1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
128 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
167 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
176 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
180 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
190 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
193 int depth, i, ok = 0;
195 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
196 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
197 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
198 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
201 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
203 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
204 * cannot do another one.
206 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
213 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
214 * the first entry is in place
216 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
217 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
218 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
221 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
222 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
224 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
225 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
226 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
227 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
231 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
232 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
233 depth = param->depth;
236 /* If we have enough, we break */
238 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
239 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
240 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
243 /* If we are self signed, we break */
244 if (cert_self_signed(x))
247 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
249 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
250 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
254 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
263 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
264 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
265 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
267 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
268 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
271 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
272 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
273 ctx->last_untrusted++;
277 * reparse the full chain for the next one
285 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
288 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
289 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
295 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
297 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
298 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
299 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
300 /* we have a self signed certificate */
301 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
303 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
304 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
305 * possible impersonation.
307 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
308 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
309 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
310 ctx->current_cert = x;
311 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
320 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
321 * version so we get any trust settings.
325 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
326 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
330 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
332 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
333 ctx->last_untrusted--;
336 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
339 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
341 /* If we have enough, we break */
344 /* If we are self signed, we break */
345 if (cert_self_signed(x))
347 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
354 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
356 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
363 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
364 i = check_trust(ctx);
366 /* If explicitly rejected error */
367 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
370 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
371 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
372 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
376 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
377 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
378 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
380 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
381 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
384 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
387 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
392 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
396 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
400 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
409 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
410 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
411 * and set bad_chain == 1
413 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
414 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
415 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
416 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
418 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
419 ctx->current_cert = x;
422 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
424 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
425 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
426 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
430 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
437 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
438 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
443 /* Check name constraints */
445 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
455 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
456 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
459 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
460 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
463 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
467 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
469 if (i != X509_V_OK) {
471 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
477 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
478 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
479 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
481 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
486 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
487 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
490 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
495 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
496 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
497 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
502 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
506 if (chain_ss != NULL)
512 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
515 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
519 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
520 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
521 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
527 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
529 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
532 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
533 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
535 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
536 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
540 ctx->current_cert = x;
541 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
542 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
545 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
547 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
549 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
551 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
558 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
562 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
564 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
567 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
569 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
570 int proxy_path_length = 0;
572 int allow_proxy_certs;
576 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
577 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
578 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
579 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
580 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
581 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
582 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
586 /* CRL path validation */
588 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
589 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
592 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
594 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
597 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
598 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
599 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
602 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
603 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
605 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
606 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
607 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
609 ctx->error_depth = i;
610 ctx->current_cert = x;
615 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
616 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
617 ctx->error_depth = i;
618 ctx->current_cert = x;
623 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
624 switch (must_be_ca) {
626 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
627 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
629 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
636 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
642 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
651 ctx->error_depth = i;
652 ctx->current_cert = x;
657 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
658 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
660 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
663 ctx->error_depth = i;
664 ctx->current_cert = x;
670 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
671 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
672 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
673 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
674 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
675 ctx->error_depth = i;
676 ctx->current_cert = x;
681 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
682 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
685 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
686 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
687 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
689 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
690 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
691 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
692 ctx->error_depth = i;
693 ctx->current_cert = x;
709 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
713 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
714 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
715 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
716 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
717 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
720 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
721 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
722 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
725 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
726 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
728 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
729 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
731 ctx->error_depth = i;
732 ctx->current_cert = x;
733 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
742 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
744 ctx->error = errcode;
745 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
746 ctx->error_depth = 0;
747 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
750 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
753 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
756 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
757 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
758 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
764 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
766 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
767 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
769 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
770 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
773 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
774 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
777 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
778 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
784 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
788 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
790 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
791 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
792 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
793 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
794 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
795 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
796 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
798 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
801 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
802 ctx->error_depth = i;
803 ctx->current_cert = x;
804 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
807 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
811 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
814 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
816 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
817 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
818 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
819 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
821 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
823 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
824 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
829 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
830 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
832 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
835 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
838 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
840 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
841 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
843 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
848 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
849 ctx->error_depth = i;
850 ok = check_cert(ctx);
857 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
859 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
862 unsigned int last_reasons;
863 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
864 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
865 ctx->current_cert = x;
866 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
867 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
868 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
869 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
870 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
871 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
873 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
875 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
877 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
880 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
881 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
884 ctx->current_crl = crl;
885 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
890 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
893 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
899 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
901 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
911 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
914 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
915 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
916 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
924 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
929 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
931 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
936 ctx->current_crl = crl;
937 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
