
156 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
157 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
158 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
165 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT *priority)
167 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
170 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
171 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
174 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
175 item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata);
176 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
178 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
179 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
181 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
185 rdata->packet = s->packet;
186 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
187 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
188 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
192 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
193 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
201 s->packet_length = 0;
202 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
203 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
205 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
207 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
218 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
222 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
225 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
227 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
237 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
239 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
240 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
241 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
243 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
244 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
245 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
246 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
249 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
253 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
256 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
257 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
259 /* Check if epoch is current. */
260 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
261 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
263 /* Process all the records. */
264 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
266 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
267 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
269 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
270 &s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
274 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
275 * have been processed */
276 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
277 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
286 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
290 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
291 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
293 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
298 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
299 if (item && item->priority == priority)
301 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
302 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
304 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
305 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
306 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
308 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
309 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
311 s->packet = rdata->packet;
312 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
313 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
314 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
316 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
319 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
329 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
336 unsigned int mac_size;
337 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
343 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
344 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
346 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
348 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
349 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
350 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
351 * the decryption or by the decompression
352 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
353 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
355 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
356 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
358 /* check is not needed I believe */
359 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
361 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
366 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
369 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
373 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
376 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
377 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
381 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
382 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
386 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
387 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
388 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
389 (s->read_hash == NULL))
394 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
396 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
398 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
399 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
400 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
403 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
406 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
407 if (rr->length < mac_size)
409 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
410 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
414 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
417 rr->length-=mac_size;
418 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
419 if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
421 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
425 /* r->length is now just compressed */
426 if (s->expand != NULL)
428 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
430 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
431 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
434 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
436 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
437 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
442 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
444 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
450 /* So at this point the following is true
451 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
452 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
453 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
454 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
458 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
460 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
463 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
464 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
465 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
466 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
467 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
468 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
469 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
470 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
472 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
478 /* Call this to get a new input record.
479 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
480 * or non-blocking IO.
481 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
482 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
483 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
484 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
486 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
487 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
489 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
493 unsigned char *p = NULL;
494 unsigned short version;
495 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
496 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
501 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
502 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
503 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
506 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
507 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
510 /* get something from the wire */
512 /* check if we have the header */
513 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
514 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
516 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
517 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
518 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
520 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
521 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
523 s->packet_length = 0;
527 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
531 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
535 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
537 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
540 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
545 /* Lets check version */
546 if (!s->first_packet)
548 if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
550 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
552 s->packet_length = 0;
557 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
558 (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
560 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
562 s->packet_length = 0;
566 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
568 /* record too long, silently discard it */
570 s->packet_length = 0;
574 s->client_version = version;
575 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
578 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
580 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
582 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
584 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
585 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
587 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
591 s->packet_length = 0;
595 /* now n == rr->length,
596 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
598 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
600 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
601 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
605 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
606 goto again; /* get another record */
609 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
610 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
611 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
612 * since they arrive from different connections and
613 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
615 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
616 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
617 ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num)))
620 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
621 goto again; /* get another record */
624 /* just read a 0 length packet */
625 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
627 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), buffer it
628 * since it cannot be processed at this time.
629 * Records from the next epoch are marked as received even though they are
630 * not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource DoS attack */
633 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
634 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num);
636 s->packet_length = 0;
640 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
643 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
648 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
649 * 'type' is one of the following:
651 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
652 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
653 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
655 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
656 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
658 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
659 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
660 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
661 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
662 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
663 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
664 * Change cipher spec protocol
665 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
667 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
669 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
670 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
671 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
672 * Application data protocol
673 * none of our business
675 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
680 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
682 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
683 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
686 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
687 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
688 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
689 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
691 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
695 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
696 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
699 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
701 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
703 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
704 i=s->handshake_func(s);
705 if (i < 0) return(i);
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
714 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
716 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
717 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
718 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
719 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
722 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
723 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
724 * in advance, if any.
726 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
729 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
732 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
734 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
739 /* Check for timeout */
740 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
743 /* get new packet if necessary */
744 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
746 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
749 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
750 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
758 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
760 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
761 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
762 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
764 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
765 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
766 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
767 * than dropping the connection.
769 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0);
774 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
775 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
776 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
779 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
784 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
786 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
787 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
788 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
789 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
791 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
792 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
796 if (len <= 0) return(len);
798 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
801 n = (unsigned int)len;
803 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
810 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
818 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
819 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
821 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
822 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
825 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
826 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
827 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
829 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
831 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
832 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
833 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
835 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
837 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
838 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
839 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
841 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
842 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
844 /* Application data while renegotiating
845 * is allowed. Try again reading.
847 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
850 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
852 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
853 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
854 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
858 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
859 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
866 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
867 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
868 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
870 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
872 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
873 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
874 * non-existing alert...
