1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123 unsigned int *preasons,
124 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
154 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
156 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
158 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
161 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
162 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
165 /* Look for exact match */
166 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
168 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
169 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
172 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
173 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
176 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
180 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
182 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
184 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
187 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
188 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
189 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
191 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
197 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
198 * present and that the first entry is in place */
199 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
201 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
202 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
204 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
207 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
208 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
211 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
212 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
213 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
215 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
219 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
220 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
226 /* If we have enough, we break */
227 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
228 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
229 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
233 /* If we are self signed, we break */
234 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
236 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
237 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
239 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
242 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
243 * will be picked up again later.
252 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
253 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
255 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
258 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
260 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
263 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
264 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
265 ctx->last_untrusted++;
268 /* reparse the full chain for
276 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
277 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
278 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
280 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
284 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
285 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
286 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
288 /* we have a self signed certificate */
289 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
291 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
292 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
293 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
295 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
296 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
298 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
300 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
301 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
308 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
309 * so we get any trust settings.
313 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
314 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
319 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
320 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
321 ctx->last_untrusted--;
323 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
327 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
330 /* If we have enough, we break */
331 if (depth < num) break;
333 /* If we are self signed, we break */
334 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
336 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
338 if (ok < 0) return ok;
342 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
345 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
351 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
353 i = check_trust(ctx);
355 /* If explicitly rejected error */
356 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
358 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
359 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
361 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
363 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
364 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
366 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
372 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
374 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
375 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
376 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
380 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
386 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
387 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
391 /* Check name constraints */
393 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
401 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
402 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
404 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
405 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
408 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
411 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
416 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
422 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
423 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
426 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
430 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
431 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
433 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
437 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
438 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
439 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
444 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
446 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
447 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
452 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
455 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
459 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
461 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
462 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
468 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
470 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
473 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
474 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
476 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
477 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
481 ctx->current_cert = x;
482 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
483 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
487 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
489 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
491 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
494 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
502 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
503 * with the supplied purpose
506 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
508 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
511 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
513 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
514 int proxy_path_length = 0;
516 int allow_proxy_certs;
519 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
520 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
521 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
522 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
523 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
524 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
525 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
529 /* CRL path validation */
532 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
533 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
538 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
539 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
541 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
542 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
543 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
546 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
547 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
550 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
551 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
552 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
555 ctx->error_depth = i;
556 ctx->current_cert = x;
560 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
563 ctx->error_depth = i;
564 ctx->current_cert = x;
568 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
572 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
573 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
576 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
585 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
592 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
596 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
604 ctx->error_depth = i;
605 ctx->current_cert = x;
609 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
611 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
613 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
616 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
617 ctx->error_depth = i;
618 ctx->current_cert = x;
623 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
624 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
625 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
626 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
628 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
629 ctx->error_depth = i;
630 ctx->current_cert = x;
634 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
635 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
637 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
638 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
639 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
641 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
643 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
646 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
647 ctx->error_depth = i;
648 ctx->current_cert = x;
664 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
668 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
669 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
671 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
672 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
673 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
675 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
676 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
677 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
678 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
680 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
682 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
685 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
689 ctx->error_depth = i;
690 ctx->current_cert = x;
691 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
700 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
702 ctx->error = errcode;
703 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
704 ctx->error_depth = 0;
705 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
708 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
710 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
712 if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
714 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
717 if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
719 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
722 if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
724 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
730 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
734 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
736 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
737 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
739 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
740 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
741 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
742 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
743 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
744 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
747 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
749 ctx->error_depth = i;
750 ctx->current_cert = x;
751 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
754 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
757 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
758 * certificate return success.
760 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
762 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
763 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
764 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
767 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
768 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
771 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
773 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
774 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
779 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
780 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
782 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
785 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
788 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
790 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
791 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
794 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
799 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
801 ctx->error_depth = i;
802 ok = check_cert(ctx);
808 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
810 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
813 unsigned int last_reasons;
814 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
815 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
816 ctx->current_cert = x;
817 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
818 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
819 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
820 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
822 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
823 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
825 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
827 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
828 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
833 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
834 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
837 ctx->current_crl = crl;
838 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
844 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
847 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
854 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
857 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
866 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
867 * another iteration, so exit loop.
