2 * Copyright (C) 2017 Denys Vlasenko
4 * Licensed under GPLv2, see file LICENSE in this source tree.
7 //config: bool #No description makes it a hidden option
10 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o
11 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm.o
12 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_montgomery_reduce.o
13 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_mul_comba.o
14 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_pstm_sqr_comba.o
15 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_rsa.o
16 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes.o
17 ////kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls_aes_gcm.o
22 #define TLS_DEBUG_HASH 0
23 #define TLS_DEBUG_DER 0
24 #define TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS 0
27 # define dbg(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
29 # define dbg(...) ((void)0)
33 # define dbg_der(...) fprintf(stderr, __VA_ARGS__)
35 # define dbg_der(...) ((void)0)
39 # define dump_raw_out(...) dump_hex(__VA_ARGS__)
41 # define dump_raw_out(...) ((void)0)
45 # define dump_raw_in(...) dump_hex(__VA_ARGS__)
47 # define dump_raw_in(...) ((void)0)
50 #define RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
51 #define RECORD_TYPE_ALERT 21
52 #define RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE 22
53 #define RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA 23
55 #define HANDSHAKE_HELLO_REQUEST 0
56 #define HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO 1
57 #define HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO 2
58 #define HANDSHAKE_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
59 #define HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4
60 #define HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE 11
61 #define HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
62 #define HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
63 #define HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14
64 #define HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
65 #define HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
66 #define HANDSHAKE_FINISHED 20
68 #define SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL 0x0000
69 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x0001
70 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0002
71 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0004
72 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0005
73 #define SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000A /* 10 */
74 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002F /* 47 */
75 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0035 /* 53 */
76 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x003B /* 59 */
78 #define TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV 0x00FF
80 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA 0x0007 /* 7 */
81 #define SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0016 /* 22 */
82 #define SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0018 /* 24 */
83 #define SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x001B /* 27 */
84 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0033 /* 51 */
85 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0039 /* 57 */
86 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0067 /* 103 */
87 #define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006B /* 107 */
88 #define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0034 /* 52 */
89 #define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x003A /* 58 */
90 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003C /* 60 */
91 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x003D /* 61 */
92 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA 0x0096 /* 150 */
93 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x008C /* 140 */
94 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x00AE /* 174 */
95 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0x00AF /* 175 */
96 #define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x008D /* 141 */
97 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0090 /* 144 */
98 #define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0091 /* 145 */
99 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /* 49156 */
100 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /* 49157 */
101 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /* 49161 */
102 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /* 49162 */
103 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /* 49170 */
104 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /* 49171 */
105 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /* 49172 */
106 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /* 49166 */
107 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /* 49167 */
108 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /* 49187 */
109 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /* 49188 */
110 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /* 49189 */
111 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /* 49190 */
112 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /* 49191 */
113 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /* 49192 */
114 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /* 49193 */
115 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /* 49194 */
117 // RFC 5288 "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS"
118 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C /* 156 */
119 #define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D /* 157 */
120 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /* 49195 */
121 #define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /* 49196 */
122 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /* 49197 */
123 #define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /* 49198 */
124 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /* 49199 */
125 #define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /* 49200 */
126 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /* 49201 */
127 #define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /* 49202 */
129 //Tested against kernel.org:
133 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
137 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** matrixssl uses this on my box
138 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
140 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
141 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
142 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, recvs SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
143 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
144 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
145 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
146 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
147 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
148 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
149 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE *** select this?
150 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA // SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
151 //^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (tested b/c this one doesn't req server certs... no luck)
152 //test TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, in TLS 1.2 it's mandated to be always supported
154 // works against "openssl s_server -cipher NULL"
155 // and against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c:
156 //#define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 // for testing (does everything except encrypting)
157 // works against wolfssl-3.9.10-stable/examples/server/server.c
158 #define CIPHER_ID TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 // ok, no SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
161 RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE = 48,
165 MAX_TLS_RECORD = (1 << 14),
166 /* 8 = 3+5. 3 extra bytes result in record data being 32-bit aligned */
167 OUTBUF_PFX = 8 + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* header + IV */
168 OUTBUF_SFX = SHA256_OUTSIZE + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* MAC + padding */
169 MAX_OUTBUF = MAX_TLS_RECORD - OUTBUF_PFX - OUTBUF_SFX,
172 // | 6.2.1. Fragmentation
173 // | The record layer fragments information blocks into TLSPlaintext
174 // | records carrying data in chunks of 2^14 bytes or less. Client
175 // | message boundaries are not preserved in the record layer (i.e.,
176 // | multiple client messages of the same ContentType MAY be coalesced
177 // | into a single TLSPlaintext record, or a single message MAY be
178 // | fragmented across several records)
181 // | The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment.
182 // | The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14.
184 // | 6.2.2. Record Compression and Decompression
186 // | Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length
187 // | by more than 1024 bytes. If the decompression function encounters a
188 // | TLSCompressed.fragment that would decompress to a length in excess of
189 // | 2^14 bytes, it MUST report a fatal decompression failure error.
192 // | The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCompressed.fragment.
193 // | The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 1024.
195 // | 6.2.3. Record Payload Protection
196 // | The encryption and MAC functions translate a TLSCompressed
197 // | structure into a TLSCiphertext. The decryption functions reverse
198 // | the process. The MAC of the record also includes a sequence
199 // | number so that missing, extra, or repeated messages are
203 // | The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.fragment.
204 // | The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048.
205 MAX_INBUF = (1 << 14) + 2048,
210 uint8_t proto_maj, proto_min;
211 uint8_t len16_hi, len16_lo;
214 struct tls_handshake_data {
215 //TODO: store just the DER key here, parse/use/delete it when sending client key
216 //this way it will stay key type agnostic here.
