1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123 unsigned int *preasons,
124 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
163 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
165 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
167 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
170 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
171 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
172 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
174 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
180 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
181 * present and that the first entry is in place */
182 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
184 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
185 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
187 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
191 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
194 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
195 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
196 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
198 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
202 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
203 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
209 /* If we have enough, we break */
210 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
211 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
212 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
216 /* If we are self signed, we break */
217 if (cert_self_signed(x))
219 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
220 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
222 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
225 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
226 * will be picked up again later.
235 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
236 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
238 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
241 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
243 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
246 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
247 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
248 ctx->last_untrusted++;
251 /* reparse the full chain for
259 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
260 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
261 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
263 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
267 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
268 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
269 if (cert_self_signed(x))
271 /* we have a self signed certificate */
272 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
274 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
275 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
276 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
278 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
279 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
281 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
283 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
284 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
291 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
292 * so we get any trust settings.
296 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
297 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
302 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
303 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
304 ctx->last_untrusted--;
306 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
310 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
313 /* If we have enough, we break */
314 if (depth < num) break;
316 /* If we are self signed, we break */
317 if (cert_self_signed(x))
320 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
322 if (ok < 0) return ok;
326 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
329 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
335 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
337 i = check_trust(ctx);
339 /* If explicitly rejected error */
340 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
342 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
343 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
345 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
347 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
348 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
350 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
356 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
358 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
359 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
360 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
364 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
370 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
371 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
375 /* Check name constraints */
377 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
385 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
386 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
388 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
389 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
392 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
395 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
400 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
406 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
407 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
410 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
414 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
415 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
417 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
421 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
422 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
423 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
428 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
430 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
431 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
436 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
439 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
443 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
445 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
446 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
452 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
454 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
457 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
458 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
462 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
463 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
465 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
467 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
468 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
470 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
476 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
478 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
479 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
483 ctx->current_cert = x;
484 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
485 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
489 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
491 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
493 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
496 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
504 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
505 * with the supplied purpose
508 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
510 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
513 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
515 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
516 int proxy_path_length = 0;
518 int allow_proxy_certs;
521 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
522 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
523 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
524 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
525 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
526 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
527 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
531 /* CRL path validation */
534 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
535 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
540 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
541 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
543 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
544 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
545 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
548 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
549 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
552 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
553 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
554 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
556 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
557 ctx->error_depth = i;
558 ctx->current_cert = x;
562 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
565 ctx->error_depth = i;
566 ctx->current_cert = x;
570 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
574 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
575 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
578 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
587 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
594 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
598 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
606 ctx->error_depth = i;
607 ctx->current_cert = x;
611 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
613 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
615 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
618 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
619 ctx->error_depth = i;
620 ctx->current_cert = x;
625 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
626 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
627 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
628 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
630 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
631 ctx->error_depth = i;
632 ctx->current_cert = x;
636 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
637 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
639 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
640 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
641 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
643 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
645 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
648 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
649 ctx->error_depth = i;
650 ctx->current_cert = x;
666 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
670 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
671 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
673 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
674 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
675 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
677 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
678 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
679 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
680 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
682 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
684 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
687 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
691 ctx->error_depth = i;
692 ctx->current_cert = x;
693 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
702 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
704 ctx->error = errcode;
705 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
706 ctx->error_depth = 0;
707 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
710 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
712 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
714 if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
716 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
719 if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
721 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
724 if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
726 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
732 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
736 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
738 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
739 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
741 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
742 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
743 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
744 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
745 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
746 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
749 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
751 ctx->error_depth = i;
752 ctx->current_cert = x;
753 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
756 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
759 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
760 * certificate return success.
