1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
128 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
167 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
176 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
180 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
190 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
193 int depth, i, ok = 0;
195 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
196 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
197 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
198 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
205 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
206 * the first entry is in place
208 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
209 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
210 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
211 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
214 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
215 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
218 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
219 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
220 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
221 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
226 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
227 depth = param->depth;
230 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
233 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
234 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
237 /* If we are self signed, we break */
238 if (cert_self_signed(x))
241 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
243 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
244 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
248 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
257 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
258 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
259 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
261 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
262 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
265 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
266 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
267 ctx->last_untrusted++;
271 * reparse the full chain for the next one
279 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
282 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
283 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
289 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
291 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
292 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
293 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
294 /* we have a self signed certificate */
295 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
297 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
298 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
299 * possible impersonation.
301 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
302 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
303 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
304 ctx->current_cert = x;
305 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
314 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
315 * version so we get any trust settings.
319 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
320 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
324 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
326 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
327 ctx->last_untrusted--;
330 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
333 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
335 /* If we have enough, we break */
338 /* If we are self signed, we break */
339 if (cert_self_signed(x))
341 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
348 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
350 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
356 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
357 i = check_trust(ctx);
359 /* If explicitly rejected error */
360 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
363 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
364 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
365 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST
368 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
369 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)) {
371 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
372 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
375 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
378 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
383 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
387 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
390 ctx->last_untrusted--;
400 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
401 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
402 * and set bad_chain == 1
404 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
405 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
406 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
407 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
409 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
410 ctx->current_cert = x;
413 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
415 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
416 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
417 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
421 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
428 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
429 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
434 /* Check name constraints */
436 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
446 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
447 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
450 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
451 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
454 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
458 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
460 if (i != X509_V_OK) {
462 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
468 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
469 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
470 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
472 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
477 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
478 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
481 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
486 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
487 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
488 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
493 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
497 if (chain_ss != NULL)
503 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
506 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
510 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
511 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
512 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
518 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
520 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
523 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
524 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
526 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
527 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
531 ctx->current_cert = x;
532 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
533 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
536 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
538 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
540 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
542 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
549 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
553 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
555 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
558 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
560 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
561 int proxy_path_length = 0;
563 int allow_proxy_certs;
567 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
568 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
569 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
570 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
571 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
572 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
573 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
577 /* CRL path validation */
579 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
580 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
583 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
585 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
588 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
589 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
590 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
593 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
594 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
596 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
597 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
598 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
599 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
600 ctx->error_depth = i;
601 ctx->current_cert = x;
606 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
607 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
608 ctx->error_depth = i;
609 ctx->current_cert = x;
614 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
615 switch (must_be_ca) {
617 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
618 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
620 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
627 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
633 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
636 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
642 ctx->error_depth = i;
643 ctx->current_cert = x;
648 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
649 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
651 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
653 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
654 ctx->error_depth = i;
655 ctx->current_cert = x;
661 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
662 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
663 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
664 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
665 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
666 ctx->error_depth = i;
667 ctx->current_cert = x;
672 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
673 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
676 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
677 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
678 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
680 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
681 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
682 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
683 ctx->error_depth = i;
684 ctx->current_cert = x;
700 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
704 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
705 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
706 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
707 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
708 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
711 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
712 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
713 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
716 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
717 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
719 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
720 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
722 ctx->error_depth = i;
723 ctx->current_cert = x;
724 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
733 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
735 ctx->error = errcode;
736 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
737 ctx->error_depth = 0;
738 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
741 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
744 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
747 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
748 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
749 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
755 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
757 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
758 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
760 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
761 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
764 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
765 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
768 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
769 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
775 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
779 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
781 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
782 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
783 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
784 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
785 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
786 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
787 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
789 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
792 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
793 ctx->error_depth = i;
794 ctx->current_cert = x;
795 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
798 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
802 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
805 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
807 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
808 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
809 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
810 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
812 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
814 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
815 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
820 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
821 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
823 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
826 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
829 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
831 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
832 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
834 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
839 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
840 ctx->error_depth = i;
841 ok = check_cert(ctx);
848 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
850 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
853 unsigned int last_reasons;
854 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
855 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
856 ctx->current_cert = x;
857 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
858 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
859 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
860 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
861 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
862 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
864 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
866 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
868 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
871 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
872 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
875 ctx->current_crl = crl;
876 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
881 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
884 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
890 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
892 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
902 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
905 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
906 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
907 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
915 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
920 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
922 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
927 ctx->current_crl = crl;
928 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
929 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