217 psRsaKey_t server_rsa_pub_key;
218 // this is also unused after client key is sent
219 uint8_t client_and_server_rand32[2 * 32];
220 // these two are unused after finished messages are exchanged:
221 sha256_ctx_t handshake_sha256_ctx;
222 uint8_t master_secret[48];
226 static unsigned get24be(const uint8_t *p)
228 return 0x100*(0x100*p[0] + p[1]) + p[2];
232 static void dump_hex(const char *fmt, const void *vp, int len)
234 char hexbuf[32 * 1024 + 4];
235 const uint8_t *p = vp;
237 bin2hex(hexbuf, (void*)p, len)[0] = '\0';
241 static void dump_tls_record(const void *vp, int len)
243 const uint8_t *p = vp;
247 if (len < RECHDR_LEN) {
248 dump_hex("< |%s|\n", p, len);
251 xhdr_len = 0x100*p[3] + p[4];
252 dbg("< hdr_type:%u ver:%u.%u len:%u", p[0], p[1], p[2], xhdr_len);
255 if (len >= 4 && p[-RECHDR_LEN] == RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE) {
256 unsigned len24 = get24be(p + 1);
257 dbg(" type:%u len24:%u", p[0], len24);
261 dump_hex(" |%s|\n", p, xhdr_len);
267 # define dump_hex(...) ((void)0)
268 # define dump_tls_record(...) ((void)0)
271 void tls_get_random(void *buf, unsigned len)
273 if (len != open_read_close("/dev/urandom", buf, len))
277 //TODO rename this to sha256_hash, and sha256_hash -> sha256_update
278 static void hash_sha256(uint8_t out[SHA256_OUTSIZE], const void *data, unsigned size)
282 sha256_hash(&ctx, data, size);
283 sha256_end(&ctx, out);
286 /* Nondestructively see the current hash value */
287 static void sha256_peek(sha256_ctx_t *ctx, void *buffer)
289 sha256_ctx_t ctx_copy = *ctx;
290 sha256_end(&ctx_copy, buffer);
294 static void sha256_hash_dbg(const char *fmt, sha256_ctx_t *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len)
296 uint8_t h[SHA256_OUTSIZE];
298 sha256_hash(ctx, buffer, len);
299 dump_hex(fmt, buffer, len);
300 dbg(" (%u) ", (int)len);
302 dump_hex("%s\n", h, SHA256_OUTSIZE);
305 # define sha256_hash_dbg(fmt, ctx, buffer, len) \
306 sha256_hash(ctx, buffer, len)
310 // HMAC(key, text) based on a hash H (say, sha256) is:
311 // ipad = [0x36 x INSIZE]
312 // opad = [0x5c x INSIZE]
313 // HMAC(key, text) = H((key XOR opad) + H((key XOR ipad) + text))
315 // H(key XOR opad) and H(key XOR ipad) can be precomputed
316 // if we often need HMAC hmac with the same key.
318 // text is often given in disjoint pieces.
319 static void hmac_sha256_precomputed_v(uint8_t out[SHA256_OUTSIZE],
320 sha256_ctx_t *hashed_key_xor_ipad,
321 sha256_ctx_t *hashed_key_xor_opad,
326 /* hashed_key_xor_ipad contains unclosed "H((key XOR ipad) +" state */
327 /* hashed_key_xor_opad contains unclosed "H((key XOR opad) +" state */
329 /* calculate out = H((key XOR ipad) + text) */
330 while ((text = va_arg(va, uint8_t*)) != NULL) {
331 unsigned text_size = va_arg(va, unsigned);
332 sha256_hash(hashed_key_xor_ipad, text, text_size);
334 sha256_end(hashed_key_xor_ipad, out);
336 /* out = H((key XOR opad) + out) */
337 sha256_hash(hashed_key_xor_opad, out, SHA256_OUTSIZE);
338 sha256_end(hashed_key_xor_opad, out);
341 static void hmac_sha256(uint8_t out[SHA256_OUTSIZE], uint8_t *key, unsigned key_size, ...)
343 sha256_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_ipad;
344 sha256_ctx_t hashed_key_xor_opad;
345 uint8_t key_xor_ipad[SHA256_INSIZE];
346 uint8_t key_xor_opad[SHA256_INSIZE];
347 uint8_t tempkey[SHA256_OUTSIZE];
351 va_start(va, key_size);
353 // "The authentication key can be of any length up to INSIZE, the
354 // block length of the hash function. Applications that use keys longer
355 // than INSIZE bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the
356 // resultant OUTSIZE byte string as the actual key to HMAC."
357 if (key_size > SHA256_INSIZE) {
358 hash_sha256(tempkey, key, key_size);
360 key_size = SHA256_OUTSIZE;
363 for (i = 0; i < key_size; i++) {
364 key_xor_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
365 key_xor_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
367 for (; i < SHA256_INSIZE; i++) {
368 key_xor_ipad[i] = 0x36;
369 key_xor_opad[i] = 0x5c;
371 sha256_begin(&hashed_key_xor_ipad);
372 sha256_hash(&hashed_key_xor_ipad, key_xor_ipad, SHA256_INSIZE);
373 sha256_begin(&hashed_key_xor_opad);
374 sha256_hash(&hashed_key_xor_opad, key_xor_opad, SHA256_INSIZE);
376 hmac_sha256_precomputed_v(out, &hashed_key_xor_ipad, &hashed_key_xor_opad, va);
381 // 5. HMAC and the Pseudorandom Function
383 // In this section, we define one PRF, based on HMAC. This PRF with the
384 // SHA-256 hash function is used for all cipher suites defined in this
385 // document and in TLS documents published prior to this document when
386 // TLS 1.2 is negotiated.
388 // P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
389 // HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) +
390 // HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
391 // where + indicates concatenation.
392 // A() is defined as:
394 // A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)) = HMAC_hash(secret, seed)
395 // A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
396 // P_hash can be iterated as many times as necessary to produce the
397 // required quantity of data. For example, if P_SHA256 is being used to
398 // create 80 bytes of data, it will have to be iterated three times
399 // (through A(3)), creating 96 bytes of output data; the last 16 bytes
400 // of the final iteration will then be discarded, leaving 80 bytes of
403 // TLS's PRF is created by applying P_hash to the secret as:
405 // PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
407 // The label is an ASCII string.