869 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
871 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
872 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
880 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
885 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
887 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
892 ctx->current_crl = crl;
893 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
894 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
898 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
903 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
904 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
912 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
913 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
917 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
919 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
925 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
926 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
929 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
930 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
934 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
935 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
941 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
946 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
947 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
948 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
950 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
951 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
952 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
953 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
954 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
956 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
958 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
960 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
962 if (crl_score > best_score)
965 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
966 best_score = crl_score;
967 best_reasons = reasons;
974 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
976 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
977 *pscore = best_score;
978 *preasons = best_reasons;
979 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
982 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
985 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
988 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
994 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
995 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
998 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1000 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1002 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1005 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1006 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1008 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1013 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1018 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1020 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1032 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1038 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1040 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1042 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1043 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1045 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1046 if (!base->crl_number)
1048 /* Issuer names must match */
1049 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1050 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1052 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1053 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1055 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1057 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1058 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1060 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1061 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1066 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1067 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1070 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1071 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1075 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1077 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1079 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1081 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1082 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1084 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1085 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1086 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1094 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1095 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1096 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1097 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1098 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1101 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1102 unsigned int *preasons,
1103 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1107 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1109 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1111 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1112 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1114 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1115 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1117 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1120 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1122 /* If no new reasons reject */
1123 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1126 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1127 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1129 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1130 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1132 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1136 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1138 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1139 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1142 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1143 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1145 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1146 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1148 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1150 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1153 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1155 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1157 /* If no new reasons reject */
1158 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1160 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1161 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1164 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1170 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1171 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1173 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1174 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1175 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1178 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1181 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1183 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1185 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1187 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1188 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1193 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1195 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1196 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1198 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1200 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1201 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1206 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1208 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1211 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1212 * set of untrusted certificates.
1214 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1216 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1217 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1219 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1221 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1222 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1228 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1229 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1230 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1231 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1235 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1237 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1239 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1242 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1245 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1246 /* Copy verify params across */
1247 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1249 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1250 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1252 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1253 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1258 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1260 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1262 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1266 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1267 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1268 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1269 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1270 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1271 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1274 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1275 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1276 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1278 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1279 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1280 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1281 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1286 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1287 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1288 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1289 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1290 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1294 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1296 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1297 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1298 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1306 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1311 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1316 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1318 gens = b->name.fullname;
1320 else if (b->type == 1)
1324 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1325 gens = a->name.fullname;
1329 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1332 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1334 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1335 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1337 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1343 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1347 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1348 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1350 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1351 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1360 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1363 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1364 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1366 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1369 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1370 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1372 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1378 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1380 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1381 unsigned int *preasons)
1384 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1386 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1388 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1393 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1396 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1397 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1399 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1400 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1403 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1405 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1410 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1415 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1416 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1419 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1420 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1423 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1425 unsigned int reasons;
1426 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1427 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1428 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1429 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1430 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1431 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1436 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1438 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1440 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1444 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1446 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1450 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1453 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1454 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1455 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1464 /* Check CRL validity */
1465 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1467 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1468 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1469 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1470 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1471 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1472 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1473 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1474 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1476 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1477 * is next certificate in chain.
