3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
182 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
184 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
186 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
188 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
190 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
192 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
195 s->packet = rdata->packet;
196 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
198 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
205 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
207 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
210 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
211 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
214 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
215 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
216 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
218 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
219 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
221 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
225 rdata->packet = s->packet;
226 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
227 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
228 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
232 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
233 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
241 s->packet_length = 0;
242 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
243 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
245 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
247 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
262 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
265 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
267 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
277 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
279 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
280 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
281 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
283 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
284 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
285 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
286 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
289 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
293 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
296 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
297 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
299 /* Check if epoch is current. */
300 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
301 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
303 /* Process all the records. */
304 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
306 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
307 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
309 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
310 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
314 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
315 * have been processed */
316 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
317 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
326 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
330 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
331 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
333 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
338 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
339 if (item && item->priority == priority)
341 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
342 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
344 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
345 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
346 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
348 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
349 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
351 s->packet = rdata->packet;
352 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
353 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
354 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
356 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
359 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
369 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
376 unsigned int mac_size;
377 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
383 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
384 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
386 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
388 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
389 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
390 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
391 * the decryption or by the decompression
392 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
393 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
395 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
396 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
398 /* check is not needed I believe */
399 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
401 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
406 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
409 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
413 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
416 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
417 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
421 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
422 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
426 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
427 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
428 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
429 (s->read_hash == NULL))
434 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
436 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
437 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
440 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
442 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
443 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
444 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
447 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
450 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
451 if (rr->length < mac_size)
453 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
454 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
458 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
461 rr->length-=mac_size;
462 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
463 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
465 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
469 /* r->length is now just compressed */
470 if (s->expand != NULL)
472 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
474 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
475 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
478 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
480 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
486 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
488 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
489 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
494 /* So at this point the following is true
495 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
496 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
497 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
498 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
502 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
504 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
507 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
508 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
509 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
510 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
511 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
512 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
513 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
514 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
516 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
522 /* Call this to get a new input record.
523 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
524 * or non-blocking IO.
525 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
526 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
527 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
528 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
530 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
531 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
533 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
538 unsigned short version;
539 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
540 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
545 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
546 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
547 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
550 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
551 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
554 /* get something from the wire */
556 /* check if we have the header */
557 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
558 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
560 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
561 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
562 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
564 OPENSSL_assert(s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
566 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
570 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
574 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
576 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
579 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
584 /* Lets check version */
585 if (!s->first_packet)
587 if (version != s->version)
589 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
591 s->packet_length = 0;
596 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
598 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
600 s->packet_length = 0;
604 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
606 /* record too long, silently discard it */
608 s->packet_length = 0;
612 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
615 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
617 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
619 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
621 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
622 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
624 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
628 s->packet_length = 0;
632 /* now n == rr->length,
633 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
635 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
637 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
638 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
642 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
643 goto again; /* get another record */
646 /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
647 if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
650 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
651 goto again; /* get another record */
654 /* just read a 0 length packet */
655 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
657 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
658 * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records
659 * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they
660 * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource
664 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
665 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
667 s->packet_length = 0;
671 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
674 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
678 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
683 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
684 * 'type' is one of the following:
686 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
687 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
688 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
690 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
691 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
693 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
694 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
695 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
696 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
697 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
698 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
699 * Change cipher spec protocol
700 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
702 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
704 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
705 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
706 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
707 * Application data protocol
708 * none of our business
710 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
715 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
717 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
718 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
721 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
722 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
723 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
724 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
726 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
730 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
731 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
734 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
736 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
738 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
739 i=s->handshake_func(s);
740 if (i < 0) return(i);
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
749 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
751 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
752 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
753 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
754 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
757 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
758 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
759 * in advance, if any.
761 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
764 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
767 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
769 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
774 /* Check for timeout */
775 if (dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
777 if (dtls1_read_failed(s, -1) > 0);
781 /* get new packet if necessary */
782 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
784 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
787 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
788 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
796 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
798 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
799 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
800 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
802 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
803 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
804 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
805 * than dropping the connection.
807 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0);
812 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
813 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
814 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
817 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
822 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
824 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
825 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
826 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
827 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
829 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
834 if (len <= 0) return(len);
836 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
839 n = (unsigned int)len;
841 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
848 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
856 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
857 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
859 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
860 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
863 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
864 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
865 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
867 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
869 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
870 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
871 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
873 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
875 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
876 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
877 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
879 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
880 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
882 /* Application data while renegotiating
883 * is allowed. Try again reading.
885 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
888 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
890 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
891 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
892 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
896 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
897 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
904 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
905 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
906 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
908 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
910 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
911 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
912 * non-existing alert...
