1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
128 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
129 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
150 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
153 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
154 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
156 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
157 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
163 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
165 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
167 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
170 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
171 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
174 /* Look for exact match */
175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
176 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
177 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
180 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
181 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
184 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
188 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
190 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
192 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
193 int depth, i, ok = 0;
195 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
196 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
197 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
200 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
202 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
205 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
207 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
208 * cannot do another one.
210 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
211 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
218 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
219 * the first entry is in place
221 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
222 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
223 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
224 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
228 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
229 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
231 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
232 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
233 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
234 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
235 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
240 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
241 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
242 depth = param->depth;
245 /* If we have enough, we break */
247 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
248 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
249 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
252 /* If we are self signed, we break */
253 if (cert_self_signed(x))
256 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
258 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
259 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
261 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
265 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
274 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
275 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
276 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
278 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
279 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
280 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
284 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
285 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
286 ctx->last_untrusted++;
290 * reparse the full chain for the next one
298 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
301 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
302 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
308 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
310 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
311 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
312 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
313 /* we have a self signed certificate */
314 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
316 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
317 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
318 * possible impersonation.
320 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
321 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
322 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
323 ctx->current_cert = x;
324 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
333 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
334 * version so we get any trust settings.
338 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
339 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
343 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
345 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
346 ctx->last_untrusted--;
349 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
352 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
354 /* If we have enough, we break */
357 /* If we are self signed, we break */
358 if (cert_self_signed(x))
360 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
363 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
369 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
371 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
372 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
379 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
380 if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
381 /* Callback already issued */
387 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
388 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
389 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
393 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
394 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
395 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
397 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
398 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
400 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
403 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
406 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
411 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
415 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
419 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
428 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
429 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
430 * and set bad_chain == 1
432 if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
433 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
434 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
435 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
437 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
438 ctx->current_cert = x;
441 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
443 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
444 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
449 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
456 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
457 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
462 /* Check name constraints */
464 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
474 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
475 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
478 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
479 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
482 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
486 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
488 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
490 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
496 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
497 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
498 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
500 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
505 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
506 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
509 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
514 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
515 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
516 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
521 /* Ensure we return an error */
524 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
528 if (chain_ss != NULL)
531 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
532 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
538 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
541 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
545 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
546 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
547 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
553 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
555 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
558 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
559 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
561 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
562 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
566 ctx->current_cert = x;
567 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
568 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
571 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
573 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
575 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
577 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
584 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
588 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
590 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
593 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
595 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
596 int proxy_path_length = 0;
598 int allow_proxy_certs;
602 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
603 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
604 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
605 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
606 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
607 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
608 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
612 /* CRL path validation */
614 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
615 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
618 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
620 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
623 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
624 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
625 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
628 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
629 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
631 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
632 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
633 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
635 ctx->error_depth = i;
636 ctx->current_cert = x;
641 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
642 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
643 ctx->error_depth = i;
644 ctx->current_cert = x;
649 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
650 switch (must_be_ca) {
652 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
653 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
655 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
668 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
677 ctx->error_depth = i;
678 ctx->current_cert = x;
683 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
684 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
686 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
688 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
689 ctx->error_depth = i;
690 ctx->current_cert = x;
696 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
697 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
698 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
699 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
707 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
708 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
711 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
712 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
713 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
715 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
717 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
718 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
719 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
720 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
722 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
723 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
724 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
725 * increment proxy_path_length.
727 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
728 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
730 ctx->error_depth = i;
731 ctx->current_cert = x;
736 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
749 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
753 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
754 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
755 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
756 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
757 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
761 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
762 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
764 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
766 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
767 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
768 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
769 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
770 int last_object_nid = 0;
772 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
774 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
775 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
776 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
777 goto proxy_name_done;
781 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
782 * there is in issuer.
