3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
128 int ret, sat, brw, i;
130 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
140 if (is_endian.little)
142 /* not reached on little-endians */
144 * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
145 * but I take no chances...
147 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
160 ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
162 brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
164 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
165 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
170 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
171 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
176 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
181 return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
184 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
186 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
187 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
188 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
189 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
190 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
191 unsigned char *priority);
192 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
194 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
195 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
197 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
199 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
201 SSL3_BUFFER_release(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer));
203 s->packet = rdata->packet;
204 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
205 memcpy(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), &(rdata->rbuf),
206 sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
207 memcpy(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), &(rdata->rrec),
208 sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
210 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
211 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
217 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
219 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
222 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
223 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
226 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
227 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
228 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 rdata->packet = s->packet;
239 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
240 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer),
241 sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
242 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer),
243 sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
248 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
249 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
250 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
251 || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
252 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
253 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
258 s->packet_length = 0;
259 memset(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
260 memset(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
262 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
265 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
271 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
272 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
274 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
275 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
284 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
288 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
290 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
292 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
302 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
305 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
306 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
307 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
310 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
313 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
314 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
315 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
317 static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
321 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
323 /* Check if epoch is current. */
324 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
325 return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
327 /* Process all the records. */
328 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
329 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
330 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
332 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
333 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer))) < 0)
339 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
342 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
343 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
348 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
354 unsigned int mac_size;
355 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
357 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
361 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
362 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
364 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
367 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
368 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
369 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
370 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
374 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
375 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
378 /* check is not needed I believe */
379 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
380 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
385 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
386 rr->data = rr->input;
387 rr->orig_len = rr->length;
389 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
392 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
393 * 1: if the padding is valid
394 * -1: if the padding is invalid
397 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
399 s->packet_length = 0;
403 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
406 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
407 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
412 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
413 if ((sess != NULL) &&
414 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
415 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
416 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
417 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
418 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
419 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
422 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
423 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
424 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
425 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
427 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
428 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
429 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
430 rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
431 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
436 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
438 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
439 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
440 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
441 * contents of the padding bytes.
444 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
445 rr->length -= mac_size;
448 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
449 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
452 rr->length -= mac_size;
453 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
456 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
457 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
458 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
460 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
465 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
467 s->packet_length = 0;
471 /* r->length is now just compressed */
472 if (s->expand != NULL) {
473 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
474 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
475 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
476 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
479 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
480 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
486 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
487 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
488 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
494 * So at this point the following is true
495 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
496 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
497 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
498 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
502 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
503 s->packet_length = 0;
507 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
513 * Call this to get a new input record.
514 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
515 * or non-blocking IO.
516 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
517 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
518 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
519 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
521 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
522 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
524 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
527 unsigned char *p = NULL;
528 unsigned short version;
529 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
530 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
532 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
535 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
536 * This is a non-blocking operation.
538 if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
541 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
542 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
545 /* get something from the wire */
547 /* check if we have the header */
548 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
549 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
550 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
551 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
552 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
554 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
556 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
557 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
558 s->packet_length = 0;
562 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
567 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
568 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
570 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
574 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
576 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
579 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
584 /* Lets check version */
585 if (!s->first_packet) {
586 if (version != s->version) {
587 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
589 s->packet_length = 0;
594 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
595 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
597 s->packet_length = 0;
601 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
602 /* record too long, silently discard it */
604 s->packet_length = 0;
608 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
611 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
613 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
614 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
616 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
617 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
620 s->packet_length = 0;
625 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
626 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
629 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
631 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
632 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
633 if (bitmap == NULL) {
635 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
636 goto again; /* get another record */
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
639 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
640 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
643 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
644 * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
645 * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
646 * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
648 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
649 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
650 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
651 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
653 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
654 goto again; /* get another record */
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
660 /* just read a 0 length packet */
665 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
666 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
667 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
671 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
672 if (dtls1_buffer_record
673 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
675 /* Mark receipt of record. */
676 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
679 s->packet_length = 0;
683 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
685 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
686 goto again; /* get another record */
688 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
695 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
696 * 'type' is one of the following:
698 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
699 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
700 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
702 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
703 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
705 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
706 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
707 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
708 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
709 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
710 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
711 * Change cipher spec protocol
712 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
714 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
716 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
717 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
718 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
719 * Application data protocol
720 * none of our business
722 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
727 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
729 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))) {
730 /* Not initialized yet */
731 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
735 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
736 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
737 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
738 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
743 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
745 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
749 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
754 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
757 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
758 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
759 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
760 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
761 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
763 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
766 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
767 i = s->handshake_func(s);
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
777 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
780 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
781 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
782 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
783 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
785 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
788 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
789 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
791 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
793 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
796 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
797 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
798 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
799 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
800 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
804 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
806 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
811 /* Check for timeout */
812 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
815 /* get new packet if necessary */
816 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
817 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
819 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
820 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
828 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
833 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
835 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
836 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
837 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
839 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
840 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
841 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
843 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) <
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
853 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
856 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
858 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
862 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
863 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
865 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
866 * doing a handshake for the first time
868 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
869 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
870 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
878 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
881 n = (unsigned int)len;
883 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
887 if (rr->length == 0) {
888 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
894 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
895 * data first, so retry.