762 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
764 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
765 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
768 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
769 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
771 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
774 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
777 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
779 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
780 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
783 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
788 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
790 ctx->error_depth = i;
791 ok = check_cert(ctx);
797 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
799 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
802 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
803 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
804 ctx->current_cert = x;
805 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
806 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
807 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
808 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
810 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
812 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
814 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
815 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
820 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
821 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
824 ctx->current_crl = crl;
825 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
831 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
834 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
841 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
844 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
858 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
863 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
865 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
870 ctx->current_crl = crl;
871 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
872 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
876 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
881 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
882 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
890 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
891 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
895 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
897 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
903 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
904 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
907 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
908 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
912 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
913 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
919 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
924 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
925 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
926 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
928 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
929 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
930 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
931 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
932 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
934 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
936 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
938 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
940 if (crl_score > best_score)
943 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
944 best_score = crl_score;
945 best_reasons = reasons;
952 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
954 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
955 *pscore = best_score;
956 *preasons = best_reasons;
957 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
960 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
963 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
966 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
972 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
973 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
976 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
978 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
980 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
983 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
984 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
986 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
991 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
996 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
998 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1010 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1016 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1018 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1020 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1021 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1023 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1024 if (!base->crl_number)
1026 /* Issuer names must match */
1027 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1028 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1030 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1031 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1033 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1035 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1036 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1038 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1039 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1044 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1045 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1048 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1049 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1053 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1055 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1057 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1059 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1060 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1062 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1063 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1064 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1072 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1073 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1074 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1075 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1076 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1079 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1080 unsigned int *preasons,
1081 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1085 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1087 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1089 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1090 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1092 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1093 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1095 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1098 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1100 /* If no new reasons reject */
1101 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1104 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1105 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1107 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1108 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1110 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1114 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1116 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1117 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1120 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1121 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1123 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1124 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1126 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1128 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1131 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1133 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1135 /* If no new reasons reject */
1136 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1138 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1139 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1142 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1148 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1149 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1151 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1152 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1153 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1156 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1159 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1161 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1163 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1165 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1166 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1171 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1173 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1174 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1176 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1178 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1179 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1184 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1186 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1189 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1190 * set of untrusted certificates.
1192 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1194 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1195 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1197 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1199 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1200 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1206 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1207 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1208 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1209 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1213 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1215 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1217 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1220 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1223 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1224 /* Copy verify params across */
1225 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1227 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1228 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1230 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1231 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1236 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1238 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1240 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1244 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1245 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1246 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1247 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1248 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1249 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1252 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1253 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1254 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1256 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1257 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1258 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1259 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1264 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1265 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1266 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1267 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1268 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1272 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1274 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1275 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1276 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1284 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1289 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1294 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1296 gens = b->name.fullname;
1298 else if (b->type == 1)
1302 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1303 gens = a->name.fullname;
1307 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1310 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1312 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1313 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1315 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1321 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1323 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1325 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1326 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1328 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1329 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1338 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1341 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1342 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1344 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1347 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1348 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1350 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1356 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1358 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1359 unsigned int *preasons)
1362 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1364 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1366 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1371 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1374 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1377 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1378 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1381 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1383 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1388 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1393 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1394 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1397 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1398 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1401 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1403 unsigned int reasons;
1404 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1405 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1406 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1407 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1408 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1409 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1414 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1416 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1418 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1422 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1424 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1428 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1431 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1432 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1433 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1442 /* Check CRL validity */
1443 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1445 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1446 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1447 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1448 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1449 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1450 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1451 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1452 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1454 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1455 * is next certificate in chain.