938 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
942 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
946 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
947 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
954 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
955 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
959 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
960 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
965 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
966 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
969 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
970 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
973 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
974 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
980 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
985 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
986 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
987 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
989 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
990 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
991 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
992 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
993 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
995 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
996 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
998 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1000 if (crl_score > best_score) {
1002 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1003 best_score = crl_score;
1004 best_reasons = reasons;
1010 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1012 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1013 *pscore = best_score;
1014 *preasons = best_reasons;
1015 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1017 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1020 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1023 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1030 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1031 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1034 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1036 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1038 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1040 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1041 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1043 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1047 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1051 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1053 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1063 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1069 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1071 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1073 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1074 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1076 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1077 if (!base->crl_number)
1079 /* Issuer names must match */
1080 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1082 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1083 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1085 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1087 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1088 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1090 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1091 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1097 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1098 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1101 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1102 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1106 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1108 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1110 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1111 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1112 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1113 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1114 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1115 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1124 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1125 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1126 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1127 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1128 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1131 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1132 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1136 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1138 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1140 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1141 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1143 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1144 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1145 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1147 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1148 /* If no new reasons reject */
1149 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1152 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1153 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1155 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1156 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1157 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1160 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1162 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1163 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1166 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1167 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1169 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1170 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1172 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1174 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1177 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1179 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1180 /* If no new reasons reject */
1181 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1183 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1184 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1187 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1193 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1194 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1196 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1197 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1198 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1201 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1204 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1206 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1207 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1208 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1209 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1214 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1215 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1216 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1218 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1219 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1220 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1225 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1227 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1231 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1232 * untrusted certificates.
1234 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1235 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1236 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1238 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1239 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1240 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1247 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1248 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1249 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1250 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1253 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1255 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1257 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1260 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1263 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1264 /* Copy verify params across */
1265 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1267 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1268 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1270 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1271 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1276 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1278 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1280 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1285 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1286 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1287 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1288 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1289 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1293 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1294 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1295 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1297 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1298 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1299 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1300 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1306 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1307 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1308 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1309 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1310 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1313 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1315 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1316 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1317 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1324 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1328 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1333 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1335 gens = b->name.fullname;
1336 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1339 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1340 gens = a->name.fullname;
1344 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1346 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1347 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1348 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1350 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1356 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1358 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1359 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1360 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1361 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1362 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1371 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1374 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1375 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1377 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1379 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1380 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1382 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1388 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1390 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1391 unsigned int *preasons)
1394 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1396 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1397 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1400 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1403 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1404 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1405 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1406 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1407 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1408 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1413 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1414 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1420 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1421 * to find a delta CRL too
1424 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1425 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1428 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1430 unsigned int reasons;
1431 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1432 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1433 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1434 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1435 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1436 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1441 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1443 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1445 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1449 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1451 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1455 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1457 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1458 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1459 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1468 /* Check CRL validity */
1469 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1471 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1472 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1473 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1474 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1475 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1476 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1477 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1478 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1481 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1482 * certificate in chain.
1484 else if (cnum < chnum)
1485 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1487 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1488 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1489 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1490 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1491 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1499 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1501 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1502 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1503 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1504 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1506 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1511 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1512 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1513 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1518 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1519 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1520 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1521 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1527 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1529 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1536 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1537 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1542 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1543 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1546 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1547 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1552 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1553 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1555 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1559 /* Verify CRL signature */
1560 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1561 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1562 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1572 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1576 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1577 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1582 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1583 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1584 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1585 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1587 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1588 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1589 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1590 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1595 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1596 * is not removeFromCRL.