408 static void prf_hmac_sha256(
409 uint8_t *outbuf, unsigned outbuf_size,
410 uint8_t *secret, unsigned secret_size,
412 uint8_t *seed, unsigned seed_size)
414 uint8_t a[SHA256_OUTSIZE];
415 uint8_t *out_p = outbuf;
416 unsigned label_size = strlen(label);
418 /* In P_hash() calculation, "seed" is "label + seed": */
419 #define SEED label, label_size, seed, seed_size
420 #define SECRET secret, secret_size
421 #define A a, (int)(sizeof(a))
423 /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, seed) */
424 hmac_sha256(a, SECRET, SEED, NULL);
425 //TODO: convert hmac_sha256 to precomputed
428 /* HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) */
429 if (outbuf_size <= SHA256_OUTSIZE) {
430 /* Last, possibly incomplete, block */
431 /* (use a[] as temp buffer) */
432 hmac_sha256(a, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL);
433 memcpy(out_p, a, outbuf_size);
436 /* Not last block. Store directly to result buffer */
437 hmac_sha256(out_p, SECRET, A, SEED, NULL);
438 out_p += SHA256_OUTSIZE;
439 outbuf_size -= SHA256_OUTSIZE;
440 /* A(2) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1)) */
441 hmac_sha256(a, SECRET, A, NULL);
448 static void tls_error_die(tls_state_t *tls)
450 dump_tls_record(tls->inbuf, tls->ofs_to_buffered + tls->buffered_size);
451 bb_error_msg_and_die("TODO: useful diagnostic about %p", tls);
455 static void tls_free_inbuf(tls_state_t *tls)
457 if (tls->buffered_size == 0) {
465 static void tls_free_outbuf(tls_state_t *tls)
468 tls->outbuf_size = 0;
472 static void *tls_get_outbuf(tls_state_t *tls, int len)
474 if (len > MAX_OUTBUF)
476 if (tls->outbuf_size < len + OUTBUF_PFX + OUTBUF_SFX) {
477 tls->outbuf_size = len + OUTBUF_PFX + OUTBUF_SFX;
478 tls->outbuf = xrealloc(tls->outbuf, tls->outbuf_size);
480 return tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
483 static void xwrite_encrypted(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size, unsigned type)
485 uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
486 struct record_hdr *xhdr;
487 uint8_t padding_length;
489 xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN);
490 if (CIPHER_ID != TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256)
491 xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN - AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* place for IV */
494 xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ;
495 xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN;
496 /* fake unencrypted record len for MAC calculation */
497 xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
498 xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
500 /* Calculate MAC signature */
501 //TODO: convert hmac_sha256 to precomputed
502 hmac_sha256(buf + size,
503 tls->client_write_MAC_key, sizeof(tls->client_write_MAC_key),
504 &tls->write_seq64_be, sizeof(tls->write_seq64_be),
508 tls->write_seq64_be = SWAP_BE64(1 + SWAP_BE64(tls->write_seq64_be));
510 size += SHA256_OUTSIZE;
513 // 6.2.3.1. Null or Standard Stream Cipher
515 // Stream ciphers (including BulkCipherAlgorithm.null; see Appendix A.6)
516 // convert TLSCompressed.fragment structures to and from stream
517 // TLSCiphertext.fragment structures.
519 // stream-ciphered struct {
520 // opaque content[TLSCompressed.length];
521 // opaque MAC[SecurityParameters.mac_length];
522 // } GenericStreamCipher;
524 // The MAC is generated as:
525 // MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
526 // TLSCompressed.type +
527 // TLSCompressed.version +
528 // TLSCompressed.length +
529 // TLSCompressed.fragment);
530 // where "+" denotes concatenation.
532 // The sequence number for this record.
534 // The MAC algorithm specified by SecurityParameters.mac_algorithm.
536 // Note that the MAC is computed before encryption. The stream cipher
537 // encrypts the entire block, including the MAC.
539 // Appendix C. Cipher Suite Definitions
541 // MAC Algorithm mac_length mac_key_length
542 // -------- ----------- ---------- --------------
543 // SHA HMAC-SHA1 20 20
544 // SHA256 HMAC-SHA256 32 32
545 if (CIPHER_ID == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256) {
546 /* No encryption, only signing */
547 xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
548 xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
549 dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
550 xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
551 dbg("wrote %u bytes (NULL crypt, SHA256 hash)\n", size);
555 // 6.2.3.2. CBC Block Cipher
556 // For block ciphers (such as 3DES or AES), the encryption and MAC
557 // functions convert TLSCompressed.fragment structures to and from block
558 // TLSCiphertext.fragment structures.
560 // opaque IV[SecurityParameters.record_iv_length];
561 // block-ciphered struct {
562 // opaque content[TLSCompressed.length];
563 // opaque MAC[SecurityParameters.mac_length];
564 // uint8 padding[GenericBlockCipher.padding_length];
565 // uint8 padding_length;
567 // } GenericBlockCipher;
570 // The Initialization Vector (IV) SHOULD be chosen at random, and
571 // MUST be unpredictable. Note that in versions of TLS prior to 1.1,
572 // there was no IV field (...). For block ciphers, the IV length is
573 // of length SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to the
574 // SecurityParameters.block_size.
576 // Padding that is added to force the length of the plaintext to be
577 // an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length.
579 // The padding length MUST be such that the total size of the
580 // GenericBlockCipher structure is a multiple of the cipher's block
581 // length. Legal values range from zero to 255, inclusive.
583 // Appendix C. Cipher Suite Definitions
586 // Cipher Type Material Size Size
587 // ------------ ------ -------- ---- -----
588 // AES_128_CBC Block 16 16 16
589 // AES_256_CBC Block 32 16 16
591 /* Fill IV and padding in outbuf */
592 tls_get_random(buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, AES_BLOCKSIZE); /* IV */
593 dbg("before crypt: 5 hdr + %u data + %u hash bytes\n", size, SHA256_OUTSIZE);
594 // RFC is talking nonsense:
595 // Padding that is added to force the length of the plaintext to be
596 // an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length.
597 // WRONG. _padding+padding_length_, not just _padding_,
599 // IOW: padding_length is the last byte of padding[] array,
600 // contrary to what RFC depicts.
602 // What actually happens is that there is always padding.
603 // If you need one byte to reach BLOCKSIZE, this byte is 0x00.
604 // If you need two bytes, they are both 0x01.
605 // If you need three, they are 0x02,0x02,0x02. And so on.
606 // If you need no bytes to reach BLOCKSIZE, you have to pad a full
607 // BLOCKSIZE with bytes of value (BLOCKSIZE-1).
608 // It's ok to have more than minimum padding, but we do minimum.
