3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
134 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
136 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num);
143 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
145 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
147 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
149 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
151 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
152 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
154 s->packet = rdata->packet;
155 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
156 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
157 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
159 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
160 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
167 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT *priority)
169 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
172 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
173 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
176 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
177 item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata);
178 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
180 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
181 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
183 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
187 rdata->packet = s->packet;
188 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
189 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
190 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
194 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
195 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
203 s->packet_length = 0;
204 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
205 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
207 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
224 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
227 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
229 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
239 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
241 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
242 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
243 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
245 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
246 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
247 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
248 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
251 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
255 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
258 /* Check if epoch is current. */
259 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
260 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
262 /* Process all the records. */
263 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
265 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
266 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
268 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
269 &s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
273 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
274 * have been processed */
275 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
276 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
285 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
289 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
290 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
292 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
297 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
298 if (item && item->priority == priority)
300 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
301 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
303 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
304 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
305 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
307 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
308 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
310 s->packet = rdata->packet;
311 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
312 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
313 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
315 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
318 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
328 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
334 unsigned int mac_size;
335 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
340 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
341 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
343 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
345 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
346 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
347 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
348 * the decryption or by the decompression
349 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
350 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
352 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
353 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
355 /* check is not needed I believe */
356 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
358 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
363 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
365 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
367 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
369 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
370 * 1: if the padding is valid
371 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
374 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
376 s->packet_length = 0;
381 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
382 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
386 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
387 if ((sess != NULL) &&
388 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
389 (s->read_hash != NULL))
391 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
392 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
393 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
394 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
395 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
397 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
398 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
399 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
400 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
402 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
403 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
404 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
405 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
407 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
412 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
414 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
415 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
416 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
417 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
420 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
421 rr->length -= mac_size;
425 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
426 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
427 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
428 rr->length -= mac_size;
429 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
432 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
433 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
435 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
441 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
443 s->packet_length = 0;
447 /* r->length is now just compressed */
448 if (s->expand != NULL)
450 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
452 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
456 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
458 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
459 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
464 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
466 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
467 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
472 /* So at this point the following is true
473 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
474 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
475 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
476 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
480 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
482 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
486 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
492 /* Call this to get a new input record.
493 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
494 * or non-blocking IO.
495 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
496 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
497 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
498 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
500 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
501 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
503 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
506 unsigned char *p = NULL;
507 unsigned short version;
508 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
509 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
513 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
514 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
515 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
517 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
518 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
521 /* get something from the wire */
523 /* check if we have the header */
524 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
525 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
527 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
528 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
529 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
531 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
532 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
534 s->packet_length = 0;
538 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
542 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
546 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
548 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
551 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
556 /* Lets check version */
557 if (!s->first_packet)
559 if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
561 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
563 s->packet_length = 0;
568 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
569 (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
571 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
573 s->packet_length = 0;
577 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
579 /* record too long, silently discard it */
581 s->packet_length = 0;
585 s->client_version = version;
586 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
589 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
591 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
593 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
595 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
596 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
598 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
602 s->packet_length = 0;
606 /* now n == rr->length,
607 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
609 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
611 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
612 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
616 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
617 goto again; /* get another record */
620 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
621 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
622 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
623 * since they arrive from different connections and
624 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
626 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
627 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
628 ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num)))
631 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
632 goto again; /* get another record */
635 /* just read a 0 length packet */
636 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
638 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
639 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
640 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
641 * anything while listening.
645 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
647 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num);
650 s->packet_length = 0;
654 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
657 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
658 goto again; /* get another record */
665 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
666 * 'type' is one of the following:
668 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
669 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
670 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
672 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
673 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
675 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
676 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
677 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
678 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
679 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
680 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
681 * Change cipher spec protocol
682 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
684 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
686 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
687 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
688 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
689 * Application data protocol
690 * none of our business
692 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
697 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
699 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
700 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
703 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
704 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
705 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
706 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
708 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
712 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
713 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
716 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
718 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
720 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
721 i=s->handshake_func(s);
722 if (i < 0) return(i);
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
731 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
733 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
734 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
735 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
736 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
739 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
740 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
741 * in advance, if any.
743 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
746 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
749 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
751 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
756 /* Check for timeout */
757 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
760 /* get new packet if necessary */
761 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
763 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
766 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
767 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
775 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
777 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
778 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
779 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
781 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
782 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
783 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
784 * than dropping the connection.
786 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num);
791 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
792 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
793 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
796 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
801 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
803 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
804 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
805 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
806 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
808 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
813 if (len <= 0) return(len);
815 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
818 n = (unsigned int)len;
820 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
827 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
835 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
836 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
838 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
839 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
842 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
843 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
844 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
846 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
848 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
849 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
850 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
852 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
854 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
855 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
856 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
858 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
859 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
861 /* Application data while renegotiating
862 * is allowed. Try again reading.
864 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
867 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
869 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
870 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
871 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
875 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
876 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
883 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
884 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
885 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
887 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
889 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
890 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
891 * non-existing alert...