897 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
898 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
899 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
900 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
901 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
902 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
903 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
907 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
908 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
909 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
911 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
912 s->d1->shutdown_received
913 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
914 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
922 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
923 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
927 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
928 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
931 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
932 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
933 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
935 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
936 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
937 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
938 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
939 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
940 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
941 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
942 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
945 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
946 /* We allow a 0 return */
947 if(dtls1_process_heartbeat(s) < 0) {
951 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
953 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
954 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
955 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
959 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
960 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
962 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
965 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
967 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
968 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
969 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
970 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
971 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
975 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
976 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
981 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
983 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
984 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
986 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
987 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
989 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
990 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
991 * non-existing alert...
995 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1000 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1001 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
1002 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1005 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1010 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1011 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1012 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1015 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1017 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1018 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1019 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1020 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1022 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1023 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1024 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1025 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1031 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
1034 if (s->msg_callback)
1035 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1036 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1037 s->msg_callback_arg);
1039 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1040 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1041 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1042 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1044 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1045 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1046 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1051 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1055 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1056 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
1057 RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
1058 /* no read-ahead left? */
1061 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1062 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1063 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1064 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1066 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1067 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1068 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1069 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1076 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1077 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1082 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1083 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1084 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1086 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1088 if (s->msg_callback)
1089 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1090 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1092 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1093 cb = s->info_callback;
1094 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1095 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1098 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1099 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1102 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1103 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1104 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1107 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1108 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
1109 * that nothing gets discarded.
1111 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1112 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1113 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1114 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1115 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1116 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1120 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1124 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1125 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1126 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1128 unsigned int frag_off;
1129 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1134 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1135 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1136 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
1138 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1140 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1143 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1146 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1147 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1151 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1154 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1155 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1157 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1158 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1159 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1160 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1161 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1164 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1172 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1174 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1179 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1180 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1181 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1183 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1185 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1189 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1190 * what the record payload has to look like
1192 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1193 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1194 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1195 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1202 if (s->msg_callback)
1203 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1204 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1207 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1208 * are still missing, so just drop it.
1210 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1214 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1216 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1217 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1220 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1221 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1223 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1224 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1228 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
1229 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
1232 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1239 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1241 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1243 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1245 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1246 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1247 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1253 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1254 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1256 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1257 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1260 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1265 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1266 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1267 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1271 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1279 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1280 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
1281 RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
1282 /* no read-ahead left? */
1285 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1286 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1287 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1288 * problems in the blocking world
1290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1291 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1293 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1302 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1303 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1307 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1310 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1312 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1314 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1315 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1316 * happen when type != rr->type
1318 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1323 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1324 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1325 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1326 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1327 * started), we will indulge it.
1329 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1330 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1331 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1332 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1333 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1334 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1335 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1336 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1339 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1342 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1350 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1355 int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1361 * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
1362 * belated app data with SCTP.
1364 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1365 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1366 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1367 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1369 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1372 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
1377 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1382 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1387 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1392 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1396 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1400 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1401 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1403 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1404 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1409 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1412 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1415 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1416 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1417 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1425 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1426 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1428 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1432 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1433 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1434 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1438 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1439 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1441 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1442 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1449 wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
1452 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1453 * will happen with non blocking IO
1455 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
1456 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1457 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1460 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1461 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1462 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1465 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1468 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1471 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1474 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1475 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1481 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1486 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1488 /* write the header */
1490 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1493 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1494 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1495 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1497 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1498 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
1499 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
1501 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1502 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1505 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1509 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1510 if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
1511 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1512 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1513 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1517 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1518 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1519 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1525 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1526 wr->data = p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1527 wr->length = (int)len;
1528 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1531 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1534 /* first we compress */
1535 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1536 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1541 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1542 wr->input = wr->data;
1546 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1547 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1551 if (mac_size != 0) {
1552 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1554 wr->length += mac_size;
1557 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1562 wr->length += eivlen;
1564 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1567 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1569 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1573 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1575 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1579 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1582 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1584 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1586 if (s->msg_callback)
1587 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1588 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1591 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1594 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1595 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1597 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1599 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1601 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1607 /* now let's set up wb */
1608 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1612 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1615 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1616 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1617 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1618 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1620 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1621 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1626 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1630 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1632 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1634 SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq);
1635 return 1; /* this record in new */
1638 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1639 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1640 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1641 return 0; /* record previously received */
1643 SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer), seq);
1647 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1651 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1653 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1656 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1657 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1660 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1663 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1664 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1668 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1671 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1672 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1673 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1675 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1677 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1678 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1679 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1681 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1682 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1683 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1684 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1688 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1690 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1691 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1693 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1694 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1695 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1698 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1700 if (s->msg_callback)
1701 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1702 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1704 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1705 cb = s->info_callback;
1706 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1707 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1710 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1711 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1717 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1718 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1723 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1724 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1725 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1727 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1728 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1729 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1731 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1737 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1740 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1742 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1743 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1745 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1746 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1748 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1749 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
1750 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1754 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);