1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
82 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
83 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
84 const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
87 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
93 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
95 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
99 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
101 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
104 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
107 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
108 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
109 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
111 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
117 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
118 * present and that the first entry is in place */
119 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
121 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
122 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
124 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
127 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
128 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
131 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
132 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
133 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
135 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
139 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
140 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
146 /* If we have enough, we break */
147 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
148 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
149 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
153 /* If we are self signed, we break */
154 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
155 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
157 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
158 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
160 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
163 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
168 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
169 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
170 ctx->last_untrusted++;
173 /* reparse the full chain for
181 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
182 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
183 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
185 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
189 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
190 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
191 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
192 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
194 /* we have a self signed certificate */
195 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
197 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
198 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
199 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
201 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
202 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
204 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
206 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
207 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
214 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
215 * so we get any trust settings.
219 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
220 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
225 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
226 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
227 ctx->last_untrusted--;
229 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
233 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
236 /* If we have enough, we break */
237 if (depth < num) break;
239 /* If we are self signed, we break */
240 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
241 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
243 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
245 if (ok < 0) return ok;
249 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
252 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
258 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
259 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
261 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
262 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
264 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
266 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
269 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
275 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
277 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
278 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
279 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
283 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
289 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
290 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
294 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
296 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
300 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
301 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
303 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
304 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
307 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
310 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
311 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
314 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
317 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
318 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
319 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
324 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
326 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
327 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
332 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
335 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
339 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
341 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
342 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
348 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
350 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
353 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
354 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
356 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
357 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
361 ctx->current_cert = x;
362 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
363 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
367 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
369 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
371 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
374 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
382 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
383 * with the supplied purpose
386 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
388 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
391 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
393 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
394 int proxy_path_length = 0;
395 int allow_proxy_certs =
396 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
399 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
400 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
401 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
402 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
403 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
404 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
405 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
409 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
411 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
412 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
414 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
415 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
418 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
419 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
420 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
422 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
423 ctx->error_depth = i;
424 ctx->current_cert = x;
428 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
430 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
431 ctx->error_depth = i;
432 ctx->current_cert = x;
436 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
440 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
441 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
444 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
453 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
460 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
464 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
472 ctx->error_depth = i;
473 ctx->current_cert = x;
477 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
479 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
482 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
485 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
486 ctx->error_depth = i;
487 ctx->current_cert = x;
493 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
494 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
496 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
497 ctx->error_depth = i;
498 ctx->current_cert = x;
502 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
503 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
504 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
506 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
508 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
511 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
512 ctx->error_depth = i;
513 ctx->current_cert = x;
529 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
531 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
536 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
538 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
539 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
540 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
541 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
542 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
544 ctx->error_depth = i;
545 ctx->current_cert = x;
546 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
547 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
549 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
555 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
558 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
560 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
561 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
564 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
566 ctx->error_depth = i;
567 ok = check_cert(ctx);
573 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
575 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
578 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
579 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
580 ctx->current_cert = x;
581 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
582 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
583 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
588 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
589 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
592 ctx->current_crl = crl;
593 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
595 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
597 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
603 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
605 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
609 ctx->current_crl = crl;
610 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
611 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
615 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
618 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
619 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
625 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
626 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
630 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
632 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
636 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
637 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
643 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
644 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
649 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
654 /* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
655 * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
656 * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
657 * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
658 * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
659 * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
661 * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
663 * a. it must be consistent.
664 * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
665 * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
666 * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
667 * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
668 * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
669 * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
672 /* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
673 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
674 /* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
675 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
677 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
679 #define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
681 /* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
683 #define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
685 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
686 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
688 int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
689 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
690 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
693 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
694 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
696 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
697 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
699 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
701 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
703 if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
704 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
707 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
711 if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
712 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
715 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
717 if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
720 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
724 if (crl_score > best_score)
727 best_score = crl_score;
733 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
739 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
741 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
742 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
744 if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
750 /* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
752 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
755 GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
756 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
758 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
760 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
765 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
768 if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
770 if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
774 inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
775 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
777 GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
778 for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
780 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
781 /* We don't handle these at present */
782 if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
784 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
786 dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
787 for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
790 sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
791 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
799 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
800 * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
801 * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
804 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
807 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
808 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
810 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
811 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
818 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
820 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
822 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
833 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
835 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
837 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
847 /* Check CRL validity */
848 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
851 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
852 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
853 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
854 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
855 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
856 * is next certificate in chain.