1598 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1599 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1601 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1602 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1610 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1615 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1616 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1618 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1621 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1624 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1628 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1629 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1630 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1632 ctx->current_cert = x;
1633 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1634 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1640 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1641 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1642 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1645 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1646 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1647 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1648 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1655 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1660 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1661 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1665 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1667 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1668 ctx->current_cert = x;
1669 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1674 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1675 ctx->current_cert = x;
1676 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1680 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1682 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1683 ctx->current_cert = x;
1684 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1690 ctx->current_cert = x;
1691 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1698 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1702 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1703 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1705 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1707 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1708 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1710 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1712 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1715 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1720 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1721 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1726 ctx->error_depth = n;
1727 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1731 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1733 ctx->error_depth = n;
1736 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1737 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1742 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1743 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1744 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1745 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1746 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1749 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1750 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1751 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1752 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1754 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1758 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1765 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1769 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1770 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1771 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1772 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1779 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1787 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1789 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1792 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1797 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1798 int i, j, remaining;
1801 remaining = ctm->length;
1802 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1804 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1805 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1806 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1807 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1809 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1810 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1811 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1812 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1813 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1820 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1821 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1822 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1823 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1831 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1842 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1843 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1844 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1846 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1849 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1850 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1859 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1868 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1870 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1873 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1874 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1876 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1877 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1881 atm.type = ctm->type;
1883 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1884 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1886 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1889 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1890 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1892 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1893 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1902 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1903 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1909 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1911 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1914 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1916 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1919 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1920 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1929 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1930 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1931 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1932 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1933 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1935 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1938 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1940 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1943 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1946 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1947 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1949 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1950 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1953 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1956 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1961 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1962 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1966 /* first, populate the other certs */
1967 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1968 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1969 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1970 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1974 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1975 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1979 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1981 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1982 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1984 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1986 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1987 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1988 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1989 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1992 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1993 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1994 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1997 /* Issuer names must match */
1998 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1999 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2002 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2003 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2004 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2007 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2008 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2011 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2012 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2013 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2016 /* CRLs must verify */
2017 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2018 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2019 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2022 /* Create new CRL */
2023 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2024 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2026 /* Set issuer name */
2027 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2030 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2032 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2035 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2037 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2041 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2042 * number to correct value too.
2045 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2046 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2047 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2048 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2052 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2054 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2056 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2057 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2058 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2060 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2061 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2063 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2064 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2067 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2068 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2073 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2075 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2081 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2087 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2088 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2089 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2090 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2093 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2094 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2096 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2097 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2100 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2102 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2105 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2107 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2110 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2115 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2120 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2122 return ctx->error_depth;
2125 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2127 return ctx->current_cert;
2130 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2135 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2142 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144 return ctx->current_issuer;
2147 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2149 return ctx->current_crl;
2152 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2157 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2162 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2164 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2167 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2172 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2174 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2177 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2179 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2183 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2184 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2185 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2186 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2187 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2188 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2189 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2193 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2194 int purpose, int trust)
2197 /* If purpose not set use default */
2199 purpose = def_purpose;
2200 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2203 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2205 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2206 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2209 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2210 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2211 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2213 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2214 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2217 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2219 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2221 trust = ptmp->trust;
2224 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2226 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2227 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2232 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2233 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2234 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2235 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2239 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2241 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2242 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2244 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2247 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2251 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2255 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2259 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2260 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2264 ctx->current_method = 0;
2266 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2268 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2269 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2273 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2274 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2275 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2276 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2277 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2278 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2279 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2283 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2286 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2291 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2295 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2297 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2300 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2301 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2306 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2307 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2310 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2314 if (store && store->check_issued)
2315 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2317 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2319 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2320 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2322 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2324 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2325 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2327 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2329 if (store && store->verify)
2330 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2332 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2334 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2335 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2337 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2339 if (store && store->get_crl)
2340 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2342 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2344 if (store && store->check_crl)
2345 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2347 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2349 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2350 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2352 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2354 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2355 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2357 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2359 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2360 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2362 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2364 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2367 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2368 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2369 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2371 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2372 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2375 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2382 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2383 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2386 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2388 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2389 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2392 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2396 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2397 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2398 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2401 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2402 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2405 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2406 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2409 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2410 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2413 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2415 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2418 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2420 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2423 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2426 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2429 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2430 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2432 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2435 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2442 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2445 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2447 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2448 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2451 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2454 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2459 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2462 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2466 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2468 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2470 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2472 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2474 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)