1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons,
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
162 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
171 * present and that the first entry is in place */
172 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
181 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
199 /* If we have enough, we break */
200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
206 /* If we are self signed, we break */
207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
209 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
210 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
212 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
215 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
216 * will be picked up again later.
225 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
226 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
228 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
231 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
233 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
237 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
238 ctx->last_untrusted++;
241 /* reparse the full chain for
249 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
250 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
251 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
253 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
257 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
258 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
259 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
261 /* we have a self signed certificate */
262 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
264 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
265 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
266 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
268 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
269 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
271 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
273 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
274 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
281 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
282 * so we get any trust settings.
286 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
287 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
292 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
293 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
294 ctx->last_untrusted--;
296 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
300 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
303 /* If we have enough, we break */
304 if (depth < num) break;
306 /* If we are self signed, we break */
307 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
309 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
311 if (ok < 0) return ok;
315 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
318 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
324 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
326 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
327 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
329 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
331 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
332 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
334 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
340 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
342 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
343 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
344 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
348 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
354 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
355 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
359 /* Check name constraints */
361 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
365 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
367 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
371 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
372 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
374 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
375 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
378 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
381 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
382 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
385 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
389 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
390 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
392 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
396 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
397 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
398 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
403 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
405 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
406 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
411 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
414 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
418 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
420 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
421 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
427 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
429 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
432 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
433 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
435 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
436 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
440 ctx->current_cert = x;
441 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
442 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
446 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
448 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
450 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
453 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
461 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
462 * with the supplied purpose
465 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
467 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
470 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
472 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
473 int proxy_path_length = 0;
475 int allow_proxy_certs;
478 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
479 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
480 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
481 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
482 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
483 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
484 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
488 /* CRL path validation */
491 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
492 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
497 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
498 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
500 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
501 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
502 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
505 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
506 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
509 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
510 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
511 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
513 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
514 ctx->error_depth = i;
515 ctx->current_cert = x;
519 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
521 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
522 ctx->error_depth = i;
523 ctx->current_cert = x;
527 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
531 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
532 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
535 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
544 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
551 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
563 ctx->error_depth = i;
564 ctx->current_cert = x;
568 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
570 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
572 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
575 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
576 ctx->error_depth = i;
577 ctx->current_cert = x;
582 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
583 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
584 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
585 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
587 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
588 ctx->error_depth = i;
589 ctx->current_cert = x;
593 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
594 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
596 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
597 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
598 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
600 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
602 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
605 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
606 ctx->error_depth = i;
607 ctx->current_cert = x;
623 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
627 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
628 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
630 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
631 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
632 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
634 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
635 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
636 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
637 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
639 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
641 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
644 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
648 ctx->error_depth = i;
649 ctx->current_cert = x;
650 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
659 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
661 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
666 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
668 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
669 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
670 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
671 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
672 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
674 ctx->error_depth = i;
675 ctx->current_cert = x;
676 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
677 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
679 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
685 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
688 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
690 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
691 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
694 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
699 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ok = check_cert(ctx);
708 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
710 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
713 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
714 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
715 ctx->current_cert = x;
716 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
717 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
718 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
719 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
721 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
723 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
725 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
726 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
731 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
732 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
735 ctx->current_crl = crl;
736 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
742 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
745 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
752 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
755 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
769 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
774 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
776 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
781 ctx->current_crl = crl;
782 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
783 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
787 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
792 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
793 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
801 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
802 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
806 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
808 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
814 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
815 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
818 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
819 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
823 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
824 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
830 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
835 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
836 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
837 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
839 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
840 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
841 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
842 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
843 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
845 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
847 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
849 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
851 if (crl_score > best_score)
854 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
855 best_score = crl_score;
856 best_reasons = reasons;
863 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
865 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
866 *pscore = best_score;
867 *preasons = best_reasons;
868 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
871 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
874 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
877 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
883 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
884 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
887 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
889 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
891 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
894 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
895 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
897 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
902 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
907 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
909 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
921 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
927 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
929 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
931 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
932 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
934 /* Base must have a CRL number */
935 if (!base->crl_number)
937 /* Issuer names must match */
938 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
939 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
941 /* AKID and IDP must match */
942 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
944 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
946 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
947 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
949 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
950 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
955 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
956 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
959 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
960 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
964 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
966 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
968 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
970 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
971 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
973 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
974 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
975 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
983 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
984 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
985 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
986 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
987 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
990 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
991 unsigned int *preasons,
992 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
996 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
998 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1000 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1001 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1003 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1004 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1006 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1009 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1011 /* If no new reasons reject */
1012 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1015 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1016 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1018 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1019 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1021 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1025 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1027 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1028 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1031 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1032 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1034 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1035 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1037 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1039 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1042 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1044 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1046 /* If no new reasons reject */
1047 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1049 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1050 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1053 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1059 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1060 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1062 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1063 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1064 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1067 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1070 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1072 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1074 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1076 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1077 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1082 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1084 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1085 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1087 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1089 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1090 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1095 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1097 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1100 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1101 * set of untrusted certificates.