609 padding_length = (~size) & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1);
611 buf[size++] = padding_length; /* padding */
612 } while ((size & (AES_BLOCKSIZE - 1)) != 0);
614 /* Encrypt content+MAC+padding in place */
616 psCipherContext_t ctx;
617 psAesInit(&ctx, buf - AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* IV */
618 tls->client_write_key, sizeof(tls->client_write_key)
622 buf, /* ciphertext */
628 dbg("writing 5 + %u IV + %u encrypted bytes, padding_length:0x%02x\n",
629 AES_BLOCKSIZE, size, padding_length);
630 size += AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* + IV */
631 xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
632 xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
633 dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
634 xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
635 dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size);
638 static void xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls_state_t *tls, unsigned size)
640 if (!tls->encrypt_on_write) {
641 uint8_t *buf = tls->outbuf + OUTBUF_PFX;
642 struct record_hdr *xhdr = (void*)(buf - RECHDR_LEN);
644 xhdr->type = RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE;
645 xhdr->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ;
646 xhdr->proto_min = TLS_MIN;
647 xhdr->len16_hi = size >> 8;
648 xhdr->len16_lo = size & 0xff;
649 dump_raw_out(">> %s\n", xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
650 xwrite(tls->ofd, xhdr, RECHDR_LEN + size);
651 dbg("wrote %u bytes\n", (int)RECHDR_LEN + size);
652 /* Handshake hash does not include record headers */
653 sha256_hash_dbg(">> sha256:%s", &tls->hsd->handshake_sha256_ctx, buf, size);
656 xwrite_encrypted(tls, size, RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE);
659 static int tls_has_buffered_record(tls_state_t *tls)
661 int buffered = tls->buffered_size;
662 struct record_hdr *xhdr;
665 if (buffered < RECHDR_LEN)
667 xhdr = (void*)(tls->inbuf + tls->ofs_to_buffered);
668 rec_size = RECHDR_LEN + (0x100 * xhdr->len16_hi + xhdr->len16_lo);
669 if (buffered < rec_size)
674 static int tls_xread_record(tls_state_t *tls)
676 struct record_hdr *xhdr;
682 dbg("ofs_to_buffered:%u buffered_size:%u\n", tls->ofs_to_buffered, tls->buffered_size);
683 total = tls->buffered_size;
685 memmove(tls->inbuf, tls->inbuf + tls->ofs_to_buffered, total);
686 //dbg("<< remaining at %d [%d] ", tls->ofs_to_buffered, total);
687 //dump_raw_in("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf, total);
694 if (total >= RECHDR_LEN && target == MAX_INBUF) {
695 xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf;
696 target = RECHDR_LEN + (0x100 * xhdr->len16_hi + xhdr->len16_lo);
697 if (target > MAX_INBUF) {
698 /* malformed input (too long): yell and die */
699 tls->buffered_size = 0;
700 tls->ofs_to_buffered = total;
703 /* can also check type/proto_maj/proto_min here */
704 dbg("xhdr type:%d ver:%d.%d len:%d\n",
705 xhdr->type, xhdr->proto_maj, xhdr->proto_min,
706 0x100 * xhdr->len16_hi + xhdr->len16_lo
709 /* if total >= target, we have a full packet (and possibly more)... */
710 if (total - target >= 0)
712 /* input buffer is grown only as needed */
713 rem = tls->inbuf_size - total;
715 tls->inbuf_size += MAX_INBUF / 8;
716 if (tls->inbuf_size > MAX_INBUF)
717 tls->inbuf_size = MAX_INBUF;
718 dbg("inbuf_size:%d\n", tls->inbuf_size);
719 rem = tls->inbuf_size - total;
720 tls->inbuf = xrealloc(tls->inbuf, tls->inbuf_size);
722 sz = safe_read(tls->ifd, tls->inbuf + total, rem);
724 if (sz == 0 && total == 0) {
725 /* "Abrupt" EOF, no TLS shutdown (seen from kernel.org) */
726 dbg("EOF (without TLS shutdown) from peer\n");
727 tls->buffered_size = 0;
730 bb_perror_msg_and_die("short read, have only %d", total);
732 dump_raw_in("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf + total, sz);
735 tls->buffered_size = total - target;
736 tls->ofs_to_buffered = target;
737 //dbg("<< stashing at %d [%d] ", tls->ofs_to_buffered, tls->buffered_size);
738 //dump_hex("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf + tls->ofs_to_buffered, tls->buffered_size);
740 sz = target - RECHDR_LEN;
742 /* Needs to be decrypted? */
743 if (tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read > SHA256_OUTSIZE) {
744 psCipherContext_t ctx;
745 uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN;
748 if (sz & (AES_BLOCKSIZE-1)
749 || sz < tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read
751 bb_error_msg_and_die("bad encrypted len:%u", sz);
753 /* Decrypt content+MAC+padding, moving it over IV in the process */
754 psAesInit(&ctx, p, /* IV */
755 tls->server_write_key, sizeof(tls->server_write_key)
757 sz -= AES_BLOCKSIZE; /* we will overwrite IV now */
759 p + AES_BLOCKSIZE, /* ciphertext */
763 padding_len = p[sz - 1];
764 dbg("encrypted size:%u type:0x%02x padding_length:0x%02x\n", sz, p[0], padding_len);
766 sz -= SHA256_OUTSIZE + padding_len; /* drop MAC and padding */
768 // bb_error_msg_and_die("bad padding size:%u", padding_len);
770 /* if nonzero, then it's TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: drop MAC */
771 /* else: no encryption yet on input, subtract zero = NOP */
772 sz -= tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read;
775 bb_error_msg_and_die("encrypted data too short");
777 //dump_hex("<< %s\n", tls->inbuf, RECHDR_LEN + sz);
779 xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf;
780 if (xhdr->type == RECORD_TYPE_ALERT && sz >= 2) {
781 uint8_t *p = tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN;
782 dbg("ALERT size:%d level:%d description:%d\n", sz, p[0], p[1]);
783 if (p[0] == 1) { /* warning */
784 if (p[1] == 0) { /* "close_notify" warning: it's EOF */
785 dbg("EOF (TLS encoded) from peer\n");
789 /* discard it, get next record */
792 /* p[0] == 1: fatal error, others: not defined in protocol */
797 /* RFC 5246 is not saying it explicitly, but sha256 hash
798 * in our FINISHED record must include data of incoming packets too!
