1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons,
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
162 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
171 * present and that the first entry is in place */
172 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
181 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
199 /* If we have enough, we break */
200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
206 /* If we are self signed, we break */
207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
209 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
210 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
212 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
215 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
216 * will be picked up again later.
225 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
226 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
228 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
231 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
233 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
237 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
238 ctx->last_untrusted++;
241 /* reparse the full chain for
249 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
250 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
251 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
253 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
257 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
258 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
259 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
261 /* we have a self signed certificate */
262 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
264 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
265 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
266 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
268 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
269 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
271 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
273 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
274 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
281 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
282 * so we get any trust settings.
286 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
287 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
292 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
293 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
294 ctx->last_untrusted--;
296 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
300 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
303 /* If we have enough, we break */
304 if (depth < num) break;
306 /* If we are self signed, we break */
307 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
309 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
311 if (ok < 0) return ok;
315 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
318 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
324 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
326 i = check_trust(ctx);
328 /* If explicitly rejected error */
329 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
331 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
332 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
334 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
336 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
337 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
339 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
345 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
347 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
348 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
349 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
353 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
359 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
360 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
364 /* Check name constraints */
366 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
370 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
371 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
373 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
374 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
377 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
380 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
381 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
384 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
388 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
389 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
391 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
395 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
396 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
397 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
402 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
404 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
405 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
410 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
413 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
417 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
419 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
420 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
426 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
428 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
431 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
432 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
434 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
435 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
439 ctx->current_cert = x;
440 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
441 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
445 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
447 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
449 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
452 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
460 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
461 * with the supplied purpose
464 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
466 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
469 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
471 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
472 int proxy_path_length = 0;
474 int allow_proxy_certs;
477 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
478 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
479 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
480 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
481 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
482 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
483 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
487 /* CRL path validation */
490 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
491 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
496 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
497 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
499 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
500 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
501 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
504 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
505 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
508 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
509 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
510 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
512 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
513 ctx->error_depth = i;
514 ctx->current_cert = x;
518 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
520 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
521 ctx->error_depth = i;
522 ctx->current_cert = x;
526 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
530 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
531 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
543 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
550 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
562 ctx->error_depth = i;
563 ctx->current_cert = x;
567 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
569 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
571 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
574 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
575 ctx->error_depth = i;
576 ctx->current_cert = x;
581 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
582 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
583 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
584 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
586 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
587 ctx->error_depth = i;
588 ctx->current_cert = x;
592 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
593 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
595 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
596 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
597 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
599 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
601 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
604 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
605 ctx->error_depth = i;
606 ctx->current_cert = x;
622 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
626 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
627 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
629 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
630 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
631 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
633 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
634 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
635 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
636 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
638 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
640 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
643 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
647 ctx->error_depth = i;
648 ctx->current_cert = x;
649 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
658 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
662 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
664 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
665 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
667 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
668 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
669 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
670 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
671 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
672 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
675 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
677 ctx->error_depth = i;
678 ctx->current_cert = x;
679 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
682 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
685 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
686 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
688 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
691 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
694 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
696 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
697 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
700 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
705 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
707 ctx->error_depth = i;
708 ok = check_cert(ctx);
714 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
716 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
719 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
720 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
721 ctx->current_cert = x;
722 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
723 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
724 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
725 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
727 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
729 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
731 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
732 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
737 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
738 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
741 ctx->current_crl = crl;
742 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
748 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
751 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
758 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
761 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
775 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
780 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
782 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
787 ctx->current_crl = crl;
788 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
789 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
793 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
798 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
799 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
807 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
808 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
812 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
814 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
820 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
821 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
824 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
825 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
829 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
830 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
836 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
841 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
842 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
843 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
845 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
846 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
847 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
848 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
849 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
851 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
853 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
855 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
857 if (crl_score > best_score)
860 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
861 best_score = crl_score;
862 best_reasons = reasons;
869 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
871 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
872 *pscore = best_score;
873 *preasons = best_reasons;
874 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
877 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
880 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
883 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
889 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
890 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
893 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
895 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
897 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
900 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
901 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
903 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
908 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
913 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
915 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
927 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
933 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
935 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
937 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
938 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
940 /* Base must have a CRL number */
941 if (!base->crl_number)
943 /* Issuer names must match */
944 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
945 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
947 /* AKID and IDP must match */
948 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
950 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
952 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
953 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
955 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
956 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
961 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
962 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
965 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
966 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
970 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
972 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
974 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
976 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
977 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
979 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
980 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
981 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
989 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
990 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
991 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
992 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
993 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
996 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
997 unsigned int *preasons,
998 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1002 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1004 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1006 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1007 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1009 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1010 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1012 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1015 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1017 /* If no new reasons reject */
1018 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1021 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1022 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1024 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1025 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1027 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1031 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1033 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1034 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1037 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1038 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1040 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1041 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1043 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1045 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1048 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1050 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1052 /* If no new reasons reject */
1053 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1055 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1056 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1059 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1065 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1066 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1068 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1069 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1070 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1073 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1076 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1078 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1080 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1082 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1083 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1088 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1090 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1091 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1093 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1095 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1096 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1101 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1103 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1106 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1107 * set of untrusted certificates.
