1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons,
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
152 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
153 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
155 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
156 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
162 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
164 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
166 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
169 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
170 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
171 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
173 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
179 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
180 * present and that the first entry is in place */
181 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
183 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
184 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
186 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
189 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
190 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
193 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
194 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
195 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
197 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
201 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
202 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
208 /* If we have enough, we break */
209 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
210 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
211 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
215 /* If we are self signed, we break */
216 if (cert_self_signed(x))
218 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
219 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
221 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
224 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
225 * will be picked up again later.
234 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
235 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
237 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
240 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
242 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
245 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
246 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
247 ctx->last_untrusted++;
250 /* reparse the full chain for
258 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
259 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
260 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
262 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
266 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
267 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
268 if (cert_self_signed(x))
270 /* we have a self signed certificate */
271 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
273 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
274 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
275 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
277 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
278 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
280 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
282 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
283 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
290 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
291 * so we get any trust settings.
295 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
296 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
301 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
302 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
303 ctx->last_untrusted--;
305 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
309 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
312 /* If we have enough, we break */
313 if (depth < num) break;
315 /* If we are self signed, we break */
316 if (cert_self_signed(x))
319 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
321 if (ok < 0) return ok;
325 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
328 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
334 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
336 i = check_trust(ctx);
338 /* If explicitly rejected error */
339 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
341 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
342 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
344 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
346 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
347 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
349 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
355 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
357 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
358 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
359 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
363 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
369 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
370 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
374 /* Check name constraints */
376 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
380 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
381 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
383 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
384 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
387 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
390 i = X509_check_suiteb_chain(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
395 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
401 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
402 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
405 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
409 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
410 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
412 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
416 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
417 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
418 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
423 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
425 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
426 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
431 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
434 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
438 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
440 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
441 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
447 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
449 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
452 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
453 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
457 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
458 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
460 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
462 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
463 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
465 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
471 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
473 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
474 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
478 ctx->current_cert = x;
479 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
480 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
484 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
486 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
488 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
491 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
499 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
500 * with the supplied purpose
503 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
505 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
508 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
510 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
511 int proxy_path_length = 0;
513 int allow_proxy_certs;
516 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
517 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
518 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
519 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
520 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
521 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
522 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
526 /* CRL path validation */
529 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
530 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
535 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
536 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
538 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
539 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
540 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
543 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
544 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
547 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
548 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
549 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
552 ctx->error_depth = i;
553 ctx->current_cert = x;
557 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
560 ctx->error_depth = i;
561 ctx->current_cert = x;
565 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
569 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
570 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
573 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
582 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
589 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
593 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
601 ctx->error_depth = i;
602 ctx->current_cert = x;
606 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
608 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
610 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
613 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
614 ctx->error_depth = i;
615 ctx->current_cert = x;
620 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
621 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
622 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
623 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
625 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
626 ctx->error_depth = i;
627 ctx->current_cert = x;
631 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
632 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
634 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
635 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
636 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
638 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
640 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
643 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
644 ctx->error_depth = i;
645 ctx->current_cert = x;
661 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
665 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
666 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
668 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
669 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
670 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
672 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
673 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
674 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
675 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
677 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
679 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
682 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
686 ctx->error_depth = i;
687 ctx->current_cert = x;
688 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
697 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
701 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
703 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
704 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
706 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
707 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
708 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
709 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
710 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
711 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
714 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
716 ctx->error_depth = i;
717 ctx->current_cert = x;
718 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
721 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
724 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
725 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
727 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
730 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
733 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
735 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
736 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
739 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
744 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
746 ctx->error_depth = i;
747 ok = check_cert(ctx);
753 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
755 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
758 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
759 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
760 ctx->current_cert = x;
761 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
762 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
763 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
764 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
766 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
768 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
770 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
771 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
776 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
777 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
780 ctx->current_crl = crl;
781 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
787 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
790 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
797 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
800 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
814 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
819 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
821 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
826 ctx->current_crl = crl;
827 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
828 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
832 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
837 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
838 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
846 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
847 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
851 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
853 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
859 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
860 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
863 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
864 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
868 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
869 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
875 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
880 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
881 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
882 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
884 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
885 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
886 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
887 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
888 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
890 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
892 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
894 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
896 if (crl_score > best_score)
899 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
900 best_score = crl_score;
901 best_reasons = reasons;
908 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
910 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
911 *pscore = best_score;
912 *preasons = best_reasons;
913 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
916 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
919 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
922 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
928 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
929 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
932 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
934 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
936 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
939 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
940 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
942 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
947 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
952 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
954 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
966 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
972 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
974 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
976 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
977 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
979 /* Base must have a CRL number */
980 if (!base->crl_number)
982 /* Issuer names must match */
983 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
984 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
986 /* AKID and IDP must match */
987 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
989 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
991 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
992 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
994 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
995 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1000 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1001 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1004 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1005 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1009 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1011 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1013 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1015 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1016 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1018 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1019 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1020 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1028 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1029 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1030 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1031 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1032 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1035 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1036 unsigned int *preasons,
1037 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1041 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1043 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1045 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1046 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1048 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1049 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1051 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1054 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1056 /* If no new reasons reject */
1057 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1060 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1061 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1063 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1064 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1066 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1070 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1072 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1073 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1076 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1077 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1079 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1080 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1082 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1084 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1087 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1089 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1091 /* If no new reasons reject */
1092 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1094 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1095 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1098 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1104 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1105 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1107 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1108 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1109 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1112 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1115 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1117 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1119 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1121 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1122 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1127 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1129 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1130 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1132 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1134 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1135 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1140 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1142 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1145 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1146 * set of untrusted certificates.
