2 * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
79 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
80 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
81 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
82 * by their Final function.
84 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
86 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
87 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
95 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
97 /* RSA padding mode */
99 /* message digest for MGF1 */
101 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
102 /* PSS salt length */
104 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
112 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
114 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
115 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
119 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
122 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
123 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
126 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
127 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
128 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
129 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
130 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
131 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
132 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
133 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
134 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
135 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
136 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
137 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
138 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
139 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
140 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
141 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
144 int mdnid = NID_undef;
149 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
150 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
151 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
156 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
157 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
163 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
165 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
166 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
170 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
171 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
172 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
180 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
182 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
187 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
188 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
192 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
193 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
195 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
197 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
199 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
202 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
204 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
205 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
207 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
208 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
209 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
210 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
215 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
218 if (mdname != NULL) {
219 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
220 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
224 || md_nid == NID_undef
225 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
230 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
231 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
234 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
235 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
236 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
237 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
238 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
241 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
242 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
243 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
244 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
245 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
247 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
252 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
258 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
261 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
262 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
264 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
266 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
271 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
273 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
275 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
282 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
284 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
285 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
288 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
290 OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
294 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
295 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
297 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
299 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
300 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
307 if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
311 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
312 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
317 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
320 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
321 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
322 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
325 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
329 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
336 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
337 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
338 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
339 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
342 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
343 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
346 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
347 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
348 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
349 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
353 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
357 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
360 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
367 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
368 /* Check PSS restrictions */
369 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
370 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
371 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
372 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
373 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
378 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
379 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
380 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
386 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
388 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
390 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
392 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
395 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
396 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
401 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
402 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
406 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
414 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
422 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
426 const unsigned char *sig,
429 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
433 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
437 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
438 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
439 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
440 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
442 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
445 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
449 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
450 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
453 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
454 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
455 "Should be %d, but got %d",
456 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
461 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
462 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
465 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
468 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
472 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
473 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
475 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
483 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
484 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
488 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
491 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
499 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
500 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
502 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
505 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
506 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
507 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
508 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
510 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
514 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
515 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
518 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
523 /* Check PSS restrictions */
524 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
525 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
526 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
527 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
529 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
530 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
531 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
532 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
537 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
538 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
539 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
547 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
550 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
551 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
552 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
553 "Should be %d, but got %d",
558 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
560 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
561 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
563 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
566 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
567 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
571 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
577 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
578 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
582 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
584 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
587 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
592 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
598 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
599 const char *props, void *vrsa)
601 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
603 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
604 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
605 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
608 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
609 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
612 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
618 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
619 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
620 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
625 int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
628 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
630 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
633 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
636 int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
639 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
640 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
641 unsigned int dlen = 0;
643 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
644 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
648 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
649 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
653 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
654 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
655 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
657 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
661 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
665 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
668 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
669 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
670 unsigned int dlen = 0;
672 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
673 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
677 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
678 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
679 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
681 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
684 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
687 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
689 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
694 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
695 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
696 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
697 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
700 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
703 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
705 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
706 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
708 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
715 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
718 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
720 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
722 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
724 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
726 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
728 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
730 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
731 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
732 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
733 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
743 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
745 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
748 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
751 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
753 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
756 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
758 switch (p->data_type) {
759 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
760 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
763 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
766 const char *word = NULL;
768 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
769 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
770 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
776 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
779 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
787 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
788 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
791 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
792 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
795 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
797 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
798 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
800 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
801 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
802 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
803 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
806 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
807 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
810 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
811 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
815 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
826 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
827 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
828 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
829 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
830 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
831 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
835 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
837 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
840 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
842 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
845 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
848 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
849 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
850 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
853 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
854 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
855 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
856 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
857 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
859 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
862 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
865 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
866 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
867 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
868 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
870 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
874 /* non-PSS code follows */
875 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
879 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
883 switch (p->data_type) {
884 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
885 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
888 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
895 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
896 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
897 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
908 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
910 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
911 * with signature use.
913 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
914 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
915 "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
917 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
918 if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
919 rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
921 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
922 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
924 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
925 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
926 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
927 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
928 "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
932 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
938 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
941 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
945 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
946 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
947 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
948 "PSS padding has been specified first");
952 switch (p->data_type) {
953 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
954 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
957 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
958 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
959 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
960 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
961 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
962 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
963 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
965 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
972 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
973 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
974 * lowest saltlen number possible.
976 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
977 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
981 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
984 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
986 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
987 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
988 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
989 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
990 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
992 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
995 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
998 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
999 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1003 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
1004 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1005 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1006 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1007 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1009 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1013 /* non-PSS code follows */
1014 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
1021 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1022 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1023 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1024 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1025 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1026 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1027 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1031 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1034 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1035 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1036 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1037 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1039 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1042 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1044 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1046 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1049 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1052 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1054 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1056 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1059 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1062 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1064 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1066 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1069 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1072 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1074 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1076 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1079 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1082 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1083 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1084 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1085 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1086 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1087 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1088 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1089 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1090 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1091 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1092 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1093 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1094 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1095 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1096 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1097 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1098 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1099 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1100 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1101 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1102 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1103 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1104 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1105 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1106 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1107 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1108 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1109 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1111 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1112 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1113 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1114 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1115 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1116 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1117 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },