1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
128 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
167 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
176 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
180 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
190 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
193 int depth, i, ok = 0;
195 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
196 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
197 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
200 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
202 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
205 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
207 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
208 * cannot do another one.
210 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
211 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
218 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
219 * the first entry is in place
221 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
222 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
223 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
224 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
228 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
229 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
231 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
232 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
233 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
234 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
235 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
240 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
241 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
242 depth = param->depth;
245 /* If we have enough, we break */
247 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
248 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
249 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
252 /* If we are self signed, we break */
253 if (cert_self_signed(x))
256 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
258 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
259 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
261 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
265 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
274 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
275 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
276 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
278 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
279 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
280 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
284 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
285 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
286 ctx->last_untrusted++;
290 * reparse the full chain for the next one
298 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
301 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
302 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
308 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
310 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
311 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
312 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
313 /* we have a self signed certificate */
314 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
316 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
317 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
318 * possible impersonation.
320 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
321 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
322 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
323 ctx->current_cert = x;
324 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
333 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
334 * version so we get any trust settings.
338 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
339 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
343 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
345 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
346 ctx->last_untrusted--;
349 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
352 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
354 /* If we have enough, we break */
357 /* If we are self signed, we break */
358 if (cert_self_signed(x))
360 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
363 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
369 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
371 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
372 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
379 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
380 if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
381 /* Callback already issued */
387 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
388 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
389 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
393 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
394 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
395 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
397 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
398 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
400 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
403 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
406 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
411 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
415 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
419 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
428 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
429 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
430 * and set bad_chain == 1
432 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
433 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
434 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
435 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
437 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
438 ctx->current_cert = x;
441 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
443 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
444 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
449 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
456 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
457 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
462 /* Check name constraints */
464 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
474 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
475 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
478 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
479 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
482 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
486 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
488 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
490 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
496 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
497 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
498 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
500 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
505 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
506 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
509 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
514 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
515 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
516 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
521 /* Ensure we return an error */
524 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
528 if (chain_ss != NULL)
531 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
532 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
538 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
541 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
545 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
546 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
547 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
553 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
555 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
558 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
559 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
561 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
562 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
566 ctx->current_cert = x;
567 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
568 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
571 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
573 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
575 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
577 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
584 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
588 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
590 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
593 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
595 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
596 int proxy_path_length = 0;
598 int allow_proxy_certs;
602 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
603 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
604 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
605 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
606 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
607 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
608 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
612 /* CRL path validation */
614 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
615 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
618 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
620 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
623 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
624 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
625 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
628 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
629 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
631 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
632 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
633 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
635 ctx->error_depth = i;
636 ctx->current_cert = x;
641 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
642 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
643 ctx->error_depth = i;
644 ctx->current_cert = x;
649 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
650 switch (must_be_ca) {
652 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
653 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
655 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
668 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
677 ctx->error_depth = i;
678 ctx->current_cert = x;
683 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
684 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
686 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
688 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
689 ctx->error_depth = i;
690 ctx->current_cert = x;
696 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
697 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
698 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
699 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
707 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
708 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
711 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
712 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
713 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
715 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
716 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
717 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
718 ctx->error_depth = i;
719 ctx->current_cert = x;
735 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
739 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
740 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
741 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
742 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
743 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
747 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
748 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
750 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
752 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
753 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
754 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
755 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
756 int last_object_nid = 0;
758 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
760 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
761 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
762 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
763 goto proxy_name_done;
767 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
768 * there is in issuer.