1148 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1150 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1151 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1153 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1155 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1156 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1162 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1163 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1164 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1165 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1169 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1171 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1173 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1176 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1179 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1180 /* Copy verify params across */
1181 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1183 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1184 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1186 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1187 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1192 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1194 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1196 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1200 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1201 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1202 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1203 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1204 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1205 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1208 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1209 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1210 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1212 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1213 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1214 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1215 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1220 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1221 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1222 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1223 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1224 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1228 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1230 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1231 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1232 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1240 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1245 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1250 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1252 gens = b->name.fullname;
1254 else if (b->type == 1)
1258 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1259 gens = a->name.fullname;
1263 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1266 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1268 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1269 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1271 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1277 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1279 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1281 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1282 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1284 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1285 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1294 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1297 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1298 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1300 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1301 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1303 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1304 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1306 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1312 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1314 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1315 unsigned int *preasons)
1318 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1320 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1322 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1327 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1330 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1331 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1333 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1334 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1337 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1339 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1344 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1349 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1350 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1353 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1354 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1357 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1359 unsigned int reasons;
1360 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1361 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1362 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1363 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1364 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1365 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1370 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1372 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1374 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1378 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1380 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1384 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1387 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1388 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1389 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1398 /* Check CRL validity */
1399 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1401 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1402 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1403 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1404 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1405 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1406 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1407 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1408 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1410 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1411 * is next certificate in chain.
1413 else if (cnum < chnum)
1414 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1417 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1418 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1419 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1421 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1422 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1429 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1432 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1434 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1435 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1436 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1439 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1443 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1446 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1450 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1452 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1454 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1455 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1460 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1462 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1463 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1470 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1472 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1477 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1478 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1482 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1483 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1489 rv = X509_check_suiteb_crl(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1490 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1493 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1497 /* Verify CRL signature */
1498 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1500 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1501 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1510 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1514 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1515 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1519 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1520 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1521 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1522 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1524 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1526 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1529 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1533 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1534 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1536 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1538 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1540 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1541 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1549 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1554 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1555 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1558 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1561 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1564 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1569 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1571 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1572 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1574 ctx->current_cert = x;
1575 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1576 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1583 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1584 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1585 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1588 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1590 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1591 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1592 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1599 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1604 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1605 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1609 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1612 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1613 ctx->current_cert=x;
1614 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1620 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1621 ctx->current_cert=x;
1622 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1626 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1629 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1630 ctx->current_cert=x;
1631 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1637 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1638 ctx->current_cert=x;
1639 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1646 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1650 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1651 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1655 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1656 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1658 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1660 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1666 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1667 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1675 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1679 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1684 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1685 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1688 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1690 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1692 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1693 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1697 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1699 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1700 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1704 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1708 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1714 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1718 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1719 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1720 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1728 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1736 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1738 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1741 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1746 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1751 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1752 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1754 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1761 if (i < 13) return 0;
1767 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1768 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1773 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1777 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1788 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1790 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1791 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1797 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1798 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1800 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1803 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1805 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1806 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1807 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1810 if (i < j) return -1;
1811 if (i > j) return 1;
1813 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1814 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1820 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1822 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1825 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1827 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1830 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1831 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1835 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1838 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1840 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1841 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1842 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1843 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1846 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1849 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1851 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1854 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1856 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1858 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1861 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1864 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1868 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1874 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1878 /* first, populate the other certs */
1879 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1881 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1882 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1883 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1886 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1887 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1891 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1892 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1894 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1895 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1896 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1897 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1900 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1902 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1905 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1907 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1910 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1915 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1920 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1922 return ctx->error_depth;
1925 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1927 return ctx->current_cert;
1930 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1935 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1939 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1940 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1941 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1943 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1944 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1949 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1951 return ctx->current_issuer;
1954 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1956 return ctx->current_crl;
1959 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1964 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1969 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1974 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1979 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1981 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1984 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1986 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1989 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1990 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1991 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1992 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1993 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1994 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1995 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1996 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1999 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2000 int purpose, int trust)
2003 /* If purpose not set use default */
2004 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2005 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2009 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2012 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2013 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2016 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2017 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2019 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2022 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2023 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2026 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2028 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2029 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2033 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2036 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2037 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2042 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2043 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2047 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2049 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2050 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2053 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2056 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2060 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2062 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2066 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2067 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2071 ctx->current_method=0;
2073 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2075 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2076 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2080 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2082 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2083 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2084 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2085 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2086 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2090 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2094 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2104 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2106 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2110 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2111 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2117 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2118 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2122 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2126 if (store && store->check_issued)
2127 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2129 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2131 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2132 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2134 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2136 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2137 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2139 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2141 if (store && store->verify)
2142 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2144 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2146 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2147 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2149 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2151 if (store && store->get_crl)
2152 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2154 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2156 if (store && store->check_crl)
2157 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2159 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2161 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2162 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2164 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2166 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2167 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2169 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2171 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2172 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2174 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2176 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2179 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2180 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2181 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2182 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2183 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2187 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2193 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2194 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2197 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2199 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2200 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2203 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2205 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2206 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2208 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2209 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2212 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2214 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2217 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2219 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2222 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2223 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2226 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2228 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2231 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2233 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2236 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2238 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2241 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2242 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2244 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2247 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2252 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2254 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2257 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2259 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2260 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2263 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2266 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2271 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2274 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2278 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2279 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2281 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2283 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2284 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)