916 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
921 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
922 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
924 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
927 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
931 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
932 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
933 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
935 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
937 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
938 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
939 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
941 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
943 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
944 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
945 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
947 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
952 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
955 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
956 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
958 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
959 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
963 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
965 i=s->handshake_func(s);
966 if (i < 0) return(i);
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
973 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
975 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
978 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
979 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
980 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
981 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
982 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
984 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
985 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
991 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
992 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
996 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
998 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
999 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1001 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1003 if (s->msg_callback)
1004 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1005 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1007 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1008 cb=s->info_callback;
1009 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1010 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1014 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1015 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1018 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1020 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1021 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1023 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1027 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1028 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1029 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1032 unsigned int frag_off;
1033 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1038 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1039 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1041 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1043 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1044 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1045 send an alert ourselves */
1046 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1047 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1052 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1056 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1057 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1059 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1060 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1061 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1062 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1067 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1075 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1077 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1082 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1084 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1085 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1087 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1089 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1092 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1093 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1094 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1095 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1096 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1098 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1105 if (s->msg_callback)
1106 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1107 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1109 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1110 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1112 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1117 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1119 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1120 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1123 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1124 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1126 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1127 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1132 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1133 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1136 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1138 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1139 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1140 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1146 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1147 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1149 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1151 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1156 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1157 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1159 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1160 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1161 * protocol violations): */
1162 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1166 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1170 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1171 if (i < 0) return(i);
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1178 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1180 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1183 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1184 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1185 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1186 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1187 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1188 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1189 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1190 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1201 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1202 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1208 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1211 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1213 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1214 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1215 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1216 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1217 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1221 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1222 * but have application data. If the library was
1223 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1224 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1225 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1226 * we will indulge it.
1228 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1229 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1231 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1232 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1233 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1235 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1236 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1237 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1241 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1246 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1254 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1260 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1265 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1267 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1268 if (i < 0) return(i);
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1281 /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to
1282 * the currently known MTU */
1283 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1284 if (i <= 0) return i;
1286 if ((i == (int)n) ||
1287 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1288 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
1290 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
1291 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
1292 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
1304 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1307 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1311 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1312 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1314 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1315 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1320 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1323 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1326 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1327 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1328 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1338 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1339 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1341 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1343 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
1344 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
1348 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1353 /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records
1354 * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */
1356 mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU, 0, NULL);
1357 mtu += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* HM already inserted */
1361 if (mtu > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1362 mtu = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1369 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
1376 if ( (int)s->s3->wnum + i == len)
1384 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1386 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1387 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1394 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1395 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1396 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1398 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1399 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1402 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1403 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1405 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1408 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1411 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1418 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1419 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1420 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1427 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1432 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1434 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1435 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1436 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1438 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1439 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1442 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1444 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1445 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1446 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1447 * together with the actual payload) */
1448 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1449 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1452 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1454 /* insufficient space */
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1460 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1463 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1465 /* write the header */
1470 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1471 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1473 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1477 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1479 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1480 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1482 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1483 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1484 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1488 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1489 wr->length=(int)len;
1490 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1492 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1495 /* first we compress */
1496 if (s->compress != NULL)
1498 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1506 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1510 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1511 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1512 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1516 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1518 wr->length+=mac_size;
1521 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1526 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1527 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1529 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1530 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1531 * the rest of randomness */
1535 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1537 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1538 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1539 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1541 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1543 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1547 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1549 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1551 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1553 /* we should now have
1554 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1555 * wr->length long */
1556 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1557 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1559 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1560 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1561 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1562 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1563 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1566 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1568 if (create_empty_fragment)
1570 /* we are in a recursive call;
1571 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1576 /* now let's set up wb */
1577 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1580 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1581 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1582 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1583 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1584 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1586 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1587 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1594 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1598 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1600 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1603 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1604 return 1; /* this record in new */
1607 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1608 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1609 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1610 return 0; /* record previously received */
1612 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1617 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1621 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1623 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1627 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1628 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1631 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1635 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1636 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1641 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1644 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1645 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1646 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1648 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1650 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1651 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1652 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1654 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1655 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1657 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1659 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1662 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1666 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1668 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1672 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1675 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1676 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1680 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1681 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1682 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1685 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1687 if (s->msg_callback)
1688 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1689 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1691 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1692 cb=s->info_callback;
1693 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1694 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1698 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1699 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1706 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1707 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1712 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1713 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1714 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1716 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1717 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1718 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1719 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1722 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1730 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1731 unsigned long *offset)
1734 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1735 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1736 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1739 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1740 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1742 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1744 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1745 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1746 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1747 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1749 unsigned short seq_num;
1750 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1751 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1753 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1755 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1756 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1757 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1761 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1762 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1766 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1767 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1768 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1769 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1771 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1772 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1773 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1775 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1776 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1777 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1781 *priority = seq_num;
1785 else /* unknown record type */
1794 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1797 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1799 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1801 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1803 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1804 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1808 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1809 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1813 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1818 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1820 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));