1457 else if (cnum < chnum)
1458 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1461 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1462 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1463 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1465 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1466 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1473 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1476 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1478 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1479 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1480 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1482 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1483 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1487 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1489 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1490 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1494 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1496 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1498 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1499 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1504 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1506 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1507 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1514 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1516 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1521 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1522 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1526 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1527 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1533 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1534 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1537 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1541 /* Verify CRL signature */
1542 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1544 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1545 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1554 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1558 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1559 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1563 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1564 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1565 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1566 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1568 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1570 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1572 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1577 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1578 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1580 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1582 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1584 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1585 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1593 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1598 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1599 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1602 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1605 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1608 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1613 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1615 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1616 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1618 ctx->current_cert = x;
1619 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1620 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1627 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1628 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1629 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1632 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1634 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1635 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1636 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1643 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1648 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1649 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1653 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1656 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1657 ctx->current_cert=x;
1658 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1664 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1665 ctx->current_cert=x;
1666 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1670 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1673 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1674 ctx->current_cert=x;
1675 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1681 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1682 ctx->current_cert=x;
1683 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1690 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1694 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1695 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1699 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1700 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1702 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1704 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1710 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1711 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1719 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1723 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1728 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1729 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1732 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1734 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1736 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1737 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1741 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1743 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1744 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1748 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1752 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1758 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1762 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1763 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1764 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1772 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1780 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1782 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1785 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1790 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1795 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1796 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1798 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1805 if (i < 13) return 0;
1811 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1812 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1817 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1821 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1832 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1834 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1835 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1841 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1842 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1844 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1847 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1849 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1850 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1851 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1854 if (i < j) return -1;
1855 if (i > j) return 1;
1857 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1858 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1864 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1866 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1869 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1871 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1874 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1875 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1879 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1882 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1884 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1885 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1886 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1887 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1890 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1893 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1895 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1898 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1900 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1902 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1905 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1908 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1912 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1918 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1922 /* first, populate the other certs */
1923 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1925 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1926 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1927 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1930 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1931 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1935 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1937 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1938 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1940 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1942 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1943 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1944 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1949 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1950 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1955 /* Issuer names must match */
1956 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1957 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1959 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1962 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1963 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1965 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1968 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1970 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1973 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1974 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1979 /* CRLs must verify */
1980 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1981 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
1983 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1986 /* Create new CRL */
1987 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1988 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1990 /* Set issuer name */
1991 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1994 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1996 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1999 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2001 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2004 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2005 * CRL number to correct value too.
2008 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2010 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2011 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2012 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2016 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2018 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2020 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2022 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2023 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2024 /* Add only if not also in base.
2025 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2026 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2028 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2030 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2033 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2035 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2040 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2042 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2048 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2054 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2055 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2057 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2058 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2059 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2060 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2063 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2065 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2068 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2070 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2073 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2078 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2083 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2085 return ctx->error_depth;
2088 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2090 return ctx->current_cert;
2093 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2098 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2102 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2105 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2107 return ctx->current_issuer;
2110 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2112 return ctx->current_crl;
2115 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2120 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2125 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2130 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2135 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2137 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2140 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2142 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2145 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2146 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2147 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2148 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2149 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2150 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2151 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2152 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2155 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2156 int purpose, int trust)
2159 /* If purpose not set use default */
2160 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2161 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2165 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2168 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2169 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2172 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2173 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2175 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2178 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2179 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2182 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2184 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2185 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2189 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2192 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2193 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2198 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2199 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2203 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2205 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2206 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2209 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2212 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2216 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2218 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2222 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2223 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2227 ctx->current_method=0;
2229 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2231 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2232 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2236 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2238 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2239 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2240 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2241 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2242 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2246 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2250 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2254 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2260 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2262 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2266 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2267 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2273 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2274 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2278 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2282 if (store && store->check_issued)
2283 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2285 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2287 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2288 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2290 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2292 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2293 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2295 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2297 if (store && store->verify)
2298 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2300 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2302 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2303 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2305 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2307 if (store && store->get_crl)
2308 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2310 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2312 if (store && store->check_crl)
2313 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2315 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2317 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2318 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2320 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2322 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2323 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2325 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2327 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2328 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2330 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2332 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2335 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2336 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2337 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2338 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2339 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2343 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2350 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2353 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2355 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2356 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2359 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2361 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2362 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2364 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2365 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2368 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2370 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2373 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2375 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2378 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2379 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2382 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2384 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2387 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2389 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2392 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2394 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2397 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2398 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2400 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2403 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2408 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2410 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2413 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2415 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2416 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2419 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2422 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2427 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2430 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2434 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2435 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2437 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2439 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2440 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)