933 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
937 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
938 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
945 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
946 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
950 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
951 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
956 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
957 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
960 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
961 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
964 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
965 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
971 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
976 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
977 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
978 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
980 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
981 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
982 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
983 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
984 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
986 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
987 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
989 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
991 if (crl_score > best_score) {
993 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
994 best_score = crl_score;
995 best_reasons = reasons;
1001 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1003 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1004 *pscore = best_score;
1005 *preasons = best_reasons;
1006 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1008 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1011 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1014 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1021 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1022 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1025 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1027 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1029 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1031 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1032 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1034 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1038 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1042 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1044 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1054 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1060 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1062 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1064 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1065 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1067 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1068 if (!base->crl_number)
1070 /* Issuer names must match */
1071 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1073 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1074 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1076 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1078 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1079 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1081 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1082 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1088 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1089 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1092 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1093 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1097 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1099 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1101 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1102 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1103 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1104 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1105 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1106 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1115 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1116 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1117 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1118 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1119 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1123 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1127 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1129 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1131 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1132 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1134 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1135 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1136 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1138 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1139 /* If no new reasons reject */
1140 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1143 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1144 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1146 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1147 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1148 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1151 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1153 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1154 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1157 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1158 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1160 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1161 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1163 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1165 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1168 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1170 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1171 /* If no new reasons reject */
1172 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1174 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1175 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1178 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1184 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1185 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1187 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1188 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1189 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1192 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1195 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1197 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1198 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1199 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1200 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1205 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1206 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1207 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1209 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1210 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1211 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1216 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1218 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1222 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1223 * untrusted certificates.
1225 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1226 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1227 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1229 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1230 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1231 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1238 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1239 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1240 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1241 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1244 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1246 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1248 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1251 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1254 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1255 /* Copy verify params across */
1256 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1258 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1259 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1261 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1262 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1267 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1269 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1271 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1276 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1277 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1278 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1279 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1280 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1284 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1285 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1286 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1288 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1289 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1290 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1291 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1297 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1298 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1299 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1300 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1301 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1304 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1306 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1307 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1308 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1315 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1319 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1324 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1326 gens = b->name.fullname;
1327 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1330 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1331 gens = a->name.fullname;
1335 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1337 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1338 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1339 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1341 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1347 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1349 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1350 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1351 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1352 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1353 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1362 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1365 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1366 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1368 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1369 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1370 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1371 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1373 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1379 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1381 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1382 unsigned int *preasons)
1385 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1387 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1388 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1391 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1394 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1395 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1396 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1397 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1398 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1399 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1404 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1405 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1411 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1412 * to find a delta CRL too
1415 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1416 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1419 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1421 unsigned int reasons;
1422 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1423 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1424 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1425 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1426 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1427 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1432 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1434 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1436 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1440 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1442 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1446 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1448 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1449 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1450 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1459 /* Check CRL validity */
1460 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1462 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1463 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1464 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1465 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1466 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1467 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1468 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1469 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1472 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1473 * certificate in chain.
1475 else if (cnum < chnum)
1476 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1478 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1479 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1480 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1481 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1482 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1490 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1492 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1493 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1494 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1495 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1496 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1497 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1502 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1504 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1509 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1510 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1511 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1512 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1518 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1520 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1527 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1528 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1533 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1534 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1537 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1538 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1543 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1544 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1546 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1550 /* Verify CRL signature */
1551 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1552 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1553 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1563 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1567 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1568 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1573 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1574 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1575 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1576 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1578 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1579 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1580 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1581 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1586 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1587 * is not removeFromCRL.
