1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123 unsigned int *preasons,
124 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
154 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
156 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
161 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
162 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
163 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
171 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
172 * present and that the first entry is in place */
173 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
175 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
176 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
178 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
181 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
182 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
185 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
186 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
187 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
189 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
193 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
194 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
200 /* If we have enough, we break */
201 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
207 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
210 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
211 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
213 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
216 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
217 * will be picked up again later.
226 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
227 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
229 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
232 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
234 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
237 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
238 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
239 ctx->last_untrusted++;
242 /* reparse the full chain for
250 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
251 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
252 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
254 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
258 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
259 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
260 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
262 /* we have a self signed certificate */
263 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
265 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
266 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
267 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
269 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
270 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
272 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
274 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
275 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
282 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
283 * so we get any trust settings.
287 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
288 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
293 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
294 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
295 ctx->last_untrusted--;
297 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
301 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
304 /* If we have enough, we break */
305 if (depth < num) break;
307 /* If we are self signed, we break */
308 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
310 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
312 if (ok < 0) return ok;
316 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
319 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
325 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
327 i = check_trust(ctx);
329 /* If explicitly rejected error */
330 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
332 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
333 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
335 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
337 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
338 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
340 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
346 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
348 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
349 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
350 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
354 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
360 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
361 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
365 /* Check name constraints */
367 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
375 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
376 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
378 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
379 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
382 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
385 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
386 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
389 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
393 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
394 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
396 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
400 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
401 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
402 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
407 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
409 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
410 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
415 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
418 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
422 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
424 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
425 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
431 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
433 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
436 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
437 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
439 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
440 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
444 ctx->current_cert = x;
445 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
446 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
450 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
452 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
454 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
457 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
465 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
466 * with the supplied purpose
469 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
471 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
474 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
476 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
477 int proxy_path_length = 0;
479 int allow_proxy_certs;
482 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
483 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
484 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
485 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
486 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
487 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
488 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
492 /* CRL path validation */
495 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
496 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
501 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
502 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
504 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
505 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
506 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
509 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
510 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
513 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
514 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
515 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
517 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
518 ctx->error_depth = i;
519 ctx->current_cert = x;
523 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
525 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
526 ctx->error_depth = i;
527 ctx->current_cert = x;
531 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
535 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
536 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
548 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
555 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
567 ctx->error_depth = i;
568 ctx->current_cert = x;
572 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
574 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
576 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
579 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
580 ctx->error_depth = i;
581 ctx->current_cert = x;
586 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
587 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
588 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
589 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
591 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
592 ctx->error_depth = i;
593 ctx->current_cert = x;
597 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
598 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
600 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
601 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
602 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
604 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
606 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
609 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
610 ctx->error_depth = i;
611 ctx->current_cert = x;
627 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
631 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
632 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
634 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
635 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
636 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
638 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
639 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
640 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
641 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
643 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
645 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
648 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
652 ctx->error_depth = i;
653 ctx->current_cert = x;
654 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
663 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
665 ctx->error = errcode;
666 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
667 ctx->error_depth = 0;
668 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
671 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
673 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
675 if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
677 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
680 if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
682 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
685 if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
687 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
693 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
697 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
699 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
700 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
702 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
703 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
704 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
705 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
706 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
707 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
710 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
712 ctx->error_depth = i;
713 ctx->current_cert = x;
714 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
717 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
720 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
721 * certificate return success.
723 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
725 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
726 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
729 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
730 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
732 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
735 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
738 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
740 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
741 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
744 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
749 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
751 ctx->error_depth = i;
752 ok = check_cert(ctx);
758 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
760 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
763 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
764 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
765 ctx->current_cert = x;
766 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
767 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
768 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
769 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
771 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
773 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
775 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
776 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
781 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
782 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
785 ctx->current_crl = crl;
786 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
792 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
795 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
802 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
805 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
819 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
824 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
826 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
831 ctx->current_crl = crl;
832 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
833 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
837 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
842 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
843 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
851 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
852 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
856 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
858 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
864 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
865 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
868 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
869 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
873 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
874 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
880 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
885 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
886 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
887 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
889 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
890 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
891 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
892 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
893 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
895 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
897 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
899 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
901 if (crl_score > best_score)
904 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
905 best_score = crl_score;
906 best_reasons = reasons;
913 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
915 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
916 *pscore = best_score;
917 *preasons = best_reasons;
918 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
921 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
924 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
927 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
933 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
934 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
937 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
939 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
941 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
944 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
945 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
947 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
952 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
957 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
959 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
971 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
977 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
979 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
981 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
982 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
984 /* Base must have a CRL number */
985 if (!base->crl_number)
987 /* Issuer names must match */
988 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
989 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
991 /* AKID and IDP must match */
992 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
994 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
996 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
997 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
999 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1000 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1005 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1006 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1009 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1010 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1014 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1016 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1018 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1020 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1021 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1023 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1024 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1025 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1033 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1034 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1035 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1036 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1037 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1040 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1041 unsigned int *preasons,
1042 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1046 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1048 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1050 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1051 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1053 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1054 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1056 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1059 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1061 /* If no new reasons reject */
1062 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1065 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1066 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1068 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1069 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1071 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1075 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1077 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1078 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1081 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1082 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1084 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1085 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1087 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1089 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1092 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1094 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1096 /* If no new reasons reject */
1097 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1099 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1100 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1103 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1109 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1110 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1112 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1113 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1114 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1117 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1120 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1122 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1124 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1126 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1127 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1132 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1134 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1135 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1137 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1139 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1140 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1145 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1147 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1150 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1151 * set of untrusted certificates.
