3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
124 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
125 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
128 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
129 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
132 if (is_endian.little) break;
133 /* not reached on little-endians */
134 /* following test is redundant, because input is
135 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
136 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
140 if (l>128) return 128;
141 else if (l<-128) return -128;
145 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
147 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
150 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
157 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
162 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
164 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
165 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
168 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
170 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
171 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
173 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
175 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
176 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
178 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
179 unsigned char *priority);
180 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
181 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
183 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
204 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
206 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
209 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
210 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
211 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
213 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
214 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
216 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
220 rdata->packet = s->packet;
221 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
222 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
223 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
227 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
228 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
236 s->packet_length = 0;
237 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
238 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
240 ssl3_setup_buffers(s);
247 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
251 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
254 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
256 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
266 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
268 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
269 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
270 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
272 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
273 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
274 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
275 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
278 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
282 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
285 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
286 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
288 /* Check if epoch is current. */
289 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
290 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
292 /* Process all the records. */
293 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
295 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
296 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
298 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
299 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
303 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
304 * have been processed */
305 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
306 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
315 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
319 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
320 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
322 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
327 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
328 if (item && item->priority == priority)
330 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
331 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
333 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
334 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
335 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
337 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
338 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
340 s->packet = rdata->packet;
341 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
342 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
343 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
345 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
348 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
358 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
365 unsigned int mac_size;
366 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
372 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
373 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
375 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
377 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
378 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
379 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
380 * the decryption or by the decompression
381 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
382 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
384 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
385 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
387 /* check is not needed I believe */
388 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
390 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
395 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
398 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
402 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
405 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
406 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
410 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
411 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
415 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
416 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
417 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
418 (s->read_hash == NULL))
423 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
425 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
427 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
428 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
432 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
435 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
436 if (rr->length < mac_size)
438 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
439 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
443 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
446 rr->length-=mac_size;
447 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
448 if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
450 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
454 /* r->length is now just compressed */
455 if (s->expand != NULL)
457 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
459 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
463 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
465 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
471 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
473 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
474 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
479 /* So at this point the following is true
480 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
481 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
482 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
483 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
487 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
489 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
492 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
493 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
494 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
495 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
496 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
497 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
498 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
499 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
501 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
507 /* Call this to get a new input record.
508 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
509 * or non-blocking IO.
510 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
515 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
516 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
518 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
524 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
525 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
530 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
531 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
532 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
535 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
536 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
539 /* get something from the wire */
541 /* check if we have the header */
542 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
543 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
545 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
546 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
547 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
549 OPENSSL_assert(s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
551 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
555 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
559 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
561 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
564 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
569 /* Lets check version */
576 if (version != s->version)
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
579 /* Send back error using their
580 * version number :-) */
582 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
587 if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
589 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
593 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
595 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
600 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
603 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
605 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
607 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
609 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
610 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
612 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
615 s->packet_length = 0;
619 /* now n == rr->length,
620 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
622 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
624 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
625 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
628 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
629 goto again; /* get another record */
632 /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
633 if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
635 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
636 goto again; /* get another record */
639 /* just read a 0 length packet */
640 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
642 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
643 * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records
644 * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they
645 * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource
649 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
650 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
651 s->packet_length = 0;
655 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
658 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
662 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
667 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
668 * 'type' is one of the following:
670 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
671 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
672 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
674 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
675 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
677 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
678 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
679 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
680 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
681 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
682 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
683 * Change cipher spec protocol
684 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
686 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
688 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
689 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
690 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
691 * Application data protocol
692 * none of our business
694 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
699 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
701 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
702 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
705 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
706 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
707 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
708 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
714 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
715 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
718 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
720 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
722 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
723 i=s->handshake_func(s);
724 if (i < 0) return(i);
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
733 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
735 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
736 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
737 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
738 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
741 /* get new packet if necessary */
742 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
744 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
747 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
748 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
756 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
758 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
759 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
760 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
762 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
767 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
768 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
769 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
772 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
777 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
779 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
780 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
781 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
782 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
784 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
785 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
789 if (len <= 0) return(len);
791 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
794 n = (unsigned int)len;
796 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
803 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
811 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
812 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
814 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
815 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
818 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
819 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
820 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
822 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
824 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
825 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
826 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
828 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
830 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
831 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
832 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
834 else /* else it's a CCS message */
835 OPENSSL_assert(rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
840 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
841 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
842 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
844 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
849 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
850 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
852 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
855 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
859 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
860 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
861 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
863 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
865 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
866 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
867 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
869 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
871 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
872 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
873 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
875 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
880 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
883 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
884 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
886 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
887 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
891 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
893 i=s->handshake_func(s);
894 if (i < 0) return(i);
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
901 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
903 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
906 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
907 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
908 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
909 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
910 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
912 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
913 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
919 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
920 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
924 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
926 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
927 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
929 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
932 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
933 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
935 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
937 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
938 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
942 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
943 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
946 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
948 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
949 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
951 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
955 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
956 /* now check if it's a missing record */
957 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
960 unsigned int frag_off;
961 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
966 dtls1_retransmit_message(s, seq, frag_off, &found);
967 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
969 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
970 /* requested a message not yet sent,
971 send an alert ourselves */
972 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
973 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
978 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
982 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
983 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
985 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
986 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
987 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
988 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
993 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1001 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1003 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1008 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1010 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1012 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1014 if ( ccs_hdr.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1016 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1017 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1018 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1019 if ( (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
1020 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1022 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1029 if (s->msg_callback)
1030 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1031 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1033 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1034 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1037 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1038 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1040 /* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */
1041 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1052 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1053 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1056 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1058 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1059 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1060 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1066 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1067 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1069 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1070 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1071 * protocol violations): */
1072 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1076 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1080 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1081 if (i < 0) return(i);
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1088 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1090 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1093 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1094 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1095 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1096 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1097 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1098 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1099 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1100 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1111 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1112 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1118 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1121 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1123 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1124 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1125 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1126 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1127 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1130 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1131 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1132 * but have application data. If the library was
1133 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1134 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1135 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1136 * we will indulge it.
