3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
62 #include <openssl/objects.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
66 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
67 # include <sys/timeb.h>
68 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
69 # include <sys/timeval.h>
70 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
71 # include <sys/times.h>
72 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
73 # include <sys/time.h>
76 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
77 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
78 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
79 int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
80 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
82 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
83 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
85 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
89 tls1_generate_master_secret,
90 tls1_change_cipher_state,
91 tls1_final_finish_mac,
92 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
93 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
96 tls1_export_keying_material,
97 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
98 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
99 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
100 dtls1_handshake_write
103 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
106 tls1_setup_key_block,
107 tls1_generate_master_secret,
108 tls1_change_cipher_state,
109 tls1_final_finish_mac,
110 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
111 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
112 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
114 tls1_export_keying_material,
115 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
116 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
117 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
118 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
119 dtls1_handshake_write
122 long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
125 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
126 * http, the cache would over fill
128 return (60 * 60 * 2);
131 int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
135 if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
141 if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
146 d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
147 d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
150 d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
156 if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
157 pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
158 pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
165 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
169 static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
172 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
174 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
175 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
176 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
180 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
181 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
182 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
187 void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
189 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
193 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
195 pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
196 pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
202 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
204 pqueue buffered_messages;
205 pqueue sent_messages;
207 unsigned int link_mtu;
209 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
212 buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
213 sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
215 link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
217 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
219 memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
222 s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
225 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
227 s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
230 s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
231 s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
235 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
236 s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
237 else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
238 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
240 s->version = s->method->version;
243 long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
248 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
249 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
253 case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
254 ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
256 case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
257 ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
259 case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
261 * For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the
262 * is the highest enabled version.
264 if (s->max_proto_version == 0 && s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION)
266 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && s->version == s->max_proto_version)
268 /* We're not limited by the max_proto_version but might still have
269 * other reasons why we use an older version like not using a
270 * version-flexible SSL_METHOD. Check s->ctx->method as version
271 * negotiation may have changed s->method.
272 * This check can be removed when we only have version-flexible
275 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
278 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
279 * highest protocol version, not limited by max_proto_version).
281 if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) {
282 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
283 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
285 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
286 return s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION;
287 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
288 return s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
290 return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
291 case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
292 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
294 s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
296 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
297 return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
298 case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
300 * We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
301 * We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
303 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
308 ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
315 * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this
316 * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately
317 * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have
318 * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
319 * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
321 const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
323 const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
326 if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
333 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
336 /* Disable timer for SCTP */
337 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
338 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
343 /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
344 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
345 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
348 /* Set timeout to current time */
349 get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
351 /* Add duration to current time */
352 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
353 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
354 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
357 struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
359 struct timeval timenow;
361 /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
362 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
366 /* Get current time */
367 get_current_time(&timenow);
369 /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
370 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
371 (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
372 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
373 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
377 /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
378 memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
379 timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
380 timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
381 if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
383 timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
387 * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
388 * because of small devergences with socket timeouts.
390 if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
391 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
397 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
399 struct timeval timeleft;
401 /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
402 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
406 /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
407 if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
411 /* Timer expired, so return true */
415 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
417 s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
418 if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
419 s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
420 dtls1_start_timer(s);
423 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
425 /* Reset everything */
426 memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
427 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
428 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
429 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
430 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
431 /* Clear retransmission buffer */
432 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
435 int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
439 s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
441 /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
442 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
443 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
445 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
447 if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
451 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
452 /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
460 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
462 /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
463 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
467 dtls1_double_timeout(s);
469 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
472 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
473 if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
474 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
477 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
478 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
479 return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
483 dtls1_start_timer(s);
484 return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
487 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
497 SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
499 now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
501 now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
503 t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
504 t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
505 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
508 t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
509 t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
511 gettimeofday(t, NULL);
516 #define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
517 #define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
520 int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
522 int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
523 unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
524 unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
525 unsigned char *data, *p, *buf;
526 unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
527 unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
530 struct sockaddr_storage tmpclient;
531 PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
533 /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
539 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
540 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
548 * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
549 * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
550 * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for dtls1_accept to handle.
