2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
81 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
82 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
83 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
84 * by their Final function.
86 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
88 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
89 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
97 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
99 /* RSA padding mode */
101 /* message digest for MGF1 */
103 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
104 /* PSS salt length */
106 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
114 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
116 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
117 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
121 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
124 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
125 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
128 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
129 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
130 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
131 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
132 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
133 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
134 { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
135 { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
136 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
137 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
138 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
139 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
140 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
141 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
142 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
143 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
144 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
145 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
148 int mdnid = NID_undef;
153 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
154 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
155 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
164 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
166 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
167 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
171 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
172 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
173 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
181 static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
183 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
186 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
187 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
188 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
190 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
191 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
198 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
200 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
201 char *propq_copy = NULL;
203 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
205 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
206 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
207 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
211 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
212 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
213 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
217 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
218 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
220 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
224 mdprops = ctx->propq;
226 if (mdname != NULL) {
227 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
228 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
230 size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
233 || md_nid == NID_undef
234 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
235 || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)
236 || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
238 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
239 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
240 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
241 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
242 "digest=%s", mdname);
243 if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
244 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
245 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
250 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
251 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
254 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
255 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
256 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
257 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
258 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
261 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
262 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
264 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
265 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
266 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
268 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
273 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
279 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
285 mdprops = ctx->propq;
287 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
288 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
290 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
291 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
292 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
295 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
296 if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
297 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
298 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
305 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
307 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
309 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
312 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
314 prsactx->operation = operation;
316 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
317 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
318 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
320 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
321 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
322 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
324 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
325 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
328 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
329 rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
331 if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
332 int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
333 int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
334 int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
335 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
338 mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
339 mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
340 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
342 if (mdname == NULL) {
343 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
344 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
347 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
348 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
349 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
353 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
354 sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
355 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
356 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
357 "hash algorithm name too long");
360 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
361 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
362 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
363 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
364 "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
367 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
369 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
370 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq);
376 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
383 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
385 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
387 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
388 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
394 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
396 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
397 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
400 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
403 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
407 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
409 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
412 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
413 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
415 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
417 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
418 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
425 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
426 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
427 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
432 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
433 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
438 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
441 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
442 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
443 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
446 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
450 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
457 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
458 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
459 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
460 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
461 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
462 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
465 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
466 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
469 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
470 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
471 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
472 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
476 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
480 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
483 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
490 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
491 /* Check PSS restrictions */
492 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
493 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
494 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
495 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
496 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
497 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
498 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
499 "but the digest only gives %d",
500 prsactx->min_saltlen,
501 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
506 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
507 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
508 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
509 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
510 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
511 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
512 prsactx->min_saltlen,
519 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
521 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
523 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
525 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
528 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
529 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
534 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
535 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
539 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
547 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
555 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
557 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
560 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
564 const unsigned char *sig,
567 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
571 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
575 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
576 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
577 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
578 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
580 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
583 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
587 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
588 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
591 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
592 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
593 "Should be %d, but got %d",
594 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
599 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
600 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
601 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
605 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
608 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
612 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
613 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
615 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
623 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
624 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
628 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
631 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
639 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
641 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
644 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
645 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
647 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
650 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
651 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
652 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
653 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
655 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
659 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
660 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
663 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
669 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
672 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
673 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
674 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
675 "Should be %d, but got %d",
680 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
682 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
683 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
685 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
688 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
689 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
693 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
699 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
700 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
704 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
706 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
709 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
714 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
720 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
721 void *vrsa, int operation)
723 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
725 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
726 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
727 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
730 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
731 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
732 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
736 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
742 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
743 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
744 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
749 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
750 const unsigned char *data,
753 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
755 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
758 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
761 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
764 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
768 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
769 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
771 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
772 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
773 unsigned int dlen = 0;
775 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
776 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
780 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
781 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
785 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
786 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
787 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
789 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
793 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
796 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
799 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
803 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
806 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
807 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
808 unsigned int dlen = 0;
810 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
811 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
815 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
816 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
817 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
819 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
822 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
825 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
827 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
832 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
833 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
834 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
835 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
836 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
839 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
842 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
844 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
845 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
847 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
848 if (dstctx == NULL) {
849 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
856 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
859 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
861 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
863 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
865 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
867 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
869 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
871 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
872 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
873 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
874 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
884 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
886 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
889 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
892 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
894 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
897 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
899 switch (p->data_type) {
900 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
901 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
904 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
907 const char *word = NULL;
909 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
910 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
911 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
917 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
920 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
928 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
929 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
932 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
933 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
936 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
938 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
939 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
941 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
942 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
943 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
944 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
947 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
948 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
951 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
952 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
956 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
967 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
968 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
969 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
970 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
971 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
972 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
976 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
978 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
981 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
983 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
986 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
989 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
990 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
991 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
994 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
995 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
996 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
997 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
998 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
1000 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1005 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1006 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1009 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1010 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1011 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
1013 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1017 /* non-PSS code follows */
1018 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1022 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
1025 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
1027 switch (p->data_type) {
1028 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1029 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1032 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1036 if (p->data == NULL)
1039 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1040 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1041 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1052 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1054 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1055 * with signature use.
1057 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1059 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
1060 if ((prsactx->operation
1061 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1063 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1066 if (prsactx->md == NULL
1067 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
1071 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
1072 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1074 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
1075 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1077 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
1078 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1080 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
1081 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1083 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1084 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
1089 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1090 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1091 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1093 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1094 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1098 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1100 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1103 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1107 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1108 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1109 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1110 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1114 switch (p->data_type) {
1115 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1116 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1119 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1120 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
1121 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1122 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
1123 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1124 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
1125 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1127 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1134 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1135 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1136 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1138 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1139 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1143 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1144 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
1145 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1146 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1147 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1151 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1152 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1153 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1154 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1155 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1156 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1157 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1158 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1163 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1164 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1165 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1166 "Should be more than %d, "
1167 "but would be set to %d",
1168 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1174 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1177 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1179 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1180 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1181 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1182 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1183 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1185 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1190 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1191 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1194 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1195 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1199 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1200 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1201 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1202 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1204 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1208 /* non-PSS code follows */
1209 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1216 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1217 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1218 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1219 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1220 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1221 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1222 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1226 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1229 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1230 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1231 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1232 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1234 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1237 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1239 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1241 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1244 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1247 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1249 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1251 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1254 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1257 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1259 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1261 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1264 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1267 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1269 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1271 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1274 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1277 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1278 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1279 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1280 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1281 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1282 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1283 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1284 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1285 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1286 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1287 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1288 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1289 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1290 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1291 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1292 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1293 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1294 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1295 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1296 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1297 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1298 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1299 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1300 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1301 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1302 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1303 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1304 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1305 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1306 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1307 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1308 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1309 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1310 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1311 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1312 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1313 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1314 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },