1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123 unsigned int *preasons,
124 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
154 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
156 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
158 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
161 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
162 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
165 /* Look for exact match */
166 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
168 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
169 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
172 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
173 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
176 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
180 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
182 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
184 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
187 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
188 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
189 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
191 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
197 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
198 * present and that the first entry is in place */
199 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
201 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
202 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
204 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
207 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
208 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
211 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
212 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
213 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
215 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
219 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
220 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
226 /* If we have enough, we break */
227 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
228 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
229 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
233 /* If we are self signed, we break */
234 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
236 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
237 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
239 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
242 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
243 * will be picked up again later.
252 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
253 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
255 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
258 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
260 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
263 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
264 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
265 ctx->last_untrusted++;
268 /* reparse the full chain for
276 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
277 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
278 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
280 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
284 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
285 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
286 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
288 /* we have a self signed certificate */
289 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
291 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
292 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
293 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
295 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
296 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
298 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
300 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
301 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
308 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
309 * so we get any trust settings.
313 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
314 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
319 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
320 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
321 ctx->last_untrusted--;
323 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
327 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
330 /* If we have enough, we break */
331 if (depth < num) break;
333 /* If we are self signed, we break */
334 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
336 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
338 if (ok < 0) return ok;
342 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
345 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
351 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
353 i = check_trust(ctx);
355 /* If explicitly rejected error */
356 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
358 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
359 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
361 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
363 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
364 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
366 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
372 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
374 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
375 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
376 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
380 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
386 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
387 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
391 /* Check name constraints */
393 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
401 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
402 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
404 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
405 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
408 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
411 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
416 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
422 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
423 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
426 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
430 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
431 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
433 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
437 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
438 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
439 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
444 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
446 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
447 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
452 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
455 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
459 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
461 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
462 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
468 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
470 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
473 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
474 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
476 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
477 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
481 ctx->current_cert = x;
482 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
483 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
487 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
489 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
491 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
494 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
502 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
503 * with the supplied purpose
506 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
508 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
511 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
513 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
514 int proxy_path_length = 0;
516 int allow_proxy_certs;
519 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
520 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
521 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
522 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
523 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
524 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
525 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
529 /* CRL path validation */
532 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
533 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
538 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
539 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
541 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
542 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
543 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
546 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
547 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
550 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
551 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
552 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
555 ctx->error_depth = i;
556 ctx->current_cert = x;
560 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
563 ctx->error_depth = i;
564 ctx->current_cert = x;
568 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
572 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
573 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
576 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
585 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
592 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
596 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
604 ctx->error_depth = i;
605 ctx->current_cert = x;
609 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
611 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
613 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
616 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
617 ctx->error_depth = i;
618 ctx->current_cert = x;
623 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
624 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
625 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
626 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
628 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
629 ctx->error_depth = i;
630 ctx->current_cert = x;
634 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
635 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
637 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
638 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
639 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
641 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
643 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
646 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
647 ctx->error_depth = i;
648 ctx->current_cert = x;
664 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
668 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
669 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
671 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
672 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
673 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
675 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
676 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
677 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
678 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
680 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
682 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
685 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
689 ctx->error_depth = i;
690 ctx->current_cert = x;
691 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
700 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
702 ctx->error = errcode;
703 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
704 ctx->error_depth = 0;
705 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
708 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
710 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
712 if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
714 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
717 if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
719 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
722 if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
724 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
730 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
734 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
736 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
737 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
739 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
740 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
741 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
742 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
743 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
744 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
747 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
749 ctx->error_depth = i;
750 ctx->current_cert = x;
751 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
754 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
757 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
758 * certificate return success.
760 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
763 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
764 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
765 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
766 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
769 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
771 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
772 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
776 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
777 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
779 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
782 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
785 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
787 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
788 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
791 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
796 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
798 ctx->error_depth = i;
799 ok = check_cert(ctx);
805 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
807 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
810 unsigned int last_reasons;
811 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
812 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
813 ctx->current_cert = x;
814 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
815 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
816 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
817 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
819 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
820 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
822 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
824 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
825 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
830 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
831 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
834 ctx->current_crl = crl;
835 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
841 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
844 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
851 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
854 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
863 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
864 * another iteration, so exit loop.
866 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
868 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
869 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
877 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
882 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
884 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
889 ctx->current_crl = crl;
890 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
891 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
895 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
900 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
901 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
909 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
910 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
914 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
916 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
922 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
923 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
926 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
927 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
931 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
932 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
938 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
943 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
944 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
945 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
947 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
948 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
949 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
950 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
951 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
953 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
955 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
957 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
959 if (crl_score > best_score)
962 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
963 best_score = crl_score;
964 best_reasons = reasons;
971 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
973 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
974 *pscore = best_score;
975 *preasons = best_reasons;
976 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
979 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
982 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
985 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
991 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
992 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
995 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
997 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
999 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1002 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1003 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1005 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1010 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1015 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1017 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1029 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1035 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1037 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1039 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1040 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1042 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1043 if (!base->crl_number)
1045 /* Issuer names must match */
1046 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1047 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1049 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1050 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1052 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1054 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1055 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1057 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1058 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1063 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1064 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1067 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1068 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1072 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1074 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1076 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1078 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1079 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1081 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1082 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1083 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1091 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1092 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1093 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1094 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1095 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1098 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1099 unsigned int *preasons,
1100 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1104 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1106 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1108 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1109 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1111 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1112 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1114 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1117 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1119 /* If no new reasons reject */
1120 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1123 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1124 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1126 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1127 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1129 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1133 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1135 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1136 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1139 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1140 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1142 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1143 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1145 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1147 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1150 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1152 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1154 /* If no new reasons reject */
1155 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1157 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1158 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1161 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1167 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1168 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1170 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1171 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1172 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1175 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1178 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1180 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1182 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1184 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1185 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1190 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1192 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1193 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1195 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1197 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1198 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1203 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1205 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1208 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1209 * set of untrusted certificates.
1211 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1213 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1214 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1216 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1218 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1219 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1225 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1226 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1227 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1228 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1232 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1234 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1236 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1239 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1242 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1243 /* Copy verify params across */
1244 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1246 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1247 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1249 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1250 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1255 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1257 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1259 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1263 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1264 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1265 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1266 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1267 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1268 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1271 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1272 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1273 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1275 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1276 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1277 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1278 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1283 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1284 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1285 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1286 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1287 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1291 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1293 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1294 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1295 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1303 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1308 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1313 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1315 gens = b->name.fullname;
1317 else if (b->type == 1)
1321 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1322 gens = a->name.fullname;
1326 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1329 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1331 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1332 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1334 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1340 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1342 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1344 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1345 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1347 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1348 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1357 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1360 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1361 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1363 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1364 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1366 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1367 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1369 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1375 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1377 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1378 unsigned int *preasons)
1381 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1383 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1385 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1390 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1393 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1394 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1396 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1397 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1400 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1402 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1407 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1412 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1413 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1416 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1417 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1420 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1422 unsigned int reasons;
1423 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1424 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1425 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1426 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1427 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1428 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1433 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1435 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1437 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1441 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1443 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1447 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1450 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1451 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1452 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1461 /* Check CRL validity */
1462 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1464 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1465 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1466 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1467 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1468 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1469 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1470 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1471 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1473 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1474 * is next certificate in chain.
1476 else if (cnum < chnum)
1477 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1480 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1481 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1482 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1484 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1485 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1492 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1495 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1497 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1498 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1499 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1501 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1502 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1506 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1508 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1509 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1513 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1515 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1517 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1518 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1523 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1525 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1526 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1533 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1535 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1540 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1541 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1545 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1546 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1552 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1553 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1556 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1560 /* Verify CRL signature */
1561 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1563 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1564 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1573 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1577 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1578 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1582 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1583 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1584 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1585 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1587 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1589 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1591 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1592 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1596 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1597 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1599 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1601 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1603 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1604 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1612 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1617 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1618 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1621 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1624 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1627 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1632 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1634 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1635 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1637 ctx->current_cert = x;
1638 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1639 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1646 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1647 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1648 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1651 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1653 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1654 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1655 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1662 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1667 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1668 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1672 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1675 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1676 ctx->current_cert=x;
1677 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1683 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1684 ctx->current_cert=x;
1685 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1689 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1692 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1693 ctx->current_cert=x;
1694 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1700 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1701 ctx->current_cert=x;
1702 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1709 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1713 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1714 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1718 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1719 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1721 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1723 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1727 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
1734 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1735 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1743 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1747 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1752 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1753 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1756 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1758 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1760 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1761 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1765 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1767 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1768 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1772 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1776 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1783 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1787 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1788 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1789 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1797 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1805 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1807 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1810 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1815 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1820 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1821 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1823 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1830 if (i < 13) return 0;
1836 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1837 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1842 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1846 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1857 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1859 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1860 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1866 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1867 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1869 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1872 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1874 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1875 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1876 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1879 if (i < j) return -1;
1880 if (i > j) return 1;
1882 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1883 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1889 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1891 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1894 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1896 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1899 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1900 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1904 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1907 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1909 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1910 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1911 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1912 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1915 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1918 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1920 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1923 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1925 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1927 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1930 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1933 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1937 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1943 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1947 /* first, populate the other certs */
1948 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1950 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1951 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1952 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1955 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1956 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1960 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1962 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1963 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1965 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1967 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1968 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1969 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1971 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1974 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1975 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1977 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1980 /* Issuer names must match */
1981 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1982 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1984 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1987 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1988 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1990 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1993 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1995 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1998 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1999 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2001 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2004 /* CRLs must verify */
2005 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2006 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2008 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2011 /* Create new CRL */
2012 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2013 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2015 /* Set issuer name */
2016 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2019 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2021 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2024 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2026 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2029 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2030 * CRL number to correct value too.
2033 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2035 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2036 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2037 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2041 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2043 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2045 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2047 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2048 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2049 /* Add only if not also in base.
2050 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2051 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2053 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2055 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2058 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2060 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2065 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2067 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2073 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2079 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2080 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2082 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2083 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2084 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2085 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2088 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2090 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2093 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2095 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2098 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2103 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2108 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2110 return ctx->error_depth;
2113 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2115 return ctx->current_cert;
2118 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2123 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2127 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
2128 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
2129 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
2131 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2132 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
2137 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139 return ctx->current_issuer;
2142 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144 return ctx->current_crl;
2147 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2152 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2157 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2162 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2167 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2169 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2172 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2174 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2177 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2178 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2179 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2180 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2181 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2182 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2183 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2184 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2188 int purpose, int trust)
2191 /* If purpose not set use default */
2192 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2193 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2197 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2200 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2201 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2204 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2205 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2207 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2210 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2211 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2214 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2216 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2217 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2221 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2224 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2225 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2230 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2231 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2235 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2237 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2238 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2241 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2244 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2248 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2250 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2254 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2255 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2259 ctx->current_method=0;
2261 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2263 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2264 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2268 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2270 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2271 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2272 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2273 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2274 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2278 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2282 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2286 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2292 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2294 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2298 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2299 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2305 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2306 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2310 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2314 if (store && store->check_issued)
2315 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2317 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2319 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2320 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2322 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2324 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2325 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2327 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2329 if (store && store->verify)
2330 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2332 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2334 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2335 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2337 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2339 if (store && store->get_crl)
2340 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2342 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2344 if (store && store->check_crl)
2345 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2347 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2349 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2350 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2352 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2354 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2355 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2357 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2359 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2360 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2362 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2364 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2367 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2368 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2369 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2370 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2371 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2375 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2381 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2382 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2385 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2387 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2388 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2391 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2393 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2394 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2396 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2397 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2400 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2402 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2405 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2407 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2410 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2411 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2414 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2416 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2419 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2421 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2424 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2426 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2429 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2430 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2432 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2435 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2442 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2445 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2447 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2448 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2451 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2454 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2459 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2462 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2466 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2467 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2469 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2471 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2472 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)