800 if (tls->inbuf[0] == RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE) {
801 sha256_hash_dbg("<< sha256:%s", &tls->hsd->handshake_sha256_ctx, tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, sz);
804 dbg("got block len:%u\n", sz);
809 * DER parsing routines
811 static unsigned get_der_len(uint8_t **bodyp, uint8_t *der, uint8_t *end)
817 // if ((der[0] & 0x1f) == 0x1f) /* not single-byte item code? */
820 len = der[1]; /* maybe it's short len */
824 if (len == 0x80 || end - der < (int)(len - 0x7e)) {
825 /* 0x80 is "0 bytes of len", invalid DER: must use short len if can */
826 /* need 3 or 4 bytes for 81, 82 */
830 len1 = der[2]; /* if (len == 0x81) it's "ii 81 xx", fetch xx */
832 /* >0x82 is "3+ bytes of len", should not happen realistically */
835 if (len == 0x82) { /* it's "ii 82 xx yy" */
836 len1 = 0x100*len1 + der[3];
837 der += 1; /* skip [yy] */
839 der += 1; /* skip [xx] */
842 // xfunc_die(); /* invalid DER: must use short len if can */
844 der += 2; /* skip [code]+[1byte] */
846 if (end - der < (int)len)
853 static uint8_t *enter_der_item(uint8_t *der, uint8_t **endp)
856 unsigned len = get_der_len(&new_der, der, *endp);
857 dbg_der("entered der @%p:0x%02x len:%u inner_byte @%p:0x%02x\n", der, der[0], len, new_der, new_der[0]);
858 /* Move "end" position to cover only this item */
859 *endp = new_der + len;
863 static uint8_t *skip_der_item(uint8_t *der, uint8_t *end)
866 unsigned len = get_der_len(&new_der, der, end);
869 dbg_der("skipped der 0x%02x, next byte 0x%02x\n", der[0], new_der[0]);
873 static void der_binary_to_pstm(pstm_int *pstm_n, uint8_t *der, uint8_t *end)
876 unsigned len = get_der_len(&bin_ptr, der, end);
878 dbg_der("binary bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", len, bin_ptr[0]);
879 pstm_init_for_read_unsigned_bin(/*pool:*/ NULL, pstm_n, len);
880 pstm_read_unsigned_bin(pstm_n, bin_ptr, len);
884 static void find_key_in_der_cert(tls_state_t *tls, uint8_t *der, int len)
886 /* Certificate is a DER-encoded data structure. Each DER element has a length,
887 * which makes it easy to skip over large compound elements of any complexity
888 * without parsing them. Example: partial decode of kernel.org certificate:
889 * SEQ 0x05ac/1452 bytes (Certificate): 308205ac
890 * SEQ 0x0494/1172 bytes (tbsCertificate): 30820494
891 * [ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_CONSTRUCTED | 0] 3 bytes: a003
892 * INTEGER (version): 0201 02
893 * INTEGER 0x11 bytes (serialNumber): 0211 00 9f85bf664b0cddafca508679501b2be4
894 * //^^^^^^note: matrixSSL also allows [ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_PRIMITIVE | 2] = 0x82 type
895 * SEQ 0x0d bytes (signatureAlgo): 300d
896 * OID 9 bytes: 0609 2a864886f70d01010b (OID_SHA256_RSA_SIG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.11)
898 * SEQ 0x5f bytes (issuer): 305f
901 * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550406
902 * Printable string "FR": 1302 4652
905 * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550408
906 * Printable string "Paris": 1305 5061726973
909 * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550407
910 * Printable string "Paris": 1305 5061726973
913 * OID 3 bytes: 0603 55040a
914 * Printable string "Gandi": 1305 47616e6469
917 * OID 3 bytes: 0603 550403
918 * Printable string "Gandi Standard SSL CA 2": 1317 47616e6469205374616e646172642053534c2043412032
919 * SEQ 30 bytes (validity): 301e
920 * TIME "161011000000Z": 170d 3136313031313030303030305a
921 * TIME "191011235959Z": 170d 3139313031313233353935395a
922 * SEQ 0x5b/91 bytes (subject): 305b //I did not decode this
923 * 3121301f060355040b1318446f6d61696e20436f
924 * 6e74726f6c2056616c6964617465643121301f06
925 * 0355040b1318506f73697469766553534c204d75
926 * 6c74692d446f6d61696e31133011060355040313
927 * 0a6b65726e656c2e6f7267
928 * SEQ 0x01a2/418 bytes (subjectPublicKeyInfo): 308201a2
929 * SEQ 13 bytes (algorithm): 300d
930 * OID 9 bytes: 0609 2a864886f70d010101 (OID_RSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.1)
932 * BITSTRING 0x018f/399 bytes (publicKey): 0382018f
934 * //after the zero byte, it appears key itself uses DER encoding:
935 * SEQ 0x018a/394 bytes: 3082018a
936 * INTEGER 0x0181/385 bytes (modulus): 02820181
937 * 00b1ab2fc727a3bef76780c9349bf3
938 * ...24 more blocks of 15 bytes each...
939 * 90e895291c6bc8693b65
940 * INTEGER 3 bytes (exponent): 0203 010001
941 * [ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_CONSTRUCTED | 0x3] 0x01e5 bytes (X509v3 extensions): a38201e5
942 * SEQ 0x01e1 bytes: 308201e1
944 * Certificate is a sequence of three elements:
945 * tbsCertificate (SEQ)
946 * signatureAlgorithm (AlgorithmIdentifier)
947 * signatureValue (BIT STRING)
949 * In turn, tbsCertificate is a sequence of:
952 * signatureAlgo (AlgorithmIdentifier)
953 * issuer (Name, has complex structure)
954 * validity (Validity, SEQ of two Times)
956 * subjectPublicKeyInfo (SEQ)
959 * subjectPublicKeyInfo is a sequence of:
960 * algorithm (AlgorithmIdentifier)
961 * publicKey (BIT STRING)
963 * We need Certificate.tbsCertificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey
965 uint8_t *end = der + len;
967 /* enter "Certificate" item: [der, end) will be only Cert */
968 der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
970 /* enter "tbsCertificate" item: [der, end) will be only tbsCert */
971 der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
973 /* skip up to subjectPublicKeyInfo */
974 der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* version */
975 der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* serialNumber */
976 der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* signatureAlgo */
977 der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* issuer */
978 der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* validity */
979 der = skip_der_item(der, end); /* subject */
981 /* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo */
982 der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
983 { /* check subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */
984 static const uint8_t expected[] = {
985 0x30,0x0d, // SEQ 13 bytes
986 0x06,0x09, 0x2a,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xf7,0x0d,0x01,0x01,0x01, // OID RSA_KEY_ALG 42.134.72.134.247.13.1.1.1
989 if (memcmp(der, expected, sizeof(expected)) != 0)
990 bb_error_msg_and_die("not RSA key");
992 /* skip subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm */
993 der = skip_der_item(der, end);
994 /* enter subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey */
995 // die_if_not_this_der_type(der, end, 0x03); /* must be BITSTRING */
996 der = enter_der_item(der, &end);
999 //based on getAsnRsaPubKey(), pkcs1ParsePrivBin() is also of note
1000 dbg("key bytes:%u, first:0x%02x\n", (int)(end - der), der[0]);
1001 if (end - der < 14) xfunc_die();
1004 * SEQ 0x018a/394 bytes: 3082018a
1005 * INTEGER 0x0181/385 bytes (modulus): 02820181 XX...XXX
1006 * INTEGER 3 bytes (exponent): 0203 010001
1008 if (*der != 0) /* "ignore bits", should be 0 */
1011 der = enter_der_item(der, &end); /* enter SEQ */
1012 /* memset(tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key, 0, sizeof(tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key)); - already is */