770 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
771 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
772 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
773 goto proxy_name_done;
777 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
780 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
781 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
782 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
783 goto proxy_name_done;
787 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
788 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
790 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
791 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
792 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
793 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
798 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
800 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
802 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
803 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
804 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
807 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
808 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
811 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
813 ctx->error_depth = i;
814 ctx->current_cert = x;
815 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
821 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
822 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
823 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
826 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
827 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
829 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
833 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
838 ctx->error_depth = i;
839 ctx->current_cert = x;
840 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
850 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
852 ctx->error = errcode;
853 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
854 ctx->error_depth = 0;
855 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
858 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
861 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
864 if (id->peername != NULL) {
865 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
868 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
869 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
870 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
876 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
878 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
879 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
881 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
882 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
885 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
886 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
889 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
890 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
896 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
900 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
902 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
903 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
904 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
905 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
906 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
907 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
908 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
910 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
913 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
914 ctx->error_depth = i;
915 ctx->current_cert = x;
916 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
919 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
923 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
926 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
928 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
929 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
930 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
931 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
933 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
935 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
936 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
941 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
942 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
944 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
947 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
950 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
952 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
953 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
955 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
960 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
961 ctx->error_depth = i;
962 ok = check_cert(ctx);
969 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
971 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
974 unsigned int last_reasons;
975 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
976 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
977 ctx->current_cert = x;
978 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
979 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
980 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
981 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
982 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
983 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
985 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
987 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
989 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
992 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
993 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
996 ctx->current_crl = crl;
997 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1002 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1005 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1011 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1013 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1019 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1023 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1026 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1027 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1028 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1034 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1036 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1041 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1043 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1048 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1049 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1050 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1054 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1058 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1059 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1066 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1067 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1071 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1072 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1077 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1078 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1081 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1082 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1085 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1086 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1092 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1097 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1098 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1099 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1101 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1102 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1103 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1104 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1105 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1107 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1108 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1109 reasons = *preasons;
1110 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1112 if (crl_score > best_score) {
1114 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1115 best_score = crl_score;
1116 best_reasons = reasons;
1122 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1124 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1125 *pscore = best_score;
1126 *preasons = best_reasons;
1127 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1129 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1132 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1135 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1142 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1143 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1146 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1148 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1150 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1152 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1153 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1155 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1159 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1163 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1165 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1175 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1181 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1183 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1185 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1186 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1188 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1189 if (!base->crl_number)
1191 /* Issuer names must match */
1192 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1194 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1195 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1197 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1199 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1200 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1202 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1203 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1209 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1210 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1213 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1214 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1218 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1220 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1222 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1223 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1224 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1225 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1226 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1227 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1236 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1237 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1238 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1239 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1240 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1243 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1244 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1248 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1250 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1252 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1253 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1255 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1256 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1257 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1259 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1260 /* If no new reasons reject */
1261 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1264 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1265 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1267 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1268 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1269 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1272 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1274 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1275 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1278 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1279 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1281 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1282 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1284 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1286 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1289 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1291 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1292 /* If no new reasons reject */
1293 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1295 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1296 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1299 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1305 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1306 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1308 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1309 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1310 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1313 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1316 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1318 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1319 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1320 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1321 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1326 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1327 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1328 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1330 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1331 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1332 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1337 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1339 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1343 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1344 * untrusted certificates.
1346 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1347 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1348 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1350 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1351 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1352 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1359 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1360 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1361 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1362 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1365 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1367 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1369 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1372 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1375 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1376 /* Copy verify params across */
1377 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1379 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1380 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1382 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1383 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1388 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1390 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1392 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1397 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1398 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1399 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1400 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1401 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1405 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1406 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1407 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1409 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1410 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1411 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1412 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1418 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1419 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1420 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1421 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1422 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1425 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1427 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1428 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1429 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1436 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1440 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1445 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1447 gens = b->name.fullname;
1448 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1451 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1452 gens = a->name.fullname;
1456 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1458 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1459 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1460 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1462 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1468 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1470 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1471 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1472 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1473 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1474 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1483 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1486 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1487 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1489 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1490 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1491 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1492 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1494 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1500 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1502 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1503 unsigned int *preasons)
1506 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1508 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1509 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1512 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1515 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1516 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1517 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1518 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1519 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1520 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1525 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1526 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1532 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1533 * to find a delta CRL too
1536 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1537 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1540 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1542 unsigned int reasons;
1543 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1544 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1545 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1546 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1547 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1548 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1553 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1555 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1557 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1561 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1563 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1567 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1569 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1570 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1571 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1580 /* Check CRL validity */
1581 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1583 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1584 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1585 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1586 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1587 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1588 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1589 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1590 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1593 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1594 * certificate in chain.
1596 else if (cnum < chnum)
1597 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1599 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1600 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1601 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1602 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1603 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1611 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1613 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1614 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1615 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1616 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1618 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1623 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1624 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1625 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1630 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1631 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1632 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1633 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1639 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1641 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1648 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1649 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1654 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1655 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1658 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1659 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1664 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1665 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1667 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1671 /* Verify CRL signature */
1672 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1673 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1674 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1684 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1688 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1689 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1694 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1695 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1696 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1697 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1699 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1700 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1701 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1702 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1707 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1708 * is not removeFromCRL.