1109 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1111 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1112 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1114 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1116 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1117 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1123 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1124 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1125 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1126 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1130 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1132 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1134 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1137 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1140 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1141 /* Copy verify params across */
1142 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1144 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1145 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1147 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1148 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1153 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1155 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1157 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1161 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1162 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1163 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1164 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1165 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1166 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1169 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1170 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1171 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1173 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1174 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1175 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1176 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1181 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1182 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1183 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1184 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1185 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1189 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1191 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1192 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1193 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1201 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1206 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1211 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1213 gens = b->name.fullname;
1215 else if (b->type == 1)
1219 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1220 gens = a->name.fullname;
1224 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1227 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1229 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1230 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1232 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1238 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1240 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1242 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1243 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1245 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1246 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1255 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1258 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1259 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1261 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1262 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1264 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1265 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1267 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1273 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1275 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1276 unsigned int *preasons)
1279 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1281 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1283 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1288 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1291 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1292 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1294 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1295 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1298 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1300 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1305 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1310 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1311 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1314 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1315 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1318 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1320 unsigned int reasons;
1321 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1322 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1323 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1324 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1325 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1326 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1331 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1333 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1335 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1339 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1341 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1345 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1348 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1349 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1350 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1359 /* Check CRL validity */
1360 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1362 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1363 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1364 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1365 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1366 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1367 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1368 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1369 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1371 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1372 * is next certificate in chain.
1374 else if (cnum < chnum)
1375 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1378 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1379 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1380 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1382 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1383 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1390 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1393 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1395 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1396 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1397 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1399 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1400 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1404 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1406 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1407 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1411 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1413 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1415 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1416 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1421 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1423 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1424 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1431 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1433 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1438 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1439 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1443 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1444 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1449 /* Verify CRL signature */
1450 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1452 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1453 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1462 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1466 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1467 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1471 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1472 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1473 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1474 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1476 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1478 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1481 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1485 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1486 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1488 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1490 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1492 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1493 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1501 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1506 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1507 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1510 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1513 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1516 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1521 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1523 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1524 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1526 ctx->current_cert = x;
1527 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1528 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1535 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1536 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1537 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1540 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1542 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1543 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1544 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1551 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1556 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1557 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1561 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1564 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1565 ctx->current_cert=x;
1566 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1572 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1573 ctx->current_cert=x;
1574 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1578 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1581 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1582 ctx->current_cert=x;
1583 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1589 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1590 ctx->current_cert=x;
1591 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1598 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1602 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1603 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1607 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1608 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1610 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1612 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1618 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1619 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1627 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1631 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1636 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1637 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1640 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1642 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1644 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1645 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1649 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1651 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1652 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1656 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1660 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1666 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1670 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1671 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1672 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1680 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1688 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1690 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1693 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1698 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1703 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1704 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1706 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1713 if (i < 13) return 0;
1719 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1720 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1725 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1729 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1740 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1742 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1743 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1749 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1750 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1752 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1755 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1757 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1758 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1759 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1762 if (i < j) return -1;
1763 if (i > j) return 1;
1765 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1766 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1772 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1774 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1777 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1779 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1782 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1783 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1787 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1790 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1792 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1793 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1794 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1795 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1798 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1801 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1803 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1806 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1808 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1810 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1813 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1816 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1820 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1826 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1830 /* first, populate the other certs */
1831 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1833 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1834 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1835 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1838 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1839 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1843 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1844 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1846 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1847 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1848 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1849 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1852 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1854 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1857 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1859 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1862 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1867 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1872 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1874 return ctx->error_depth;
1877 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1879 return ctx->current_cert;
1882 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1887 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1891 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1892 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1893 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1895 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1896 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1901 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1903 return ctx->current_issuer;
1906 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1908 return ctx->current_crl;
1911 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1916 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1921 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1926 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1931 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1933 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1936 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1938 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1941 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1942 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1943 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1944 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1945 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1946 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1947 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1948 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1951 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1952 int purpose, int trust)
1955 /* If purpose not set use default */
1956 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1957 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1961 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1964 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1965 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1968 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1969 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1971 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1974 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1975 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1978 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1980 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1981 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1985 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1988 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1989 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1994 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1995 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1999 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2001 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2002 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2005 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2008 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2012 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2014 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2018 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2019 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2023 ctx->current_method=0;
2025 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2027 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2028 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2032 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2034 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2035 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2036 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2037 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2038 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2042 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2046 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2050 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2056 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2058 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2062 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2063 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2069 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2070 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2074 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2078 if (store && store->check_issued)
2079 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2081 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2083 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2084 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2086 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2088 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2089 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2091 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2093 if (store && store->verify)
2094 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2096 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2098 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2099 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2101 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2103 if (store && store->get_crl)
2104 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2106 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2108 if (store && store->check_crl)
2109 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2111 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2113 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2114 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2116 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2118 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2119 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2121 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2123 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2124 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2126 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2128 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2131 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2132 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2133 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2134 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2135 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2139 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2145 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2146 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2149 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2151 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2152 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2155 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2157 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2158 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2160 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2161 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2164 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2166 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2169 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2171 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2174 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2175 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2178 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2180 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2183 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2185 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2188 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2190 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2193 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2194 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2196 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2199 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2204 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2206 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2209 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2211 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2212 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2215 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2218 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2223 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2226 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2230 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2231 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2233 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2235 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2236 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)