1013 der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.N, der, end); /* modulus */
1014 der = skip_der_item(der, end);
1015 der_binary_to_pstm(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.e, der, end); /* exponent */
1016 tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.size = pstm_unsigned_bin_size(&tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.N);
1017 dbg("server_rsa_pub_key.size:%d\n", tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key.size);
1021 * TLS Handshake routines
1023 static int tls_xread_handshake_block(tls_state_t *tls, int min_len)
1025 struct record_hdr *xhdr;
1026 int len = tls_xread_record(tls);
1028 xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf;
1030 || xhdr->type != RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE
1031 || xhdr->proto_maj != TLS_MAJ
1032 || xhdr->proto_min != TLS_MIN
1036 dbg("got HANDSHAKE\n");
1040 static ALWAYS_INLINE void fill_handshake_record_hdr(void *buf, unsigned type, unsigned len)
1042 struct handshake_hdr {
1044 uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
1049 h->len24_hi = len >> 16;
1050 h->len24_mid = len >> 8;
1051 h->len24_lo = len & 0xff;
1054 //TODO: implement RFC 5746 (Renegotiation Indication Extension) - some servers will refuse to work with us otherwise
1055 static void send_client_hello(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni)
1057 struct client_hello {
1059 uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
1060 uint8_t proto_maj, proto_min;
1062 uint8_t session_id_len;
1063 /* uint8_t session_id[]; */
1064 uint8_t cipherid_len16_hi, cipherid_len16_lo;
1065 uint8_t cipherid[2 * 1]; /* actually variable */
1066 uint8_t comprtypes_len;
1067 uint8_t comprtypes[1]; /* actually variable */
1068 /* Extensions (SNI shown):
1069 * hi,lo // len of all extensions
1070 * 0x00,0x00 // extension_type: "Server Name"
1071 * 0x00,0x0e // list len (there can be more than one SNI)
1072 * 0x00,0x0c // len of 1st Server Name Indication
1073 * 0x00 // name type: host_name
1074 * 0x00,0x09 // name len
1075 * "localhost" // name
1078 struct client_hello *record;
1080 int sni_len = sni ? strnlen(sni, 127) : 0;
1082 len = sizeof(*record);
1084 len += 11 + strlen(sni);
1085 record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, len);
1086 memset(record, 0, len);
1087 fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO, len);
1088 record->proto_maj = TLS_MAJ; /* the "requested" version of the protocol, */
1089 record->proto_min = TLS_MIN; /* can be higher than one in record headers */
1090 tls_get_random(record->rand32, sizeof(record->rand32));
1091 if (TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS)
1092 memset(record->rand32, 0x11, sizeof(record->rand32));
1093 memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, record->rand32, sizeof(record->rand32));
1094 /* record->session_id_len = 0; - already is */
1095 /* record->cipherid_len16_hi = 0; */
1096 record->cipherid_len16_lo = 2 * 1;
1097 record->cipherid[0] = CIPHER_ID >> 8;
1098 record->cipherid[1] = CIPHER_ID & 0xff;
1099 record->comprtypes_len = 1;
1100 /* record->comprtypes[0] = 0; */
1103 uint8_t *p = (void*)(record + 1);
1105 p[1] = sni_len + 9; //ext_len
1107 //p[3] = 0; //extension_type
1109 p[5] = sni_len + 5; //list len
1111 p[7] = sni_len + 3; //len of 1st SNI
1112 //p[8] = 0; //name type
1114 p[10] = sni_len; //name len
1115 memcpy(&p[11], sni, sni_len);
1118 dbg(">> CLIENT_HELLO\n");
1119 xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, len);
1122 static void get_server_hello(tls_state_t *tls)
1124 struct server_hello {
1125 struct record_hdr xhdr;
1127 uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
1128 uint8_t proto_maj, proto_min;
1129 uint8_t rand32[32]; /* first 4 bytes are unix time in BE format */
1130 uint8_t session_id_len;
1131 uint8_t session_id[32];
1132 uint8_t cipherid_hi, cipherid_lo;
1134 /* extensions may follow, but only those which client offered in its Hello */
1137 struct server_hello *hp;
1140 tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 74);
1142 hp = (void*)tls->inbuf;
1144 // 02 000046 03|03 58|78|cf|c1 50|a5|49|ee|7e|29|48|71|fe|97|fa|e8|2d|19|87|72|90|84|9d|37|a3|f0|cb|6f|5f|e3|3c|2f |20 |d8|1a|78|96|52|d6|91|01|24|b3|d6|5b|b7|d0|6c|b3|e1|78|4e|3c|95|de|74|a0|ba|eb|a7|3a|ff|bd|a2|bf |00|9c |00|
1145 //SvHl len=70 maj.min unixtime^^^ 28randbytes^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_^^^ slen sid32bytes^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ cipSel comprSel
1146 if (hp->type != HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO
1147 || hp->len24_hi != 0
1148 || hp->len24_mid != 0
1149 /* hp->len24_lo checked later */
1150 || hp->proto_maj != TLS_MAJ
1151 || hp->proto_min != TLS_MIN
1156 cipherid = &hp->cipherid_hi;
1157 if (hp->session_id_len != 32) {
1158 if (hp->session_id_len != 0)
1161 // session_id_len == 0: no session id
1163 // may return an empty session_id to indicate that the session will
1164 // not be cached and therefore cannot be resumed."
1166 hp->len24_lo += 32; /* what len would be if session id would be present */
1169 if (hp->len24_lo < 70
1170 || cipherid[0] != (CIPHER_ID >> 8)
1171 || cipherid[1] != (CIPHER_ID & 0xff)
1172 || cipherid[2] != 0 /* comprtype */
1177 dbg("<< SERVER_HELLO\n");
1178 memcpy(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32 + 32, hp->rand32, sizeof(hp->rand32));
1181 static void get_server_cert(tls_state_t *tls)
1183 struct record_hdr *xhdr;
1187 len = tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 10);
1189 xhdr = (void*)tls->inbuf;
1190 certbuf = (void*)(xhdr + 1);
1191 if (certbuf[0] != HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE)
1193 dbg("<< CERTIFICATE\n");
1195 // 0b 00|11|24 00|11|21 00|05|b0 30|82|05|ac|30|82|04|94|a0|03|02|01|02|02|11|00|9f|85|bf|66|4b|0c|dd|af|ca|50|86|79|50|1b|2b|e4|30|0d...
1196 //Cert len=4388 ChainLen CertLen^ DER encoded X509 starts here. openssl x509 -in FILE -inform DER -noout -text
1197 len1 = get24be(certbuf + 1);
1198 if (len1 > len - 4) tls_error_die(tls);
1200 len1 = get24be(certbuf + 4);
1201 if (len1 > len - 3) tls_error_die(tls);
1203 len1 = get24be(certbuf + 7);
1204 if (len1 > len - 3) tls_error_die(tls);
1208 find_key_in_der_cert(tls, certbuf + 10, len);
1211 static void send_client_key_exchange(tls_state_t *tls)
1213 struct client_key_exchange {
1215 uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
1216 /* keylen16 exists for RSA (in TLS, not in SSL), but not for some other key types */
1217 uint8_t keylen16_hi, keylen16_lo;
1218 uint8_t key[4 * 1024]; // size??
1220 //FIXME: better size estimate
1221 struct client_key_exchange *record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, sizeof(*record));
1222 uint8_t rsa_premaster[RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE];
1225 tls_get_random(rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
1226 if (TLS_DEBUG_FIXED_SECRETS)
1227 memset(rsa_premaster, 0x44, sizeof(rsa_premaster));
1229 // "Note: The version number in the PreMasterSecret is the version
1230 // offered by the client in the ClientHello.client_version, not the
1231 // version negotiated for the connection."