859 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
862 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
863 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
864 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
866 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
867 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
874 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
875 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
876 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
878 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
879 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
883 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
885 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
887 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
888 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
891 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
893 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
894 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
897 if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
899 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
900 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
905 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
906 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
910 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
911 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
916 /* Verify CRL signature */
917 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
919 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
920 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
926 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
937 /* Check certificate against CRL */
938 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
941 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
942 * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
943 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
945 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
947 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
948 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
953 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
955 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
957 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
958 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
966 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
969 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
970 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
973 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
976 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
979 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
984 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
986 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
987 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
989 ctx->current_cert = x;
990 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
991 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
997 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
998 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
999 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1002 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1004 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1005 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1006 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1013 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1018 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1019 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1023 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1026 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1027 ctx->current_cert=x;
1028 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1034 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1035 ctx->current_cert=x;
1036 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1040 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1043 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1044 ctx->current_cert=x;
1045 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1051 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1052 ctx->current_cert=x;
1053 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1060 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1064 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1065 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1069 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1070 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1072 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1074 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1080 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1081 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1089 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1093 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1099 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1101 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1102 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1106 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1107 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1108 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1109 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1110 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1111 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1112 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1113 * been declared trusted. */
1115 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1116 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1120 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1124 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1130 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1134 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1135 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1136 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1144 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1152 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1154 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1157 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1162 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1167 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1168 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1170 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1177 if (i < 13) return 0;
1183 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1184 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1189 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1193 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1204 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1206 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1207 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1212 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1213 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1215 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1218 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1220 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1221 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1222 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1225 if (i < j) return -1;
1226 if (i > j) return 1;
1228 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1229 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1235 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1237 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1240 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1245 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1249 if (s) type = s->type;
1250 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1251 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1252 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1255 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1257 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1260 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1262 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1264 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1267 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1270 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1274 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1280 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1284 /* first, populate the other certs */
1285 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1287 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1288 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1289 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1292 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1293 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1297 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1298 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1300 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1301 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1302 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1303 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1306 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1308 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1311 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1313 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1316 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1321 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1326 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1328 return ctx->error_depth;
1331 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1333 return ctx->current_cert;
1336 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1341 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1345 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1346 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1347 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1349 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1350 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1355 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1360 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1365 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1370 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1372 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1375 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1377 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1380 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1381 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1382 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1383 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1384 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1385 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1386 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1387 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1390 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1391 int purpose, int trust)
1394 /* If purpose not set use default */
1395 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1396 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1400 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1403 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1404 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1407 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1408 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1410 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1413 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1414 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1417 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1419 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1420 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1424 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1427 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1428 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1433 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1434 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1438 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1440 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1441 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1444 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1447 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1451 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1453 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1457 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1458 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1462 ctx->current_method=0;
1464 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1466 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1467 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1471 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1473 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1474 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1477 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1481 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1485 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1491 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1493 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1497 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1498 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1504 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1505 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1509 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1513 if (store && store->check_issued)
1514 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1516 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1518 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1519 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1521 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1523 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1524 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1526 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1528 if (store && store->verify)
1529 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1531 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1533 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1534 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1536 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1538 if (store && store->get_crl)
1539 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1541 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1543 if (store && store->check_crl)
1544 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1546 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1548 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1549 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1551 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1553 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
1554 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
1556 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
1558 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
1559 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
1561 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
1563 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1566 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1567 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1568 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1569 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1570 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1574 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1580 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1581 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1584 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1586 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1587 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1590 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1592 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1593 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1595 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1596 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1598 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1601 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1602 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1605 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1607 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1610 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1612 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1615 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1617 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1620 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1621 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1623 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1626 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1631 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1633 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1636 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1638 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1639 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1642 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1645 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1650 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1653 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1657 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1658 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1660 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1662 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1663 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)