1589 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1590 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1592 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1593 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1601 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1606 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1607 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1609 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1612 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1615 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1619 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1620 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1621 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1623 ctx->current_cert = x;
1624 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1625 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1631 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1632 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1633 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1636 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1637 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1638 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1639 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1646 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1651 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1652 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1656 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1658 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1659 ctx->current_cert = x;
1660 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1665 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1666 ctx->current_cert = x;
1667 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1671 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1673 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1674 ctx->current_cert = x;
1675 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1680 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1681 ctx->current_cert = x;
1682 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1689 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1693 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1694 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1696 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1698 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1699 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1701 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1703 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1706 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1711 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1712 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1717 ctx->error_depth = n;
1718 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1722 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1724 ctx->error_depth = n;
1727 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1728 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1733 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1734 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1735 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1736 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1737 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1740 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1741 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1742 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1743 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1745 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1749 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1756 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1760 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1761 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1762 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1763 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1770 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1778 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1780 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1783 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1788 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1793 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1794 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1795 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
1808 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1814 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1817 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
1828 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1830 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1831 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1835 atm.type = ctm->type;
1837 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1838 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1840 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1843 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1844 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1846 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1847 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1856 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1857 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1863 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1865 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1868 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1870 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1873 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1874 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1883 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1884 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1885 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1886 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1887 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1889 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1892 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1894 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1897 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1900 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1901 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1903 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1904 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1907 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1910 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1915 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1916 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1920 /* first, populate the other certs */
1921 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1922 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1923 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1924 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1928 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1929 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1933 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1935 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1936 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1938 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1940 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1941 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1942 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1943 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1946 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1947 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1948 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1951 /* Issuer names must match */
1952 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1953 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1956 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1957 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1958 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1961 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1962 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1965 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1966 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1967 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1970 /* CRLs must verify */
1971 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1972 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1973 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1976 /* Create new CRL */
1977 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1978 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1980 /* Set issuer name */
1981 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1984 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1986 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1989 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1991 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1995 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1996 * number to correct value too.
1999 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2000 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2001 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2002 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2006 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2008 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2010 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2011 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2012 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2014 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2015 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2017 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2018 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2021 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2022 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2027 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2029 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2035 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2041 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2042 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2043 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2044 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2047 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2048 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2050 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2051 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2054 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2056 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2059 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2061 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2064 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2069 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2074 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2076 return ctx->error_depth;
2079 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2081 return ctx->current_cert;
2084 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2089 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2093 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2096 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2098 return ctx->current_issuer;
2101 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2103 return ctx->current_crl;
2106 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2111 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2116 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2118 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2121 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2126 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2128 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2131 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2133 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2137 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2138 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2139 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2140 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2141 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2142 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2143 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2147 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2148 int purpose, int trust)
2151 /* If purpose not set use default */
2153 purpose = def_purpose;
2154 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2157 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2159 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2160 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2163 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2164 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2165 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2167 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2168 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2171 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2173 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2175 trust = ptmp->trust;
2178 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2180 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2181 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2186 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2187 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2188 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2189 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2193 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2195 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2196 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2198 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2201 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2205 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2207 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2211 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2212 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2216 ctx->current_method = 0;
2218 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2220 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2221 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2225 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2226 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2227 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2228 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2229 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2230 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2231 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2235 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2238 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2243 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2247 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2249 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2252 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2253 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2258 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2259 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2262 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2266 if (store && store->check_issued)
2267 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2269 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2271 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2272 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2274 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2276 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2277 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2279 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2281 if (store && store->verify)
2282 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2284 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2286 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2287 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2289 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2291 if (store && store->get_crl)
2292 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2294 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2296 if (store && store->check_crl)
2297 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2299 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2301 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2302 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2304 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2306 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2307 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2309 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2311 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2312 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2314 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2316 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2319 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2320 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2321 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2323 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2324 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2327 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2334 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2335 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2338 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2340 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2341 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2344 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2348 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2349 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2350 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2353 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2354 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2357 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2358 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2361 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2362 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2365 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2367 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2370 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2372 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2375 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2378 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2381 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2382 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2384 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2387 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2392 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2394 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2397 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2399 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2400 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2403 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2406 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2411 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2414 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2418 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2420 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2422 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2424 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2426 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)