1153 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1155 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1156 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1158 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1160 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1161 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1167 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1168 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1169 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1170 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1174 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1176 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1178 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1181 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1184 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1185 /* Copy verify params across */
1186 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1188 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1189 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1191 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1192 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1197 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1199 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1201 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1205 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1206 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1207 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1208 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1209 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1210 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1213 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1214 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1215 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1217 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1218 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1219 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1220 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1225 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1226 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1227 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1228 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1229 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1233 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1235 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1236 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1237 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1245 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1250 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1255 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1257 gens = b->name.fullname;
1259 else if (b->type == 1)
1263 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1264 gens = a->name.fullname;
1268 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1271 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1273 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1274 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1276 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1282 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1284 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1286 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1287 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1289 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1290 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1299 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1302 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1303 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1305 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1306 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1308 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1309 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1311 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1317 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1319 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1320 unsigned int *preasons)
1323 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1325 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1327 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1332 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1335 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1336 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1338 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1339 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1342 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1344 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1349 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1354 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1355 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1358 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1359 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1362 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1364 unsigned int reasons;
1365 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1366 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1367 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1368 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1369 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1370 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1375 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1377 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1379 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1383 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1385 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1389 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1392 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1393 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1394 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1403 /* Check CRL validity */
1404 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1406 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1407 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1408 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1409 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1410 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1411 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1412 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1413 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1415 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1416 * is next certificate in chain.
1418 else if (cnum < chnum)
1419 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1422 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1423 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1424 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1426 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1427 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1434 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1437 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1439 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1440 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1441 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1443 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1444 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1448 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1450 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1451 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1455 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1457 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1459 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1460 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1465 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1467 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1468 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1475 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1477 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1482 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1483 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1487 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1488 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1493 /* Verify CRL signature */
1494 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1496 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1497 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1506 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1510 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1511 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1515 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1516 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1517 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1518 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1520 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1522 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1525 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1529 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1530 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1532 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1534 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1536 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1537 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1545 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1550 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1551 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1554 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1557 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1560 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1565 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1567 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1568 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1570 ctx->current_cert = x;
1571 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1572 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1579 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1580 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1581 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1584 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1586 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1587 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1588 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1595 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1600 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1601 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1605 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1608 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1609 ctx->current_cert=x;
1610 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1616 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1617 ctx->current_cert=x;
1618 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1622 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1625 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1626 ctx->current_cert=x;
1627 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1633 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1634 ctx->current_cert=x;
1635 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1642 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1646 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1647 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1651 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1652 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1654 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1656 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1662 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1663 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1671 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1675 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1680 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1681 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1684 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1686 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1688 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1689 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1693 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1695 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1696 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1700 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1704 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1710 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1714 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1715 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1716 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1724 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1732 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1734 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1737 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1742 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1747 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1748 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1750 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1757 if (i < 13) return 0;
1763 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1764 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1769 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1773 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1784 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1786 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1787 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1793 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1794 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1796 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1799 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1801 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1802 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1803 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1806 if (i < j) return -1;
1807 if (i > j) return 1;
1809 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1810 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1816 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1818 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1821 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1823 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1826 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1827 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1831 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1834 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1836 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1837 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1838 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1839 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1842 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1845 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1847 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1850 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1852 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1854 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1857 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1860 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1864 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1870 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1874 /* first, populate the other certs */
1875 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1877 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1878 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1879 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1882 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1883 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1887 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1888 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1890 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1891 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1892 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1893 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1896 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1898 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1901 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1903 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1906 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1911 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1916 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1918 return ctx->error_depth;
1921 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1923 return ctx->current_cert;
1926 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1931 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1935 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1936 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1937 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1939 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1940 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1945 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1947 return ctx->current_issuer;
1950 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1952 return ctx->current_crl;
1955 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1960 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1965 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1970 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1975 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1977 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1980 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1982 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1985 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1986 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1987 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1988 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1989 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1990 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1991 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1992 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1995 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1996 int purpose, int trust)
1999 /* If purpose not set use default */
2000 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2001 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2005 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2008 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2009 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2012 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2013 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2015 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2018 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2019 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2022 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2024 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2025 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2029 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2032 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2033 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2038 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2039 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2043 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2045 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2046 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2049 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2052 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2056 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2058 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2062 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2063 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2067 ctx->current_method=0;
2069 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2071 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2072 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2076 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2078 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2079 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2080 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2081 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2082 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2086 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2090 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2094 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2100 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2102 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2106 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2107 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2113 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2114 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2118 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2122 if (store && store->check_issued)
2123 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2125 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2127 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2128 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2130 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2132 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2133 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2135 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2137 if (store && store->verify)
2138 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2140 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2142 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2143 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2145 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2147 if (store && store->get_crl)
2148 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2150 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2152 if (store && store->check_crl)
2153 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2155 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2157 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2158 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2160 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2162 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2163 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2165 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2167 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2168 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2170 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2172 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2175 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2176 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2177 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2178 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2179 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2183 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2189 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2190 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2193 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2195 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2196 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2199 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2201 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2202 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2204 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2205 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2208 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2210 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2213 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2215 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2218 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2219 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2222 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2224 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2227 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2229 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2232 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2234 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2237 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2238 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2240 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2243 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2248 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2250 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2253 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2255 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2256 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2259 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2262 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2267 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2270 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2274 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2275 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2277 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2279 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2280 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)