1710 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1711 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1713 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1714 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1722 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1727 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1728 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1730 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1731 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1734 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1737 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1741 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1742 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1743 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1745 ctx->current_cert = x;
1746 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1747 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1753 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1754 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1755 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1758 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1759 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1761 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1762 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1763 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1764 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1766 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1773 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1778 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1779 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1783 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1785 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1786 ctx->current_cert = x;
1787 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1792 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1793 ctx->current_cert = x;
1794 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1798 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1800 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1801 ctx->current_cert = x;
1802 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1807 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1808 ctx->current_cert = x;
1809 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1816 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1820 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1821 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1823 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1825 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1826 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1828 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1830 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1833 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1838 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1839 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1844 ctx->error_depth = n;
1845 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1849 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1851 ctx->error_depth = n;
1854 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1855 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1860 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1861 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1862 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1863 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1864 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1867 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1868 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1869 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1870 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1872 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1876 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1883 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1887 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1888 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1889 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1890 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1897 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1905 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1907 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1910 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1915 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1916 int i, j, remaining;
1919 remaining = ctm->length;
1920 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1922 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1923 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1924 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1925 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1927 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1928 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1929 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1930 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1931 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1938 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1939 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1940 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1941 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1949 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1960 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1961 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1962 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1964 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1967 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1968 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1977 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1986 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1988 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1991 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1992 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1994 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1995 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1999 atm.type = ctm->type;
2001 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
2002 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
2004 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
2007 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
2008 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
2010 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
2011 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
2020 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
2021 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
2027 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2029 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2032 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2034 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2037 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2038 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2047 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
2048 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2049 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2050 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2051 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2053 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2056 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2058 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2061 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2064 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2065 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2067 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2068 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2071 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2074 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2079 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2080 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2084 /* first, populate the other certs */
2085 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2086 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2087 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
2088 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2092 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2093 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2097 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2099 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2100 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2102 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2104 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2105 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2106 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2107 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2110 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2111 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2112 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2115 /* Issuer names must match */
2116 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2117 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2120 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2121 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2122 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2125 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2126 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2129 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2130 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2131 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2134 /* CRLs must verify */
2135 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2136 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2137 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2140 /* Create new CRL */
2141 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2142 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2144 /* Set issuer name */
2145 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2148 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2150 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2153 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2155 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2159 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2160 * number to correct value too.
2163 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2164 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2165 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2166 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2170 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2172 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2174 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2175 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2176 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2178 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2179 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2181 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2182 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2185 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2186 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2191 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2193 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2199 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2205 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2206 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2207 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2208 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2211 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2212 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2214 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2215 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2218 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2220 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2223 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2225 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2228 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2233 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2238 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2240 return ctx->error_depth;
2243 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2245 return ctx->current_cert;
2248 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2253 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2257 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2260 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2262 return ctx->current_issuer;
2265 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2267 return ctx->current_crl;
2270 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2275 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2280 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2282 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2285 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2290 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2292 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2295 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2297 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2301 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2302 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2303 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2304 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2305 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2306 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2307 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2311 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2312 int purpose, int trust)
2315 /* If purpose not set use default */
2317 purpose = def_purpose;
2318 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2321 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2323 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2324 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2327 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2328 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2329 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2331 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2332 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2335 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2337 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2339 trust = ptmp->trust;
2342 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2344 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2345 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2350 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2351 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2352 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2353 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2357 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2359 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2360 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2362 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2365 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2369 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2373 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2377 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2378 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2382 ctx->current_method = 0;
2384 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2386 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2387 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2391 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2392 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2393 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2394 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2395 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2396 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2397 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2400 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2401 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2403 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2405 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2410 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2413 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2415 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2418 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2419 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2420 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2425 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2426 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2429 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2433 if (store && store->check_issued)
2434 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2436 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2438 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2439 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2441 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2443 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2444 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2446 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2448 if (store && store->verify)
2449 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2451 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2453 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2454 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2456 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2458 if (store && store->get_crl)
2459 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2461 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2463 if (store && store->check_crl)
2464 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2466 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2468 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2469 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2471 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2473 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2474 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2476 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2478 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2479 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2481 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2483 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2485 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2488 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2492 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2493 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2495 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2500 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2501 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2504 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2506 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2507 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2510 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2513 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2514 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2515 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2516 * pointers below after they're freed!
2518 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2519 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2521 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2523 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2524 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2525 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2528 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2529 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2532 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2533 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2536 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2537 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2540 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2542 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2545 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2547 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2550 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2553 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2556 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2557 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2559 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2562 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2567 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2569 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2572 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2574 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2575 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2578 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2581 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2586 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2589 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2593 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2595 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2597 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2599 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2601 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)