1103 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1105 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1106 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1108 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1110 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1111 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1117 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1118 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1119 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1120 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1124 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1126 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1128 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1131 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1134 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1135 /* Copy verify params across */
1136 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1138 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1139 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1141 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1142 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1147 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1149 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1151 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1155 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1156 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1157 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1158 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1159 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1160 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1163 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1164 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1165 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1167 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1168 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1169 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1170 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1175 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1176 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1177 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1178 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1179 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1183 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1185 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1186 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1187 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1195 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1200 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1205 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1207 gens = b->name.fullname;
1209 else if (b->type == 1)
1213 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1214 gens = a->name.fullname;
1218 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1221 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1223 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1224 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1226 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1232 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1234 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1236 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1237 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1239 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1240 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1249 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1252 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1253 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1255 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1256 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1258 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1259 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1261 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1267 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1269 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1270 unsigned int *preasons)
1273 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1275 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1277 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1282 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1285 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1286 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1288 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1289 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1292 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1294 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1299 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1304 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1305 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1308 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1309 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1312 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1314 unsigned int reasons;
1315 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1316 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1317 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1318 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1319 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1320 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1325 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1327 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1329 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1333 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1335 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1339 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1342 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1343 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1344 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1353 /* Check CRL validity */
1354 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1356 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1357 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1358 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1359 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1360 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1361 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1362 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1363 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1365 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1366 * is next certificate in chain.
1368 else if (cnum < chnum)
1369 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1372 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1373 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1374 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1376 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1377 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1384 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1387 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1389 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1390 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1391 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1393 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1394 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1398 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1400 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1401 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1405 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1407 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1409 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1410 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1415 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1417 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1418 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1425 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1427 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1432 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1433 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1437 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1438 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1443 /* Verify CRL signature */
1444 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1446 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1447 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1456 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1460 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1461 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1465 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1466 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1467 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1468 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1470 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1472 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1474 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1475 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1479 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1480 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1482 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1484 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1486 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1487 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1495 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1500 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1501 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1504 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1507 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1510 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1515 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1517 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1518 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1520 ctx->current_cert = x;
1521 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1522 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1529 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1530 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1531 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1534 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1536 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1537 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1538 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1545 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1550 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1551 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1555 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1558 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1559 ctx->current_cert=x;
1560 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1566 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1567 ctx->current_cert=x;
1568 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1572 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1575 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1576 ctx->current_cert=x;
1577 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1583 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1584 ctx->current_cert=x;
1585 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1592 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1596 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1597 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1601 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1602 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1604 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1606 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1612 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1613 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1621 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1625 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1630 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1631 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1634 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1636 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1638 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1639 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1643 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1645 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1646 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1650 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1654 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1660 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1664 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1665 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1666 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1674 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1682 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1684 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1687 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1692 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1697 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1698 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1700 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1707 if (i < 13) return 0;
1713 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1714 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1719 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1723 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1734 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1736 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1737 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1743 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1744 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1746 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1749 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1751 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1752 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1753 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1756 if (i < j) return -1;
1757 if (i > j) return 1;
1759 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1760 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1766 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1768 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1771 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1773 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1776 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1777 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1781 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1784 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1786 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1787 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1788 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1789 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1792 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1795 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1797 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1800 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1802 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1804 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1807 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1810 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1814 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1820 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1824 /* first, populate the other certs */
1825 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1827 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1828 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1829 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1832 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1833 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1837 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1838 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1840 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1841 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1842 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1843 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1846 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1848 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1851 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1853 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1856 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1866 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1868 return ctx->error_depth;
1871 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1873 return ctx->current_cert;
1876 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1881 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1885 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1886 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1887 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1889 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1890 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1895 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1897 return ctx->current_issuer;
1900 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1902 return ctx->current_crl;
1905 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1910 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1915 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1920 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1925 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1927 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1930 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1932 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1935 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1936 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1937 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1938 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1939 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1940 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1941 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1942 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1945 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1946 int purpose, int trust)
1949 /* If purpose not set use default */
1950 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1951 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1955 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1958 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1959 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1962 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1963 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1965 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1968 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1969 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1972 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1974 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1975 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1979 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1982 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1983 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1988 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1989 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1993 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1995 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1996 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1999 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2002 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2006 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2008 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2012 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2013 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2017 ctx->current_method=0;
2019 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2021 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2022 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2026 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2028 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2029 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2030 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2031 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2032 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2036 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2040 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2044 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2050 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2052 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2056 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2057 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2063 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2064 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2068 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2072 if (store && store->check_issued)
2073 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2075 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2077 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2078 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2080 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2082 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2083 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2085 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2087 if (store && store->verify)
2088 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2090 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2092 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2093 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2095 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2097 if (store && store->get_crl)
2098 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2100 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2102 if (store && store->check_crl)
2103 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2105 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2107 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2108 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2110 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2112 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2113 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2115 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2117 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2118 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2120 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2122 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2125 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2126 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2127 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2128 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2129 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2133 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2139 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2140 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2143 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2145 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2146 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2149 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2151 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2152 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2154 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2155 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2158 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2160 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2163 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2165 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2168 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2169 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2172 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2174 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2177 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2179 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2182 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2184 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2187 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2188 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2190 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2193 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2198 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2200 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2203 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2205 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2206 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2209 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2212 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2217 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2220 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2224 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2225 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2227 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2229 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2230 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)