784 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
785 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
786 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
787 goto proxy_name_done;
791 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
794 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set
795 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) {
796 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
797 goto proxy_name_done;
801 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
802 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
804 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
805 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
806 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
807 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
812 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
814 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
816 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
817 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
818 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
821 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
822 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
825 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
827 ctx->error_depth = i;
828 ctx->current_cert = x;
829 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
835 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
836 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
837 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
840 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
841 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
843 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
847 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
852 ctx->error_depth = i;
853 ctx->current_cert = x;
854 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
864 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
866 ctx->error = errcode;
867 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
868 ctx->error_depth = 0;
869 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
872 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
875 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
878 if (id->peername != NULL) {
879 OPENSSL_free(id->peername);
882 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
883 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
884 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
890 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
892 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
893 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
895 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
896 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
899 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
900 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
903 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
904 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
910 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
914 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
916 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
917 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
918 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
919 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
920 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
921 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
922 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
924 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
927 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
928 ctx->error_depth = i;
929 ctx->current_cert = x;
930 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
933 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
937 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
940 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
942 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
943 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
944 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
945 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
947 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
949 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
950 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
955 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
956 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
958 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
961 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
964 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
966 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
967 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
969 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
974 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
975 ctx->error_depth = i;
976 ok = check_cert(ctx);
983 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
985 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
988 unsigned int last_reasons;
989 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
990 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
991 ctx->current_cert = x;
992 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
993 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
994 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
995 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
996 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
997 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
999 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
1001 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
1003 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
1006 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1007 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1010 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1011 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
1016 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
1019 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
1025 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
1027 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
1033 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1037 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
1040 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
1041 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
1042 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1048 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
1050 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1055 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1057 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
1062 ctx->current_crl = crl;
1063 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1064 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1068 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
1072 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
1073 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1080 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
1081 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1085 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
1086 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
1091 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
1092 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1095 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1096 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1099 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
1100 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1106 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1111 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1112 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1113 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1115 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1116 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1117 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1118 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1119 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1121 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1122 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1123 reasons = *preasons;
1124 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1125 if (crl_score < best_score)
1127 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1128 if (crl_score == best_score) {
1130 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1131 X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1134 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1137 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1141 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1142 best_score = crl_score;
1143 best_reasons = reasons;
1148 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1150 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1151 *pscore = best_score;
1152 *preasons = best_reasons;
1153 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1155 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1158 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1161 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1168 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1169 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1172 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1174 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1176 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1178 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1179 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1181 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1185 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1189 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1191 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1201 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1207 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1209 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1211 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1212 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1214 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1215 if (!base->crl_number)
1217 /* Issuer names must match */
1218 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1220 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1221 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1223 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1225 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1226 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1228 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1229 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1235 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1236 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1239 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1240 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1244 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1246 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1248 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1249 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1250 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1251 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1252 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1253 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1262 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1263 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1264 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1265 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1266 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1269 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1270 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1274 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1276 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1278 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1279 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1281 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1282 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1283 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1285 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1286 /* If no new reasons reject */
1287 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1290 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1291 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1293 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1294 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1295 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1298 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1300 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1301 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1304 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1305 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1307 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1308 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1310 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1312 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1315 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1317 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1318 /* If no new reasons reject */
1319 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1321 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1322 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1325 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1331 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1332 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1334 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1335 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1336 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1339 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1342 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1344 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1345 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1346 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1347 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1352 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1353 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1354 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1356 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1357 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1358 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1363 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1365 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1369 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1370 * untrusted certificates.
1372 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1373 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1374 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1376 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1377 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1378 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1385 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1386 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1387 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1388 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1391 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1393 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1395 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1398 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1401 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1402 /* Copy verify params across */
1403 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1405 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1406 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1408 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1409 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1414 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1416 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1418 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1423 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1424 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1425 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1426 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1427 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1431 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1432 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1433 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1435 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1436 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1437 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1438 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1444 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1445 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1446 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1447 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1448 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1451 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1453 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1454 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1455 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1462 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1466 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1471 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1473 gens = b->name.fullname;
1474 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1477 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1478 gens = a->name.fullname;
1482 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1484 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1485 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1486 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1488 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1494 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1496 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1497 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1498 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1499 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1500 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1509 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1512 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1513 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1515 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1516 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1517 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1518 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1520 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1526 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1528 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1529 unsigned int *preasons)
1532 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1534 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1535 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1538 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1541 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1542 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1543 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1544 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1545 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1546 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1551 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1552 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1558 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1559 * to find a delta CRL too
1562 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1563 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1566 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1568 unsigned int reasons;
1569 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1570 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1571 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1572 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1573 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1574 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1579 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1581 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1583 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1587 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1589 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1593 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1595 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1596 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1597 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1606 /* Check CRL validity */
1607 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1609 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1610 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1611 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1612 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1613 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1614 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1615 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1616 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1619 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1620 * certificate in chain.
1622 else if (cnum < chnum)
1623 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1625 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1626 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1627 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1628 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1629 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1637 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1639 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1640 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1641 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1642 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1644 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1649 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1650 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1651 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1656 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1657 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1658 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1659 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1665 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1666 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1667 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1674 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1675 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1680 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1681 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1684 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1685 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1690 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1691 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1693 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1697 /* Verify CRL signature */
1698 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1699 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1700 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1710 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1714 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1715 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1720 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1721 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1722 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1723 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1725 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1726 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1727 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1728 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1733 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1734 * is not removeFromCRL.
