2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
80 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
81 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
82 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
83 * by their Final function.
85 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
87 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
88 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
96 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
98 /* RSA padding mode */
100 /* message digest for MGF1 */
102 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
103 /* PSS salt length */
105 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
113 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
115 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
116 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
120 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
123 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
124 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
127 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
128 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
129 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
130 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
131 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
132 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
133 { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
134 { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
135 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
136 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
137 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
138 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
139 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
140 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
141 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
142 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
143 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
144 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
147 int mdnid = NID_undef;
152 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
153 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
154 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
159 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
160 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
166 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
168 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
169 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
173 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
174 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
175 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
183 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
185 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
190 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
191 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
195 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
196 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
198 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
200 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
202 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
205 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
207 prsactx->operation = operation;
208 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
209 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
211 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
212 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
213 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
214 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
219 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
222 if (mdname != NULL) {
223 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
224 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
228 || md_nid == NID_undef
229 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
234 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
235 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
238 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
239 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
240 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
241 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
242 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
245 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
246 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
247 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
248 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
249 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
251 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
256 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
262 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
265 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
266 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
268 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
270 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
275 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
277 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
279 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
286 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
288 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
289 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
292 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
294 OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
298 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
300 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
303 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
304 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
306 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
308 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
309 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
316 if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
320 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
321 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
326 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
329 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
330 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
331 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
334 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
338 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
345 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
346 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
347 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
348 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
351 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
352 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
355 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
356 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
357 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
358 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
362 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
366 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
369 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
376 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
377 /* Check PSS restrictions */
378 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
379 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
380 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
381 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
382 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
387 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
388 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
389 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
395 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
397 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
399 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
401 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
404 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
405 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
410 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
411 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
415 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
423 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
431 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
433 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
436 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
440 const unsigned char *sig,
443 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
447 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
451 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
452 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
453 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
454 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
456 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
459 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
463 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
464 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
467 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
468 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
469 "Should be %d, but got %d",
470 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
475 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
476 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
479 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
482 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
486 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
487 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
489 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
497 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
498 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
502 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
505 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
513 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
515 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
518 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
519 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
521 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
524 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
525 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
526 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
527 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
529 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
533 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
534 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
537 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
543 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
546 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
547 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
548 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
549 "Should be %d, but got %d",
554 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
556 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
557 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
559 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
562 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
563 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
567 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
573 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
574 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
578 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
580 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
583 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
588 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
594 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
595 const char *props, void *vrsa,
598 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
600 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
601 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
602 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
605 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
606 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
609 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
615 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
616 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
617 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
622 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
623 const unsigned char *data,
626 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
628 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
631 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
634 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
635 const char *props, void *vrsa)
637 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, props, vrsa,
641 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
642 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
644 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
645 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
646 unsigned int dlen = 0;
648 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
649 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
653 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
654 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
658 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
659 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
660 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
662 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
666 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
669 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
670 const char *props, void *vrsa)
672 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, props, vrsa,
676 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
679 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
680 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
681 unsigned int dlen = 0;
683 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
684 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
688 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
689 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
690 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
692 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
695 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
698 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
700 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
705 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
706 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
707 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
708 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
711 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
714 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
716 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
717 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
719 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
726 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
729 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
731 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
733 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
735 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
737 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
739 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
741 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
742 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
743 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
744 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
754 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
756 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
759 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
762 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
764 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
767 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
769 switch (p->data_type) {
770 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
771 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
774 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
777 const char *word = NULL;
779 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
780 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
781 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
787 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
790 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
798 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
799 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
802 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
803 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
806 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
808 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
809 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
811 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
812 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
813 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
814 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
817 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
818 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
821 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
822 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
826 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
837 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
838 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
839 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
840 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
841 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
842 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
846 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
848 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
851 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
853 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
856 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
859 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
860 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
861 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
864 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
865 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
866 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
867 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
868 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
870 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
873 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
876 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
877 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
878 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
879 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
881 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
885 /* non-PSS code follows */
886 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
890 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
893 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
895 switch (p->data_type) {
896 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
897 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
900 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
907 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
908 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
909 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
920 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
922 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
923 * with signature use.
925 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
927 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
928 if ((prsactx->operation
929 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
931 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
934 if (prsactx->md == NULL
935 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
936 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
937 "%s could not be fetched",
938 OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1);
942 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
943 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
945 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
946 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
949 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
951 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
952 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
954 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) == NULL)
959 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
960 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
961 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
963 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
964 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
968 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
970 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
973 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
977 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
978 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
979 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
980 "PSS padding has been specified first");
984 switch (p->data_type) {
985 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
986 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
989 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
990 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
991 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
992 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
993 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
994 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
995 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
997 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1004 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1005 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1006 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1008 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1009 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1013 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1014 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
1015 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1016 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1017 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1021 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1022 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1023 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1024 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1025 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1026 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1027 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1028 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1033 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1034 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1035 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1036 "Should be more than %d, "
1037 "but would be set to %d",
1038 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1044 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1047 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1049 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1050 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1051 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1052 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1053 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1055 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1058 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1061 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1062 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1066 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1067 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1068 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1069 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1071 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1075 /* non-PSS code follows */
1076 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
1083 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1084 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1085 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1086 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1087 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1088 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1089 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1093 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1096 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1097 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1098 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1099 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1101 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1104 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1106 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1108 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1111 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1114 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1116 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1118 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1121 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1124 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1126 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1128 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1131 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1134 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1136 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1138 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1141 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1144 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1145 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1146 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1147 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1148 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1149 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1150 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1151 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1152 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1153 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1154 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1155 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1156 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1157 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1158 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1159 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1160 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1161 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1162 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1163 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1164 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1165 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1166 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1167 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1168 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1169 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1170 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1171 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1172 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1173 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1174 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1175 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1176 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1177 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1178 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1179 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1180 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1181 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },