2 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
5 /* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
61 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
62 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
64 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
66 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
67 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
68 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
69 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
70 static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
71 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
72 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
73 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
74 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
75 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
76 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
78 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
79 const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
80 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
82 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
83 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
84 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
85 {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
86 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
87 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
88 {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
89 {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
90 {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
91 {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL},
94 #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
96 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
98 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
100 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
101 const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
103 return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
106 /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
107 * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
109 int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
112 const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
113 if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
114 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
115 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
116 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
118 if(id == -1) return 1;
119 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
120 if(idx == -1) return -1;
121 pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
122 return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
125 int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
127 if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
128 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
135 int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
137 if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
138 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
141 X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
143 if(idx < 0) return NULL;
144 if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
145 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
148 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
152 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
153 xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
154 if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
159 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
163 if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
164 return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
165 tmp.purpose = purpose;
166 if(!xptable) return -1;
167 idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
168 if(idx == -1) return -1;
169 return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
172 int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
173 int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
174 char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
178 /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
179 flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
180 /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
181 flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
182 /* Get existing entry if any */
183 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
184 /* Need a new entry */
186 if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
187 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190 ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
191 } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
193 /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
194 if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
195 OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
196 OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
198 /* dup supplied name */
199 ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
200 ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
201 if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
202 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
205 /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
206 ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
207 /* Set all other flags */
208 ptmp->flags |= flags;
212 ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
213 ptmp->usr_data = arg;
215 /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
217 if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
218 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
221 if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
222 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
229 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
232 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
234 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
235 OPENSSL_free(p->name);
236 OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
242 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
245 sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
246 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
250 int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
255 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
260 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
265 int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
270 static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b)
275 int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
277 /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
278 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
279 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
280 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
281 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
282 * searched using bsearch.
285 static int supported_nids[] = {
286 NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
287 NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
288 NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
289 NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
290 NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
291 NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
293 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
294 NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
296 NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
297 NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
298 NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
299 NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
300 NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
305 ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
307 if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
310 if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids,
311 sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
312 (int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp))
317 static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
319 X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
323 if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
324 dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
325 if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
326 dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
327 dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
330 dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
331 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
333 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
335 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
336 if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
338 iname = gen->d.directoryName;
343 iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
345 DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
349 static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
352 x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
353 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
354 setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
357 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
359 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
360 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
361 ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
363 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
367 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
369 X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
371 /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
372 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
373 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
374 /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
375 if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
376 /* Handle basic constraints */
377 if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
378 if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
380 if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
382 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
384 } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
385 } else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
386 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
387 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
389 /* Handle proxy certificates */
390 if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
391 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
392 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0
393 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) {
394 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
396 if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
398 ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
399 } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
400 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
401 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
403 /* Handle key usage */
404 if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
405 if(usage->length > 0) {
406 x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
407 if(usage->length > 1)
408 x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
409 } else x->ex_kusage = 0;
410 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
411 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
414 if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
415 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
416 for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
417 switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
418 case NID_server_auth:
419 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
422 case NID_client_auth:
423 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
426 case NID_email_protect:
427 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
431 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
436 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
440 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
444 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
448 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
452 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
455 if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
456 if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
457 else x->ex_nscert = 0;
458 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
459 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
461 x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
462 x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
463 x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
464 x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
465 if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
466 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
471 x->rfc3779_addr =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
472 x->rfc3779_asid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
475 for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
477 ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
478 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
480 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
482 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
486 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
489 /* CA checks common to all purposes
493 * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
494 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
495 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
498 #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
499 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
500 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
501 #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
502 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
503 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
504 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
506 static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
508 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
509 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
510 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
511 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
512 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
515 /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
516 if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
517 /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
518 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
519 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
520 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
521 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
522 /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
527 int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
529 if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
530 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
531 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
532 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
538 /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
539 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
542 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
543 if(!ca_ret) return 0;
544 /* check nsCertType if present */
545 if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
550 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
552 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
553 if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
554 /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
555 if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
556 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
557 if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
561 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
563 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
564 if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
566 if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
567 /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
568 if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
574 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
577 ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
578 if(!ret || ca) return ret;
579 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
580 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
584 /* common S/MIME checks */
585 static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
587 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
590 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
591 if(!ca_ret) return 0;
592 /* check nsCertType if present */
593 if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
596 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
597 if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
598 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
599 if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
605 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
608 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
609 if(!ret || ca) return ret;
610 if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
614 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
617 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
618 if(!ret || ca) return ret;
619 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
623 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
627 if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
630 if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
634 /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
635 * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
638 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
640 /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
642 if(ca) return check_ca(x);
643 /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
647 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
652 /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
653 if (ca) return check_ca(x);
656 * Check the optional key usage field:
657 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
658 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
661 if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
662 && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
663 !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
666 /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
667 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
670 /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
671 i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, 0);
674 X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
675 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
682 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
687 /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
688 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
689 * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
692 * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
693 * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
694 * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
695 * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
696 * codes for X509_verify_cert()
699 int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
701 if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
702 X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
703 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
704 x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
705 x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
709 int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
710 if (ret != X509_V_OK)
714 if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
716 if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
717 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
719 else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
720 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
724 int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
730 /* Check key ids (if present) */
731 if(akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
732 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
733 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
734 /* Check serial number */
736 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
737 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
738 /* Check issuer name */
741 /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
742 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
743 * There may be more than one but we only take any
744 * notice of the first.
748 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
751 for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
753 gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
754 if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
760 if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
761 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;