1138 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1139 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1141 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1142 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1143 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1145 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1146 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1147 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1151 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1156 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1164 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1170 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1175 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1177 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1178 if (i < 0) return(i);
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1191 /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to
1192 * the currently known MTU */
1193 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1194 if (i <= 0) return i;
1196 if ((i == (int)n) ||
1197 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1198 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
1200 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
1201 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
1202 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
1214 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1217 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1221 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1222 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1224 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1225 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1230 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1233 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1236 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1237 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1238 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1248 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1249 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1251 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1253 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
1254 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
1258 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1263 /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records
1264 * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */
1266 mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU, 0, NULL);
1267 mtu += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* HM already inserted */
1271 if (mtu > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1272 mtu = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1279 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
1286 if ( (int)s->s3->wnum + i == len)
1294 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1296 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1297 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1304 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1305 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1306 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1308 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1309 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1312 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1313 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1315 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1318 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1321 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1328 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1329 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1330 (s->write_hash == NULL))
1336 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
1338 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1340 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1341 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1342 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION)
1344 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1345 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1348 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1350 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1351 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1352 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1353 * together with the actual payload) */
1354 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1355 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1358 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1360 /* insufficient space */
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1370 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1372 /* write the header */
1377 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1378 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1380 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1384 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1386 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1387 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1389 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1390 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1391 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1395 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1396 wr->length=(int)len;
1397 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1399 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1402 /* first we compress */
1403 if (s->compress != NULL)
1405 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1413 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1417 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1418 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1419 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1423 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
1424 wr->length+=mac_size;
1427 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1432 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1433 wr->length += bs; /* bs != 0 in case of CBC. The enc fn provides
1435 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1437 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1438 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1439 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1441 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1443 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1447 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1449 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1451 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1453 /* we should now have
1454 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1455 * wr->length long */
1456 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1457 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1459 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1460 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1461 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1462 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1463 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1466 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1468 if (create_empty_fragment)
1470 /* we are in a recursive call;
1471 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1476 /* now let's set up wb */
1477 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1480 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1481 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1482 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1483 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1484 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1486 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1487 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1494 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1498 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1500 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1503 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1504 return 1; /* this record in new */
1507 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1508 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1509 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1510 return 0; /* record previously received */
1512 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1517 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1521 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1523 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1527 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1528 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1531 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1535 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1536 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1541 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1544 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1545 unsigned char buf[2 + 2 + 3]; /* alert level + alert desc + message seq +frag_off */
1546 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1548 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1550 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1551 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1552 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1554 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1556 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1558 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1561 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1565 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1567 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1570 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1573 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1574 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1578 if ( s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL ||
1579 s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1580 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1582 if (s->msg_callback)
1583 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1584 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1586 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1587 cb=s->info_callback;
1588 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1589 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1593 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1594 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1601 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1602 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1607 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1608 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1609 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1611 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1612 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1613 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1614 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1617 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1625 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1626 unsigned long *offset)
1629 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1630 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1631 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1634 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1635 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1637 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1639 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1640 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1641 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1642 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1644 unsigned short seq_num;
1645 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1646 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1648 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1650 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1651 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1652 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1656 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1657 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1661 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1662 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1663 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1664 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1666 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1667 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1668 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1670 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1671 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1672 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1676 *priority = seq_num;
1680 else /* unknown record type */
1689 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1692 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1694 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1696 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1698 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1699 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1703 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1707 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1712 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1714 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));