1479 else if (cnum < chnum)
1480 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1483 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1484 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1485 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1487 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1488 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1495 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1498 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1500 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1501 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1502 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1504 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1505 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1509 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1511 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1512 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1516 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1518 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1520 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1521 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1526 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1529 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1536 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1538 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1543 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1544 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1548 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1549 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1555 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1556 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1559 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1563 /* Verify CRL signature */
1564 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1566 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1567 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1576 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1580 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1581 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1585 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1586 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1587 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1588 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1590 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1592 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1594 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1595 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1599 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1600 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1602 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1604 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1606 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1607 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1615 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1620 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1621 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1624 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1627 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1630 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1635 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1637 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1638 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1640 ctx->current_cert = x;
1641 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1642 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1649 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1650 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1651 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1654 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1656 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1657 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1658 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1665 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1670 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1671 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1675 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1678 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1679 ctx->current_cert=x;
1680 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1686 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1687 ctx->current_cert=x;
1688 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1692 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1695 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1696 ctx->current_cert=x;
1697 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1703 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1704 ctx->current_cert=x;
1705 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1712 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1716 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1717 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1721 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1722 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1724 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1726 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1730 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
1731 return check_cert_time(ctx, xi);
1734 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1735 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1743 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1747 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1752 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1753 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1756 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1758 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1760 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1761 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1765 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1767 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1768 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1772 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1776 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1782 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1786 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1787 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1788 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1796 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1804 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1806 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1809 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1814 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1819 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1820 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1822 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1829 if (i < 13) return 0;
1835 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1836 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1841 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1845 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1856 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1858 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1859 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1865 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1866 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1868 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1871 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1873 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1874 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1875 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1878 if (i < j) return -1;
1879 if (i > j) return 1;
1881 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1882 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1888 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1890 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1893 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1895 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1898 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1899 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1903 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1906 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1908 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1909 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1910 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1911 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1914 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1917 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1919 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1922 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1924 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1926 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1929 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1932 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1936 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1946 /* first, populate the other certs */
1947 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1949 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1950 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1951 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1954 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1955 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1959 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1961 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1962 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1964 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1966 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1967 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1968 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1970 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1973 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1974 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1976 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1979 /* Issuer names must match */
1980 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1981 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1983 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1986 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1987 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1989 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1992 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1994 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1997 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1998 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2000 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2003 /* CRLs must verify */
2004 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2005 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2007 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2010 /* Create new CRL */
2011 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2012 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2014 /* Set issuer name */
2015 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2018 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2020 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2023 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2025 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2028 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2029 * CRL number to correct value too.
2032 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2034 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2035 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2036 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2040 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2042 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2044 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2046 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2047 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2048 /* Add only if not also in base.
2049 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2050 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2052 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2054 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2057 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2059 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2064 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2066 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2072 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2078 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2079 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2081 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2082 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2083 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2084 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2087 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2089 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2092 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2094 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2097 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2102 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2107 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2109 return ctx->error_depth;
2112 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2114 return ctx->current_cert;
2117 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2122 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2126 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
2127 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
2128 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
2130 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2131 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
2136 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2138 return ctx->current_issuer;
2141 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2143 return ctx->current_crl;
2146 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2151 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2166 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2168 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2171 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2173 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2176 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2177 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2178 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2179 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2180 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2181 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2182 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2183 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2186 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2187 int purpose, int trust)
2190 /* If purpose not set use default */
2191 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2192 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2196 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2199 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2200 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2203 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2204 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2206 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2209 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2210 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2213 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2215 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2216 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2220 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2223 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2224 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2229 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2230 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2234 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2236 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2237 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2240 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2243 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2247 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2249 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2253 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2254 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2258 ctx->current_method=0;
2260 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2262 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2263 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2267 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2269 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2270 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2271 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2272 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2273 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2277 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2281 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2285 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2291 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2293 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2297 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2298 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2304 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2305 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2309 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2313 if (store && store->check_issued)
2314 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2316 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2318 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2319 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2321 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2323 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2324 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2326 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2328 if (store && store->verify)
2329 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2331 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2333 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2334 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2336 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2338 if (store && store->get_crl)
2339 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2341 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2343 if (store && store->check_crl)
2344 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2346 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2348 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2349 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2351 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2353 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2354 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2356 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2358 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2359 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2361 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2363 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2366 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2367 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2368 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2369 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2370 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2374 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2380 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2381 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2384 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2386 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2387 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2390 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2392 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2393 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2395 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2396 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2399 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2401 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2404 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2406 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2409 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2410 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2413 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2415 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2418 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2420 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2423 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2425 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2428 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2429 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2431 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2434 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2439 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2441 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2444 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2446 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2447 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2450 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2453 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2458 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2461 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2465 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2466 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2468 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2470 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2471 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)