1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
63 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72 #include <internal/dane.h>
73 #include <internal/x509_int.h>
76 /* CRL score values */
78 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
80 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
82 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
84 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
88 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
90 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
92 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
94 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
96 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
98 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
100 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
102 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
104 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
106 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
108 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
110 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
112 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
114 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
118 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
119 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
120 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
124 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
126 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
127 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
128 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
129 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
130 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
132 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
133 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
134 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
136 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
137 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
138 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
139 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
141 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
142 unsigned int *preasons);
143 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
144 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
145 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
146 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
148 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
150 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
155 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
156 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
159 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
160 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
161 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
163 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
164 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
170 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
172 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
174 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
177 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
178 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
181 /* Look for exact match */
182 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
183 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
184 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
187 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
191 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
196 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
197 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
199 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
200 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
202 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
204 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
206 ctx->error_depth = depth;
207 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
208 if (err != X509_V_OK)
210 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
214 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
215 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
218 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
220 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
223 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
226 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
229 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
231 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
234 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
235 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
238 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
239 * check the security of issuer keys.
241 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
242 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
245 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
246 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
248 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
249 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
255 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
261 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
262 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
264 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
265 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
266 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
267 (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
268 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
269 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
270 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
273 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
275 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
276 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
280 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
281 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
286 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
287 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
289 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
293 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
294 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
295 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
299 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
301 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
303 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
304 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
308 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
310 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
311 * cannot do another one.
313 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
318 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
319 * the first entry is in place
321 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
322 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
323 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
326 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
327 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
329 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
330 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
331 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
335 * If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
336 * DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
337 * keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in
338 * the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
340 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
341 return dane_verify(ctx);
342 return verify_chain(ctx);
346 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
348 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
352 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
353 X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
355 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
357 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
363 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
365 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
369 return cert_self_signed(x);
370 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
371 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
374 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
375 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
377 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
378 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
379 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
380 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
386 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
389 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
391 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
393 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
395 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
401 static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
403 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
406 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
407 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
408 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
410 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
411 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
412 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
422 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
423 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
425 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
428 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
431 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
432 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
434 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
435 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
436 * ctx->param->purpose!
438 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
439 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
440 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
441 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
442 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
444 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
445 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
448 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
449 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
452 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
454 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
457 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
463 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
469 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
473 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
477 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
479 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
481 int proxy_path_length = 0;
483 int allow_proxy_certs;
484 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
487 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
488 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
489 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
490 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
491 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
492 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
493 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
497 /* CRL path validation */
499 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
500 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
503 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
505 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
508 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
509 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
510 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
513 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
515 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
516 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
517 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
518 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
519 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
522 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
523 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
524 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
527 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
528 switch (must_be_ca) {
530 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
531 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
540 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
545 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
547 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
550 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
555 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
557 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
558 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
560 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
561 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
562 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
563 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
564 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
567 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
568 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
571 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
572 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
573 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
575 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
576 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
577 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
578 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
589 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
593 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
594 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
595 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
598 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
599 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
602 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
603 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
604 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
607 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
608 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
611 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
613 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
621 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
623 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
626 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
629 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
632 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
633 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
634 vpm->peername = NULL;
636 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
637 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
638 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
644 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
646 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
648 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
649 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
652 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
653 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
656 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
657 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
663 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
668 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
669 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
673 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
674 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
676 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
677 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
678 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
679 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
685 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
686 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
687 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
688 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
690 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
691 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
692 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
693 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
694 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
696 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
701 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
702 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
704 if (num_untrusted < num) {
705 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
707 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
710 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
712 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
713 * for a direct trust store match.
716 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
717 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
719 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
722 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
723 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
725 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
726 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
731 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
732 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
734 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
739 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
740 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
742 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
745 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
746 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
747 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
750 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
751 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
753 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
754 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
755 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
756 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
757 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
760 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
762 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
763 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
765 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
766 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
768 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
773 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
774 ctx->error_depth = i;
775 ok = check_cert(ctx);
782 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
784 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
786 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
787 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
789 ctx->current_cert = x;
790 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
791 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
792 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
794 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
795 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
797 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
799 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
801 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
803 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
806 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
809 ctx->current_crl = crl;
810 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
815 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
818 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
824 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
826 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
836 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
839 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
840 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
848 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
852 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
854 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
860 ctx->current_crl = crl;
861 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
862 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
863 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
868 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
872 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
879 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
883 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
884 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
889 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
892 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
893 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
896 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
902 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
907 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
908 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
909 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
911 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
912 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
913 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
914 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
915 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
917 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
918 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
920 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
922 if (crl_score > best_score) {
924 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
925 best_score = crl_score;
926 best_reasons = reasons;
931 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
933 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
934 *pscore = best_score;
935 *preasons = best_reasons;
936 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
937 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
939 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
942 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
949 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
950 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
953 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
955 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
957 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
959 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
960 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
962 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
966 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
970 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
972 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
982 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
988 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
990 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
992 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
993 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
995 /* Base must have a CRL number */
996 if (!base->crl_number)
998 /* Issuer names must match */
999 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1001 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1002 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1004 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1006 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1007 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1009 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1010 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1016 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1017 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1020 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1021 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1025 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1027 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1029 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1030 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1031 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1032 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1033 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1034 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1043 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1044 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1045 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1046 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1047 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1050 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1051 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1055 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1057 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1059 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1060 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1062 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1063 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1064 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1066 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1067 /* If no new reasons reject */
1068 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1071 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1072 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1074 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1075 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1076 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1079 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1081 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1082 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1085 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1086 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1088 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1089 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1091 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1093 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1096 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1098 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1099 /* If no new reasons reject */
1100 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1102 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1103 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1106 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1112 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1113 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1115 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1116 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1117 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1120 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1123 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1125 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1126 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1127 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1128 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1133 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1134 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1135 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1137 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1138 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1139 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1144 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1146 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1150 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1151 * untrusted certificates.
1153 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1154 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1155 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1157 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1158 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1159 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1166 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1167 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1168 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1169 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1172 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1174 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1177 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1180 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1183 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1184 /* Copy verify params across */
1185 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1187 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1188 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1190 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1191 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1195 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1196 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1198 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1203 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1204 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1205 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1206 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1207 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1211 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1212 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1213 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1215 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1216 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1217 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1218 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1224 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1225 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1226 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1227 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1228 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1231 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1233 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1234 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1235 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1242 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1246 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1251 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1253 gens = b->name.fullname;
1254 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1257 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1258 gens = a->name.fullname;
1262 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1264 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1265 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1266 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1268 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1274 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1276 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1277 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1278 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1279 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1280 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1289 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1292 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1293 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1295 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1296 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1297 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1298 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1300 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1306 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1308 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1309 unsigned int *preasons)
1312 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1314 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1315 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1318 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1321 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1322 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1323 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1324 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1325 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1326 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1331 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1332 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1338 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1339 * to find a delta CRL too
1342 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1343 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1346 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1348 unsigned int reasons;
1349 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1350 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1351 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1353 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1354 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1355 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1359 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1361 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1363 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1367 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1369 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1372 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1374 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1375 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1376 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1384 /* Check CRL validity */
1385 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1387 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1388 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1389 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1390 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1392 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1393 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1394 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1396 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1397 * certificate in chain.
1399 else if (cnum < chnum)
1400 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1402 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1403 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1404 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1405 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1413 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1415 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1416 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1417 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1418 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1419 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1422 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1423 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1426 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1427 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1428 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1431 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1432 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1436 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1437 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1440 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1441 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1444 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1448 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1450 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1452 /* Verify CRL signature */
1453 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1454 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1460 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1461 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1466 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1467 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1468 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1469 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1471 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1472 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1473 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1476 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1477 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1479 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1480 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1482 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1489 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1496 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1497 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1498 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1499 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1500 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1501 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1502 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1503 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1504 * X509_policy_check() call.
1506 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1507 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1510 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1511 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1512 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1513 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1515 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1516 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1519 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1520 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1523 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1524 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1525 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1527 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1529 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1530 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1535 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1536 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1537 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1538 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1540 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1541 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1546 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1547 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1548 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1556 * Check certificate validity times.
1557 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1558 * the validation status.