1736 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1737 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1739 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1740 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1748 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1753 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1754 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1756 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1757 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1760 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1763 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1767 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1768 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1769 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1771 ctx->current_cert = x;
1772 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1773 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1779 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1780 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1781 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1784 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1785 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1787 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1788 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1789 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1790 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1792 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1799 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1804 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1805 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1809 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1811 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1812 ctx->current_cert = x;
1813 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1818 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1819 ctx->current_cert = x;
1820 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1824 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1826 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1827 ctx->current_cert = x;
1828 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1833 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1834 ctx->current_cert = x;
1835 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1842 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1846 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1847 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1849 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1851 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1852 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1854 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1856 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1859 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1864 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1865 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1870 ctx->error_depth = n;
1871 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1875 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1877 ctx->error_depth = n;
1880 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1881 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1886 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1887 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1888 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1889 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1890 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1893 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1894 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1895 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1896 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1898 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1902 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1909 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1913 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1914 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1915 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1916 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1923 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1931 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1933 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1936 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1941 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1942 int i, j, remaining;
1945 remaining = ctm->length;
1946 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1948 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1949 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1950 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1951 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1953 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1954 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1955 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1956 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1957 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1964 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1965 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1966 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1967 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1975 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1986 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1987 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1988 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1990 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1993 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1994 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
2003 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
2012 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
2014 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
2017 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
2018 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
2020 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
2021 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
2025 atm.type = ctm->type;
2027 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
2028 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
2030 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
2033 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
2034 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
2036 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
2037 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
2046 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
2047 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
2053 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
2055 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
2058 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2060 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
2063 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
2064 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
2073 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
2074 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
2075 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2076 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
2077 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2079 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
2082 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2084 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
2087 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
2090 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2091 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
2093 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2094 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
2097 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
2100 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2105 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
2106 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2110 /* first, populate the other certs */
2111 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
2112 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
2113 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
2114 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2118 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
2119 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2123 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2125 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2126 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2128 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2130 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2131 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2132 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
2133 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2136 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2137 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
2138 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2141 /* Issuer names must match */
2142 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
2143 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2146 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2147 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2148 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2151 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2152 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2155 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2156 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2157 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2160 /* CRLs must verify */
2161 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2162 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2163 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2166 /* Create new CRL */
2167 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2168 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2170 /* Set issuer name */
2171 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2174 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2176 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2179 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2181 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2185 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2186 * number to correct value too.
2189 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2190 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2191 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2192 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2196 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2198 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2200 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2201 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2202 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2204 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2205 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2207 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2208 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2211 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2212 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2217 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2219 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2225 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2231 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2232 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2233 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2234 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2237 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2238 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2240 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2241 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2244 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2246 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2249 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2251 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2254 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2259 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2264 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2266 return ctx->error_depth;
2269 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2271 return ctx->current_cert;
2274 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2279 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2283 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2286 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2288 return ctx->current_issuer;
2291 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2293 return ctx->current_crl;
2296 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2301 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2306 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2308 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2311 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2316 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2318 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2321 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2323 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2327 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2328 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2329 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2330 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2331 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2332 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2333 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2337 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2338 int purpose, int trust)
2341 /* If purpose not set use default */
2343 purpose = def_purpose;
2344 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2347 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2349 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2350 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2353 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2354 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2355 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2357 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2358 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2361 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2363 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2365 trust = ptmp->trust;
2368 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2370 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2371 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2376 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2377 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2378 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2379 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2383 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2385 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2386 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2388 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2391 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2395 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2399 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2403 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2404 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2408 ctx->current_method = 0;
2410 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2412 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2413 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2417 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2418 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2419 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2420 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2421 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2422 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2423 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2426 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2427 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2429 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2431 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2436 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2439 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2441 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2444 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2445 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
2446 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2451 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2452 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2455 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2459 if (store && store->check_issued)
2460 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2462 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2464 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2465 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2467 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2469 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2470 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2472 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2474 if (store && store->verify)
2475 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2477 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2479 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2480 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2482 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2484 if (store && store->get_crl)
2485 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2487 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2489 if (store && store->check_crl)
2490 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2492 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2494 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2495 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2497 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2499 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2500 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2502 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2504 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2505 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2507 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2509 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2511 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2514 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2518 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2519 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2521 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2526 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2527 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2530 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2532 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2533 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2536 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2539 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2540 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2541 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2542 * pointers below after they're freed!
2544 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2545 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2547 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2549 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2550 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2551 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2554 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2555 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2558 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2559 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2562 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2563 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2566 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2568 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2571 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2573 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2576 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2579 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2582 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2583 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2585 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2588 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2593 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2595 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2598 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2600 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2601 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2604 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2607 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2612 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2615 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2619 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2621 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2623 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2625 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2627 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)