878 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
883 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
884 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
886 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
889 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
893 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
894 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
895 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
897 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
899 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
900 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
901 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
903 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
905 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
906 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
907 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
909 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
914 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
917 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
918 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
920 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
921 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
925 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
927 i=s->handshake_func(s);
928 if (i < 0) return(i);
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
935 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
937 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
940 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
941 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
942 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
943 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
944 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
946 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
947 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
953 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
954 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
958 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
960 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
961 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
963 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
966 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
967 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
969 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
971 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
972 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
976 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
977 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
980 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
982 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
983 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
985 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
989 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
990 /* now check if it's a missing record */
991 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
994 unsigned int frag_off;
995 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1000 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1001 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1003 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1005 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1006 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1007 send an alert ourselves */
1008 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1009 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1014 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1018 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1019 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1021 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1022 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1023 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1024 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1029 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1037 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1039 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1044 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1046 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1047 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1049 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1051 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1052 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1053 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1054 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1057 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1059 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1066 if (s->msg_callback)
1067 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1068 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1070 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1071 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1073 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1078 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1080 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1081 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1084 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1085 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1087 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1088 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1093 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1094 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1097 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1099 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1100 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1101 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1107 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1108 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1110 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1112 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1117 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1118 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1120 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1121 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1122 * protocol violations): */
1123 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1127 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1131 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1132 if (i < 0) return(i);
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1139 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1141 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1144 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1145 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1146 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1147 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1148 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1149 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1150 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1151 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1162 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1163 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1169 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1172 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1174 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1175 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1176 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1177 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1178 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1182 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1183 * but have application data. If the library was
1184 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1185 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1186 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1187 * we will indulge it.
1189 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1190 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1192 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1193 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1194 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1196 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1197 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1198 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1202 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1207 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1215 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1221 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1225 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1227 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1228 if (i < 0) return(i);
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1236 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1242 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1247 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1250 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1254 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1255 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1257 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1258 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1263 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1266 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1269 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1270 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1271 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1281 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1282 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1284 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1288 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1289 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1290 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1294 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1296 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1297 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1304 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1305 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1306 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1308 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1309 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1312 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1313 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1315 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1318 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1321 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1328 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1329 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1330 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1336 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1338 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1340 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1341 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1342 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1344 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1345 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1348 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1350 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1351 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1352 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1353 * together with the actual payload) */
1354 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1355 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1358 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1360 /* insufficient space */
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1370 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1372 /* write the header */
1377 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1378 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
1379 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
1381 *(p++)=(s->version>>8),
1382 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1384 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1388 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1390 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1391 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1393 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1394 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1395 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1399 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1400 wr->length=(int)len;
1401 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1403 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1406 /* first we compress */
1407 if (s->compress != NULL)
1409 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1417 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1421 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1422 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1423 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1427 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1428 wr->length+=mac_size;
1431 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1436 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1437 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1439 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1440 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1441 * the rest of randomness */
1445 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1447 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1448 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1449 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1451 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1453 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1457 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1459 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1461 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1463 /* we should now have
1464 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1465 * wr->length long */
1466 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1467 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1469 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1470 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1471 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1472 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1473 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1476 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1478 if (create_empty_fragment)
1480 /* we are in a recursive call;
1481 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1486 /* now let's set up wb */
1487 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1490 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1491 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1492 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1493 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1494 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1496 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1497 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1504 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
1507 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1508 PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
1510 PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp;
1512 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1513 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1515 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1516 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1519 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1520 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1522 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1523 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1524 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1525 return 1; /* this record is new */
1528 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1530 if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length)
1532 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1533 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1534 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1537 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1540 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1541 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1542 offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1543 if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset))
1545 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1546 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1551 mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
1552 if (bitmap->map & mask)
1553 return 0; /* record previously received */
1556 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1557 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1558 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1563 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1570 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1571 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1573 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1575 /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support
1576 * on 32-bit machines */
1577 if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1578 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1580 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num));
1581 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1);
1583 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1585 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift);
1586 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp);
1588 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0);
1589 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1);
1590 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1592 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1);
1593 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length);
1594 ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx);
1595 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx);
1596 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx);
1600 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1601 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1602 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1604 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift);
1607 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1608 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1612 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1615 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1616 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1617 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1619 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1621 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1622 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1623 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1625 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1626 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1628 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1630 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1633 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1637 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1639 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1643 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1646 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1647 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1651 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1652 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1653 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1656 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1658 if (s->msg_callback)
1659 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1660 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1662 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1663 cb=s->info_callback;
1664 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1665 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1669 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1670 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1677 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1678 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1683 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1684 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1685 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1687 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1688 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1689 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1690 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1693 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1701 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1702 unsigned long *offset)
1705 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1706 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1707 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1710 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1711 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1713 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1715 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1716 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1717 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1718 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1720 unsigned short seq_num;
1721 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1722 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1724 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1726 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1727 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1728 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1732 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1733 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1737 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1738 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1739 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1740 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1742 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1743 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1744 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1746 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1747 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1748 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1752 *priority = seq_num;
1756 else /* unknown record type */
1765 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1768 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1770 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1772 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1775 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1776 s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length;
1777 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num),
1778 &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1780 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1781 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1782 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1783 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1784 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1788 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1789 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1793 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1796 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1798 bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num)
1802 _num = (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[0]) << 56) |
1803 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[1]) << 48) |
1804 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[2]) << 40) |
1805 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[3]) << 32) |
1806 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[4]) << 24) |
1807 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[5]) << 16) |
1808 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[6]) << 8) |
1809 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[7]) );
1818 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1820 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));