1560 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1562 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1567 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1568 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1569 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1574 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1575 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1577 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1578 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1580 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1583 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1584 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1586 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1587 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1589 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1594 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1596 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1597 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1601 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1602 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1603 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1605 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1611 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1614 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1619 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1620 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1622 ctx->error_depth = n;
1623 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1627 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1628 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1634 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1635 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1636 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1637 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1639 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1640 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1641 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1642 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1644 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1645 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1646 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1652 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1653 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1657 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1660 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1661 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1662 ctx->error_depth = n;
1663 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1668 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1674 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1676 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1679 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1684 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1685 int i, j, remaining;
1688 remaining = ctm->length;
1689 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1691 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1692 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1693 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1694 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1696 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1697 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1698 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1699 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1700 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1707 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1708 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1709 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1710 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1718 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1729 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1730 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1731 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1733 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1736 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1737 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1746 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1755 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1757 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1760 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1761 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1763 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1764 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1768 atm.type = ctm->type;
1770 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1771 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1773 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1776 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1777 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1779 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1780 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1789 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1790 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1796 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1798 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1801 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1803 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1806 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1807 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1816 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1817 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1818 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1819 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1820 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1822 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1825 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1827 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1830 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1833 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1834 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1836 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1837 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1840 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1844 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1845 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1849 /* first, populate the other certs */
1850 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1851 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1852 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1856 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1860 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1862 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1863 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1865 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1867 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1868 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1869 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1870 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1873 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1874 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1875 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1878 /* Issuer names must match */
1879 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1880 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1883 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1884 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1885 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1888 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1889 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1892 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1893 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1894 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1897 /* CRLs must verify */
1898 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1899 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1900 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1903 /* Create new CRL */
1904 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1905 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1907 /* Set issuer name */
1908 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1911 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1913 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1916 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1918 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1922 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1923 * number to correct value too.
1926 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
1927 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
1928 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
1929 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
1933 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1935 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
1937 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
1938 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
1939 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
1941 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1942 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1944 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
1945 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
1948 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
1949 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
1954 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
1956 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
1962 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1967 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1969 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
1972 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1974 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
1977 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1982 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1987 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1989 return ctx->error_depth;
1992 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1994 return ctx->current_cert;
1997 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2002 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2006 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2009 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2011 return ctx->current_issuer;
2014 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2016 return ctx->current_crl;
2019 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2024 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2029 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2034 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2037 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2038 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2039 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2041 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2044 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2047 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2048 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2050 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2054 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2055 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2056 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2057 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2058 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2059 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2060 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2064 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2065 int purpose, int trust)
2068 /* If purpose not set use default */
2070 purpose = def_purpose;
2071 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2074 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2076 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2077 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2080 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2081 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2082 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2084 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2085 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2086 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2089 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2090 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2093 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2095 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2097 trust = ptmp->trust;
2100 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2102 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2103 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2108 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2109 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2110 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2111 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2115 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2117 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2120 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2126 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2131 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2135 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2136 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2141 ctx->current_method = 0;
2143 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2145 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2146 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2150 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2151 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2152 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2153 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2154 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2155 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2156 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2160 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2161 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2162 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2165 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2166 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2167 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2171 if (store && store->check_issued)
2172 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2174 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2176 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2177 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2179 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2181 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2182 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2184 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2186 if (store && store->verify)
2187 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2189 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2191 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2192 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2194 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2196 if (store && store->get_crl)
2197 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2199 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2201 if (store && store->check_crl)
2202 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2204 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2206 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2207 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2209 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2211 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2212 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2214 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2216 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2217 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2219 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2221 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2223 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2224 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2225 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2230 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2233 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2235 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2238 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2239 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2242 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2247 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2248 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2250 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2251 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2252 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2255 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2258 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2261 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2265 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2266 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2268 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2273 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2274 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2276 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2278 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2279 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2280 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2283 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2286 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2287 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2288 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2289 * pointers below after they're freed!
2291 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2292 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2294 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2296 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2297 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2298 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2301 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2303 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2305 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2306 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2309 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2311 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2314 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2316 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2319 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2322 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2325 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2326 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2328 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2331 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2333 return ctx->verify_cb;
2336 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2341 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2343 return ctx->untrusted;
2346 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2348 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2351 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2353 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2357 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2358 X509_STORE_CTX_verify verify)
2360 ctx->verify = verify;
2363 X509_STORE_CTX_verify X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2368 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2373 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2375 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2378 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2380 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2383 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2385 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2386 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2389 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2392 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2397 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2399 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2403 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2408 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2411 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2413 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2417 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2420 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2421 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2423 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2424 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2427 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2431 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2432 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2436 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2440 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2442 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2444 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2445 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2446 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2447 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2448 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2449 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2450 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2451 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2452 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2453 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2457 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2460 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2463 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2465 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2466 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2469 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2470 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2471 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2473 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2474 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2477 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2478 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2479 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2480 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2482 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2483 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2484 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2485 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2487 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2488 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2489 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2491 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2492 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2493 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2494 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2495 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2496 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2497 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2499 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2500 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2501 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2502 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2504 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2505 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2506 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2507 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2509 if (t->usage != usage) {
2512 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2513 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2514 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2516 if (t->selector != selector) {
2517 selector = t->selector;
2519 /* Update per-selector state */
2520 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2521 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2525 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2526 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2527 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2528 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2532 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2534 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2535 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2536 * other than "Full".
