3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
62 #include <openssl/objects.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
66 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
67 # include <sys/timeb.h>
68 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
69 # include <sys/timeval.h>
70 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
71 # include <sys/times.h>
72 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
73 # include <sys/time.h>
76 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
77 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
78 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
79 int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
80 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
82 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
83 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
85 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
89 tls1_generate_master_secret,
90 tls1_change_cipher_state,
91 tls1_final_finish_mac,
92 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
93 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
96 tls1_export_keying_material,
97 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
98 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
99 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
100 dtls1_handshake_write
103 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
106 tls1_setup_key_block,
107 tls1_generate_master_secret,
108 tls1_change_cipher_state,
109 tls1_final_finish_mac,
110 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
111 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
112 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
114 tls1_export_keying_material,
115 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
116 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
117 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
118 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
119 dtls1_handshake_write
122 long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
125 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
126 * http, the cache would over fill
128 return (60 * 60 * 2);
131 int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
135 if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
141 if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
146 d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
147 d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
150 d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
156 if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
157 pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
158 pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
165 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
169 static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
172 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
174 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
175 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
176 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
180 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
181 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
182 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
187 void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
189 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
193 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
195 pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
196 pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
202 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
204 pqueue buffered_messages;
205 pqueue sent_messages;
207 unsigned int link_mtu;
209 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
212 buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
213 sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
215 link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
217 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
219 memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
222 s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
225 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
227 s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
230 s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
231 s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
235 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
236 s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
237 else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
238 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
240 s->version = s->method->version;
243 long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
248 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
249 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
253 case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
254 ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
256 case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
257 ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
259 case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
261 * For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the
262 * highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, as version
263 * negotiation may have changed s->method).
265 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
268 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
269 * highest protocol version).
271 if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) {
272 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
273 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
275 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
276 return s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION;
277 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
278 return s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
280 return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
281 case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
282 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
284 s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
286 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
287 return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
288 case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
290 * We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
291 * We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
293 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
298 ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
305 * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this
306 * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately
307 * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have
308 * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
309 * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
311 const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
313 const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
316 if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
323 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
326 /* Disable timer for SCTP */
327 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
328 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
333 /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
334 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
335 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
338 /* Set timeout to current time */
339 get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
341 /* Add duration to current time */
342 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
343 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
344 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
347 struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
349 struct timeval timenow;
351 /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
352 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
356 /* Get current time */
357 get_current_time(&timenow);
359 /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
360 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
361 (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
362 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
363 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
367 /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
368 memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
369 timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
370 timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
371 if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
373 timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
377 * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
378 * because of small devergences with socket timeouts.
380 if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
381 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
387 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
389 struct timeval timeleft;
391 /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
392 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
396 /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
397 if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
401 /* Timer expired, so return true */
405 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
407 s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
408 if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
409 s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
410 dtls1_start_timer(s);
413 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
415 /* Reset everything */
416 memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
417 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
418 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
419 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
420 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
421 /* Clear retransmission buffer */
422 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
425 int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
429 s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
431 /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
432 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
433 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
435 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
437 if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
441 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
442 /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
443 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
450 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
452 /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
453 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
457 dtls1_double_timeout(s);
459 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
462 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
463 if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
464 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
467 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
468 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
469 return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
473 dtls1_start_timer(s);
474 return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
477 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
487 SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
489 now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
491 now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
493 t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
494 t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
495 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
498 t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
499 t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
501 gettimeofday(t, NULL);
506 #define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
507 #define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
510 int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
512 int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
513 unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
514 unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
515 unsigned char *data, *p, *buf;
516 unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
517 unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
520 struct sockaddr_storage tmpclient;
521 PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
523 /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
529 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
530 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
533 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
538 * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
539 * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
540 * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for dtls1_accept to handle.
542 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
545 * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
546 * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
547 * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
548 * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
551 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
556 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
557 if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
558 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
562 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
564 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
569 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
576 * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
577 * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
578 * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
579 * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
580 * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
581 * in the record length check below.
583 n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
586 if(BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
587 /* Non-blocking IO */
593 /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
596 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
597 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
602 * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
603 * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
604 * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
605 * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
606 * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
607 * logged for diagnostic purposes."
610 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
611 if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
612 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
617 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
618 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
620 /* Get the record header */
621 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
622 || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
623 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
627 if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
628 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
633 * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
636 if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
641 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
642 /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
643 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
644 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)
645 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
646 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
650 /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
651 if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
656 /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
657 data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
659 /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
660 if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
661 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
662 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
663 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
664 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
665 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, msglen)
666 || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
667 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
671 if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
672 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
676 /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
682 /* We don't support a fragmented ClientHello whilst listening */
683 if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen != msglen) {
684 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
689 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
690 msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
691 s->msg_callback_arg);
693 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
694 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
699 * Verify client version is supported
701 if ((clientvers > (unsigned int)s->method->version &&
702 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)) {
703 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
707 if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
708 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
709 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
715 * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
716 * HelloVerifyRequest.
718 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
719 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
722 * We have a cookie, so lets check it.
724 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
729 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
730 PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
733 * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
736 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
738 /* Cookie verification succeeded */
739 next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
743 if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
745 * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
746 * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
747 * to resend, we just drop it.
751 * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
754 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
755 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
756 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
758 /* Generate the cookie */
759 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
760 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
767 p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
768 msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
771 *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
776 /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
780 * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
781 * and fragment length is message length
786 /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
787 reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
789 /* Add the record header */
792 *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
794 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
795 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
796 * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
798 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
799 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
800 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
802 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
803 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
807 * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
810 memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
817 * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
820 reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
823 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
824 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
827 * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
830 if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, &tmpclient) <= 0
831 || BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, &tmpclient) <= 0) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
836 if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
837 if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
839 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
840 * going to drop this packet.
847 if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
848 if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
850 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
851 * going to drop this packet.
858 } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
861 * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
863 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
864 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
865 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
866 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
869 * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
872 SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
875 * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
878 ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
880 if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
890 /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
891 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
896 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
898 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
899 dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, htype, len, 0, len);
900 s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
902 /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
904 if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
910 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
912 return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
916 int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
919 unsigned short hbtype;
920 unsigned int payload;
921 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
924 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
925 p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
927 /* Read type and payload length first */
928 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
929 return 0; /* silently discard */
930 if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
931 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
935 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
936 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
939 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
940 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
941 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
942 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
946 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
950 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
951 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
953 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
958 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
959 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
961 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
964 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
965 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
969 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
971 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
972 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
973 buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
975 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
979 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
983 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
984 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
988 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
991 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
998 int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1000 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1002 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1003 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1005 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1006 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1007 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1012 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1013 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1018 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1019 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1025 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1026 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1027 * some random stuff.
1028 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1029 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1030 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1031 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1034 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1041 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1042 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1044 /* Sequence number */
1045 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1046 /* 16 random bytes */
1047 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 /* Random padding */
1053 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1060 if (s->msg_callback)
1061 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1062 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1063 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1065 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1066 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
1076 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1082 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
1083 if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
1084 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
1085 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
1090 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
1094 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1096 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1101 int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
1103 if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
1105 s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1106 s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
1109 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
1110 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1111 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
1113 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
1116 * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
1117 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
1119 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1120 /* Set to min mtu */
1121 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
1122 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
1131 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1133 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1134 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1137 unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1139 return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));