1232 rsa_premaster[0] = TLS_MAJ;
1233 rsa_premaster[1] = TLS_MIN;
1234 len = psRsaEncryptPub(/*pool:*/ NULL,
1235 /* psRsaKey_t* */ &tls->hsd->server_rsa_pub_key,
1236 rsa_premaster, /*inlen:*/ sizeof(rsa_premaster),
1237 record->key, sizeof(record->key),
1240 record->keylen16_hi = len >> 8;
1241 record->keylen16_lo = len & 0xff;
1243 record->type = HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1244 record->len24_hi = 0;
1245 record->len24_mid = len >> 8;
1246 record->len24_lo = len & 0xff;
1249 dbg(">> CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE\n");
1250 xwrite_and_update_handshake_hash(tls, len);
1253 // For all key exchange methods, the same algorithm is used to convert
1254 // the pre_master_secret into the master_secret. The pre_master_secret
1255 // should be deleted from memory once the master_secret has been
1257 // master_secret = PRF(pre_master_secret, "master secret",
1258 // ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)
1260 // The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length. The length
1261 // of the premaster secret will vary depending on key exchange method.
1263 tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret),
1264 rsa_premaster, sizeof(rsa_premaster),
1266 tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32, sizeof(tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32)
1268 dump_hex("master secret:%s\n", tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret));
1271 // 6.3. Key Calculation
1273 // The Record Protocol requires an algorithm to generate keys required
1274 // by the current connection state (see Appendix A.6) from the security
1275 // parameters provided by the handshake protocol.
1277 // The master secret is expanded into a sequence of secure bytes, which
1278 // is then split to a client write MAC key, a server write MAC key, a
1279 // client write encryption key, and a server write encryption key. Each
1280 // of these is generated from the byte sequence in that order. Unused
1281 // values are empty. Some AEAD ciphers may additionally require a
1282 // client write IV and a server write IV (see Section 6.2.3.3).
1284 // When keys and MAC keys are generated, the master secret is used as an
1287 // To generate the key material, compute
1289 // key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret,
1291 // SecurityParameters.server_random +
1292 // SecurityParameters.client_random);
1294 // until enough output has been generated. Then, the key_block is
1295 // partitioned as follows:
1297 // client_write_MAC_key[SecurityParameters.mac_key_length]
1298 // server_write_MAC_key[SecurityParameters.mac_key_length]
1299 // client_write_key[SecurityParameters.enc_key_length]
1300 // server_write_key[SecurityParameters.enc_key_length]
1301 // client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length]
1302 // server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length]
1306 /* make "server_rand32 + client_rand32" */
1307 memcpy(&tmp64[0] , &tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32[32], 32);
1308 memcpy(&tmp64[32], &tls->hsd->client_and_server_rand32[0] , 32);
1311 tls->client_write_MAC_key, 2 * (SHA256_OUTSIZE + AES256_KEYSIZE),
1313 // server_write_MAC_key[SHA256_OUTSIZE]
1314 // client_write_key[AES256_KEYSIZE]
1315 // server_write_key[AES256_KEYSIZE]
1316 tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret),
1320 dump_hex("client_write_MAC_key:%s\n",
1321 tls->client_write_MAC_key, sizeof(tls->client_write_MAC_key)
1323 dump_hex("client_write_key:%s\n",
1324 tls->client_write_key, sizeof(tls->client_write_key)
1329 static const uint8_t rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC[] = {
1330 RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, TLS_MAJ, TLS_MIN, 00, 01,
1334 static void send_change_cipher_spec(tls_state_t *tls)
1336 dbg(">> CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC\n");
1337 xwrite(tls->ofd, rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, sizeof(rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1341 // A Finished message is always sent immediately after a change
1342 // cipher spec message to verify that the key exchange and
1343 // authentication processes were successful. It is essential that a
1344 // change cipher spec message be received between the other handshake
1345 // messages and the Finished message.
1347 // The Finished message is the first one protected with the just
1348 // negotiated algorithms, keys, and secrets. Recipients of Finished
1349 // messages MUST verify that the contents are correct. Once a side
1350 // has sent its Finished message and received and validated the
1351 // Finished message from its peer, it may begin to send and receive
1352 // application data over the connection.
1355 // opaque verify_data[verify_data_length];
1359 // PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages))
1360 // [0..verify_data_length-1];
1363 // For Finished messages sent by the client, the string
1364 // "client finished". For Finished messages sent by the server,
1365 // the string "server finished".
1367 // Hash denotes a Hash of the handshake messages. For the PRF
1368 // defined in Section 5, the Hash MUST be the Hash used as the basis
1369 // for the PRF. Any cipher suite which defines a different PRF MUST
1370 // also define the Hash to use in the Finished computation.
1372 // In previous versions of TLS, the verify_data was always 12 octets
1373 // long. In the current version of TLS, it depends on the cipher
1374 // suite. Any cipher suite which does not explicitly specify
1375 // verify_data_length has a verify_data_length equal to 12. This
1376 // includes all existing cipher suites.
1377 static void send_client_finished(tls_state_t *tls)
1381 uint8_t len24_hi, len24_mid, len24_lo;
1382 uint8_t prf_result[12];
1384 struct finished *record = tls_get_outbuf(tls, sizeof(*record));
1385 uint8_t handshake_hash[SHA256_OUTSIZE];
1387 fill_handshake_record_hdr(record, HANDSHAKE_FINISHED, sizeof(*record));
1389 sha256_peek(&tls->hsd->handshake_sha256_ctx, handshake_hash);
1390 prf_hmac_sha256(record->prf_result, sizeof(record->prf_result),
1391 tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret),
1393 handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash)
1395 dump_hex("from secret: %s\n", tls->hsd->master_secret, sizeof(tls->hsd->master_secret));
1396 dump_hex("from labelSeed: %s", "client finished", sizeof("client finished")-1);
1397 dump_hex("%s\n", handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash));
1398 dump_hex("=> digest: %s\n", record->prf_result, sizeof(record->prf_result));
1400 dbg(">> FINISHED\n");
1401 xwrite_encrypted(tls, sizeof(*record), RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE);
1404 void FAST_FUNC tls_handshake(tls_state_t *tls, const char *sni)
1406 // Client RFC 5246 Server
1407 // (*) - optional messages, not always sent
1409 // ClientHello ------->
1412 // ServerKeyExchange*
1413 // CertificateRequest*
1414 // <------- ServerHelloDone
1416 // ClientKeyExchange
1417 // CertificateVerify*
1418 // [ChangeCipherSpec]
1419 // Finished ------->
1420 // [ChangeCipherSpec]
1421 // <------- Finished
1422 // Application Data <------> Application Data
1425 tls->hsd = xzalloc(sizeof(*tls->hsd));
1426 sha256_begin(&tls->hsd->handshake_sha256_ctx);
1428 send_client_hello(tls, sni);
1429 get_server_hello(tls);
1432 // The server MUST send a Certificate message whenever the agreed-
1433 // upon key exchange method uses certificates for authentication
1434 // (this includes all key exchange methods defined in this document
1435 // except DH_anon). This message will always immediately follow the
1436 // ServerHello message.