552 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
555 * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
556 * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
557 * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
558 * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
561 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
562 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
566 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
567 if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
568 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
572 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
579 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
586 * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
587 * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
588 * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
589 * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
590 * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
591 * in the record length check below.
593 n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
596 if(BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
597 /* Non-blocking IO */
603 /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
606 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
607 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
612 * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
613 * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
614 * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
615 * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
616 * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
617 * logged for diagnostic purposes."
620 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
621 if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
622 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
627 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
628 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
630 /* Get the record header */
631 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
632 || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
637 if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
638 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
643 * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
646 if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
647 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
651 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
652 /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
653 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
654 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)
655 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
660 /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
661 if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
666 /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
667 data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
669 /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
670 if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
671 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
672 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
673 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
674 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
675 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, msglen)
676 || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
677 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
681 if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
682 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
686 /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
688 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
692 /* We don't support a fragmented ClientHello whilst listening */
693 if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen != msglen) {
694 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
699 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
700 msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
701 s->msg_callback_arg);
703 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
704 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
709 * Verify client version is supported
711 if ((clientvers > (unsigned int)s->method->version &&
712 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)) {
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
717 if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
718 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
719 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
725 * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
726 * HelloVerifyRequest.
728 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
729 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
732 * We have a cookie, so lets check it.
734 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
739 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
740 PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
743 * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
746 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
748 /* Cookie verification succeeded */
749 next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
753 if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
755 * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
756 * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
757 * to resend, we just drop it.
761 * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
764 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
765 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
766 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
768 /* Generate the cookie */
769 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
770 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
772 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
777 p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
778 msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
781 *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
786 /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
790 * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
791 * and fragment length is message length
796 /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
797 reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
799 /* Add the record header */
802 *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
804 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
805 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
806 * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
808 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
809 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
810 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
812 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
813 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
817 * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
820 memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
827 * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
830 reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
833 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
834 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
837 * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
840 if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, &tmpclient) <= 0
841 || BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, &tmpclient) <= 0) {
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
846 if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
847 if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
849 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
850 * going to drop this packet.
857 if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
858 if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
860 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
861 * going to drop this packet.
868 } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
871 * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
873 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
874 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
875 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
876 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
879 * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
882 SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
885 * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
888 ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
890 if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
898 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
900 /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
901 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
906 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
908 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
909 dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, htype, len, 0, len);
910 s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
912 /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
914 if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
920 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
922 return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
926 int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
929 unsigned short hbtype;
930 unsigned int payload;
931 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
934 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
935 p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
937 /* Read type and payload length first */
938 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
939 return 0; /* silently discard */
940 if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
941 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
945 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
946 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
949 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
950 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
951 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
952 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
956 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
960 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
961 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
963 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
968 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
969 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
971 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
974 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
975 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
979 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
981 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
982 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
983 buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
985 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
989 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
993 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
994 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
998 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
1001 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1008 int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1010 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1012 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1013 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1015 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1016 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1017 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1022 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1023 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1028 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1029 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1035 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1036 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1037 * some random stuff.
1038 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1039 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1040 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1041 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1044 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1051 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1052 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1054 /* Sequence number */
1055 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1056 /* 16 random bytes */
1057 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1062 /* Random padding */
1063 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1070 if (s->msg_callback)
1071 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1072 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1073 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1075 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1076 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
1086 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1092 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
1093 if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
1094 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
1095 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
1100 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
1104 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1106 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1111 int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
1113 if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
1115 s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1116 s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
1119 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
1120 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1121 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
1123 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
1126 * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
1127 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
1129 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1130 /* Set to min mtu */
1131 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
1132 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
1141 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1143 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1144 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1147 unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1149 return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));