895 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
900 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
901 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
903 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
906 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
910 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
911 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
912 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
914 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
916 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
917 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
918 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
920 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
922 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
923 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
924 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
926 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
931 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
934 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
935 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
937 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
938 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
942 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
944 i=s->handshake_func(s);
945 if (i < 0) return(i);
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
952 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
954 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
957 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
958 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
959 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
960 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
961 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
963 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
964 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
970 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
971 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
975 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
977 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
978 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
980 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
983 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
984 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
986 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
988 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
989 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
993 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
994 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
997 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
999 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1000 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1002 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1006 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1007 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1008 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1011 unsigned int frag_off;
1012 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1017 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1018 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1020 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1022 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1023 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1024 send an alert ourselves */
1025 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1026 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1031 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1035 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1036 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1038 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1039 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1040 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1041 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1046 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1054 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1056 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1061 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1063 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1064 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1066 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1068 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1069 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1070 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1071 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1074 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1076 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1083 if (s->msg_callback)
1084 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1085 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1087 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1088 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1090 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1095 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1097 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1098 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1101 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1102 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1104 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1105 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1110 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1111 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1114 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1116 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1117 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1118 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1124 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1125 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1127 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1129 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1132 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1137 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1138 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1140 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1141 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1142 * protocol violations): */
1143 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1147 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1151 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1152 if (i < 0) return(i);
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1159 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1161 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1164 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1165 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1166 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1167 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1168 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1169 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1170 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1171 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1182 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1183 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1189 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1192 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1194 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1195 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1196 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1197 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1198 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1202 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1203 * but have application data. If the library was
1204 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1205 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1206 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1207 * we will indulge it.
1209 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1210 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1212 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1213 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1214 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1216 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1217 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1218 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1222 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1227 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1235 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1241 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1245 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1247 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1248 if (i < 0) return(i);
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1256 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1262 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1267 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1270 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1274 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1275 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1277 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1278 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1283 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1286 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1289 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1290 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1291 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1301 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1302 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1304 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1308 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1309 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1310 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1314 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1316 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1317 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1324 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1325 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1326 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1328 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1329 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1332 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1333 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1335 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1338 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1341 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1348 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1349 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1350 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1356 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1358 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1360 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1361 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1362 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1364 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1365 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1368 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1370 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1371 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1372 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1373 * together with the actual payload) */
1374 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1375 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1378 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1380 /* insufficient space */
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1386 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1390 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1392 /* write the header */
1397 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1398 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8,
1399 *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff;
1401 *(p++)=(s->version>>8),
1402 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1404 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1408 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1410 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1411 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1413 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1414 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1415 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1419 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1420 wr->length=(int)len;
1421 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1423 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1426 /* first we compress */
1427 if (s->compress != NULL)
1429 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1437 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1441 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1442 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1443 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1447 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1448 wr->length+=mac_size;
1451 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1456 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1457 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1459 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1460 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1461 * the rest of randomness */
1465 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1467 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1468 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1469 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1471 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1473 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1477 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1479 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1481 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1483 /* we should now have
1484 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1485 * wr->length long */
1486 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1487 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1489 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1490 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1491 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1492 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1493 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1496 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1498 if (create_empty_fragment)
1500 /* we are in a recursive call;
1501 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1506 /* now let's set up wb */
1507 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1510 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1511 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1512 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1513 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1514 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1516 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1517 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1524 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
1527 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1528 PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
1530 PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp;
1532 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1533 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1535 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1536 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1539 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1540 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1542 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1543 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1544 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1545 return 1; /* this record is new */
1548 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1550 if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length)
1552 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1553 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1554 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1557 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1560 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1561 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1562 offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1563 if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset))
1565 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1566 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1571 mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
1572 if (bitmap->map & mask)
1573 return 0; /* record previously received */
1576 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num);
1577 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1578 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1583 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1590 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num);
1591 pq_64bit_init(&tmp);
1593 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8);
1595 /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support
1596 * on 32-bit machines */
1597 if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) ||
1598 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)))
1600 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num));
1601 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1);
1603 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1605 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift);
1606 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp);
1608 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0);
1609 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1);
1610 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1612 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1);
1613 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length);
1614 ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx);
1615 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx);
1616 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx);
1620 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num);
1621 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1);
1622 shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp);
1624 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift);
1627 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num);
1628 pq_64bit_free(&tmp);
1632 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1635 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1636 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1637 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1639 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1641 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1642 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1643 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1645 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1646 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1648 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1650 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1653 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1657 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1659 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1663 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1666 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1667 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1671 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1672 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1673 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1676 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1678 if (s->msg_callback)
1679 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1680 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1682 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1683 cb=s->info_callback;
1684 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1685 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1689 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1690 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1697 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1698 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1703 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1704 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1705 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1707 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1708 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1709 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1710 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1713 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1721 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1722 unsigned long *offset)
1725 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1726 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1727 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1730 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1731 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1733 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1735 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1736 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1737 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1738 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1740 unsigned short seq_num;
1741 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1742 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1744 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1746 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1747 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1748 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1752 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1753 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1757 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1758 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1759 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1760 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1762 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1763 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1764 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1766 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1767 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1768 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1772 *priority = seq_num;
1776 else /* unknown record type */
1785 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1788 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1790 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1792 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1795 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1796 s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length;
1797 pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num),
1798 &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1800 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1801 pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1802 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1803 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
1804 pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
1808 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1809 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1813 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1816 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1818 bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num)
1822 _num = (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[0]) << 56) |
1823 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[1]) << 48) |
1824 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[2]) << 40) |
1825 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[3]) << 32) |
1826 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[4]) << 24) |
1827 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[5]) << 16) |
1828 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[6]) << 8) |
1829 (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[7]) );