2538 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2543 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2544 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2546 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2547 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2553 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2561 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2562 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2565 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2566 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2567 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2569 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2570 dane->mdpth = depth;
2572 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2580 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2581 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2585 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2587 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2591 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2592 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2595 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2596 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2597 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2599 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2600 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2601 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2603 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2604 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2607 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2610 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2612 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2614 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2615 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2616 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2619 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2620 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2621 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2622 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2623 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2624 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2627 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2628 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2631 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2632 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2633 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2636 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2637 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2638 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2639 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2641 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2644 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2647 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2650 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2652 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2659 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2661 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2663 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2665 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2668 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2670 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2671 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2678 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2679 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2680 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2681 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2682 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2684 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2685 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2686 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2687 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2689 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2690 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2693 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2696 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2697 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2699 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2700 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2701 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2702 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2706 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2707 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2708 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2713 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2714 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2716 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2720 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2721 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2723 return verify_chain(ctx);
2726 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2727 static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2729 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2733 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2734 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2739 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2741 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2742 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2743 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2744 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2745 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2746 unsigned int search;
2747 int may_trusted = 0;
2748 int may_alternate = 0;
2749 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2750 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2755 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2756 OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
2758 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2759 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2760 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2762 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2763 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2764 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2765 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2766 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2768 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2769 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2770 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2771 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2772 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2778 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2779 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2780 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2782 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2783 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2787 /* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */
2788 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2789 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2790 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2791 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2792 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2799 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2800 * might be reasonable.
2802 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2803 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2806 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2807 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2808 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2810 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2812 while (search != 0) {
2817 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2818 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2819 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2820 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2822 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2823 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2824 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2825 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2826 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2827 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2828 * would be a-priori too long.
2830 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
2831 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2832 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2834 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2835 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2836 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2837 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2838 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2839 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2840 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2841 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2842 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2843 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2845 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2846 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2850 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
2852 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
2855 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2862 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
2863 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
2864 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
2865 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
2866 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
2867 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
2868 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
2869 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
2871 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
2872 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
2873 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
2875 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2876 OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
2877 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
2878 for (; num > i; --num)
2879 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2880 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
2882 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
2883 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
2885 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2888 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
2889 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2894 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
2895 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
2898 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
2900 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2901 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2905 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
2906 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
2908 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
2909 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
2910 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
2911 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
2913 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
2914 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
2919 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
2920 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
2925 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
2926 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
2927 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
2928 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
2930 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
2931 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
2932 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
2933 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
2934 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
2935 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
2938 OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
2939 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
2940 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
2941 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
2942 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
2952 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
2953 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
2954 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
2955 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
2957 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
2958 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
2959 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
2961 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
2962 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
2963 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
2965 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
2966 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
2967 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
2973 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
2975 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
2976 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2977 OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
2978 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
2981 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
2982 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
2984 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
2986 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
2988 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2992 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
2993 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
2995 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
2996 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2997 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3002 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
3003 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3004 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3007 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3009 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3010 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3011 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3017 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3020 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3021 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3023 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3025 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3026 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3027 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3028 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3032 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3034 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3035 /* Callback already issued */
3037 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3039 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3041 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3042 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3043 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3044 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3045 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3046 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3047 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3048 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3050 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3051 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3052 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3053 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3054 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3055 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3056 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3060 static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3061 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3064 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3067 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3069 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3071 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3072 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3074 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3080 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3081 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3083 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3087 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3088 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3089 * self-signed or otherwise).
3091 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3093 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3095 int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
3096 int mdnid = NID_undef;
3098 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3102 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3103 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3105 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3106 if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
3109 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
3110 if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
3111 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3114 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];