1438 // IOW: in practice, Certificate *always* follows.
1439 // (for example, kernel.org does not even accept DH_anon cipher id)
1440 get_server_cert(tls);
1442 len = tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 4);
1443 if (tls->inbuf[RECHDR_LEN] == HANDSHAKE_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1445 // 0c 00|01|c7 03|00|17|41|04|87|94|2e|2f|68|d0|c9|f4|97|a8|2d|ef|ed|67|ea|c6|f3|b3|56|47|5d|27|b6|bd|ee|70|25|30|5e|b0|8e|f6|21|5a...
1447 // with TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: 461 bytes:
1448 // 0c 00|01|c9 03|00|17|41|04|cd|9b|b4|29|1f|f6|b0|c2|84|82|7f|29|6a|47|4e|ec|87|0b|c1|9c|69|e1|f8|c6|d0|53|e9|27|90|a5|c8|02|15|75...
1449 dbg("<< SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE len:%u\n", len);
1450 //probably need to save it
1451 tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 4);
1454 // if (tls->inbuf[RECHDR_LEN] == HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1455 // dbg("<< CERTIFICATE_REQUEST\n");
1456 // RFC 5246: (in response to this,) "If no suitable certificate is available,
1457 // the client MUST send a certificate message containing no
1458 // certificates. That is, the certificate_list structure has a
1459 // length of zero. ...
1460 // Client certificates are sent using the Certificate structure
1461 // defined in Section 7.4.2."
1462 // (i.e. the same format as server certs)
1463 // tls_xread_handshake_block(tls, 4);
1466 if (tls->inbuf[RECHDR_LEN] != HANDSHAKE_SERVER_HELLO_DONE)
1468 // 0e 000000 (len:0)
1469 dbg("<< SERVER_HELLO_DONE\n");
1471 send_client_key_exchange(tls);
1473 send_change_cipher_spec(tls);
1474 /* from now on we should send encrypted */
1475 /* tls->write_seq64_be = 0; - already is */
1476 tls->encrypt_on_write = 1;
1478 send_client_finished(tls);
1480 /* Get CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC */
1481 len = tls_xread_record(tls);
1482 if (len != 1 || memcmp(tls->inbuf, rec_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 6) != 0)
1484 dbg("<< CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC\n");
1485 if (CIPHER_ID == TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256)
1486 tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = SHA256_OUTSIZE;
1488 /* all incoming packets now should be encrypted and have IV + MAC + padding */
1489 tls->min_encrypted_len_on_read = AES_BLOCKSIZE + SHA256_OUTSIZE + AES_BLOCKSIZE;
1491 /* Get (encrypted) FINISHED from the server */
1492 len = tls_xread_record(tls);
1493 if (len < 4 || tls->inbuf[RECHDR_LEN] != HANDSHAKE_FINISHED)
1495 dbg("<< FINISHED\n");
1496 /* application data can be sent/received */
1498 /* free handshake data */
1500 // memset(tls->hsd, 0, sizeof(*tls->hsd));
1505 static void tls_xwrite(tls_state_t *tls, int len)
1508 xwrite_encrypted(tls, len, RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA);
1511 // To run a test server using openssl:
1512 // openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:$((4096/4*3)) -keyout key.pem -out server.pem -nodes -days 99999 -subj '/CN=localhost'
1513 // openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert server.pem -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1
1515 // Unencryped SHA256 example:
1516 // openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:$((4096/4*3)) -keyout key.pem -out server.pem -nodes -days 99999 -subj '/CN=localhost'
1517 // openssl s_server -key key.pem -cert server.pem -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher NULL
1518 // openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:4433 -debug -tls1_2 -no_tls1 -no_tls1_1 -cipher NULL-SHA256
1520 void FAST_FUNC tls_run_copy_loop(tls_state_t *tls)
1524 const int INBUF_STEP = 4 * 1024;
1526 //TODO: convert to poll
1527 /* Select loop copying stdin to ofd, and ifd to stdout */
1529 FD_SET(tls->ifd, &readfds);
1530 FD_SET(STDIN_FILENO, &readfds);
1532 inbuf_size = INBUF_STEP;
1538 if (select(tls->ifd + 1, &testfds, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0)
1539 bb_perror_msg_and_die("select");
1541 if (FD_ISSET(STDIN_FILENO, &testfds)) {
1544 dbg("STDIN HAS DATA\n");
1545 buf = tls_get_outbuf(tls, inbuf_size);
1546 nread = safe_read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, inbuf_size);
1548 /* We'd want to do this: */
1549 /* Close outgoing half-connection so they get EOF,
1550 * but leave incoming alone so we can see response
1552 //shutdown(tls->ofd, SHUT_WR);
1553 /* But TLS has no way to encode this,
1554 * doubt it's ok to do it "raw"
1556 FD_CLR(STDIN_FILENO, &readfds);
1557 tls_free_outbuf(tls); /* mem usage optimization */
1559 if (nread == inbuf_size) {
1560 /* TLS has per record overhead, if input comes fast,
1561 * read, encrypt and send bigger chunks
1563 inbuf_size += INBUF_STEP;
1564 if (inbuf_size > MAX_OUTBUF)
1565 inbuf_size = MAX_OUTBUF;
1567 tls_xwrite(tls, nread);
1570 if (FD_ISSET(tls->ifd, &testfds)) {
1571 dbg("NETWORK HAS DATA\n");
1573 nread = tls_xread_record(tls);
1575 /* TLS protocol has no real concept of one-sided shutdowns:
1576 * if we get "TLS EOF" from the peer, writes will fail too
1578 //FD_CLR(tls->ifd, &readfds);
1579 //close(STDOUT_FILENO);
1580 //tls_free_inbuf(tls); /* mem usage optimization */
1584 if (tls->inbuf[0] != RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA)
1585 bb_error_msg_and_die("unexpected record type %d", tls->inbuf[0]);
1586 xwrite(STDOUT_FILENO, tls->inbuf + RECHDR_LEN, nread);
1587 /* We may already have a complete next record buffered,
1588 * can process it without network reads (and possible blocking)
1590 if (tls_has_buffered_record(tls))