1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons,
125 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
129 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
131 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
157 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
158 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
168 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
171 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
175 /* Look for exact match */
176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
178 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
179 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
182 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
183 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
186 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
190 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
192 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
194 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
197 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
198 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
199 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
201 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
207 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
208 * present and that the first entry is in place */
209 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
211 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
212 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
214 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
217 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
218 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
221 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
222 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
223 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
225 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
229 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
230 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
236 /* If we have enough, we break */
237 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
238 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
239 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
243 /* If we are self signed, we break */
244 if (cert_self_signed(x))
246 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
247 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
249 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
252 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
253 * will be picked up again later.
262 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
263 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
265 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
268 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
270 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
273 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
274 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
275 ctx->last_untrusted++;
278 /* reparse the full chain for
286 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
287 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
288 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
290 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
294 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
295 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
296 if (cert_self_signed(x))
298 /* we have a self signed certificate */
299 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
301 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
302 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
303 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
305 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
306 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
308 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
310 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
311 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
318 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
319 * so we get any trust settings.
323 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
324 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
329 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
330 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
331 ctx->last_untrusted--;
333 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
337 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
340 /* If we have enough, we break */
341 if (depth < num) break;
343 /* If we are self signed, we break */
344 if (cert_self_signed(x))
347 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
349 if (ok < 0) return ok;
353 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
356 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
362 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
364 i = check_trust(ctx);
366 /* If explicitly rejected error */
367 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
369 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
370 * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
371 * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
373 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
375 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
377 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
378 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
380 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
386 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
388 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
389 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
390 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
394 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
400 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
401 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
405 /* Check name constraints */
407 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
415 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
416 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
418 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
419 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
422 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
425 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
430 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
436 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
437 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
440 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
444 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
445 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
447 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
451 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
452 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
453 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
458 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
460 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
461 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
466 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
469 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
473 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
475 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
476 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
482 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
484 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
487 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
488 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
490 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
491 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
495 ctx->current_cert = x;
496 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
497 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
500 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
502 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
504 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
507 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
515 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
516 * with the supplied purpose
519 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
524 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
526 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
527 int proxy_path_length = 0;
529 int allow_proxy_certs;
532 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
533 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
534 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
535 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
536 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
537 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
538 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
542 /* CRL path validation */
545 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
546 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
551 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
552 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
554 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
555 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
556 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
559 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
560 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
563 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
564 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
565 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
567 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
568 ctx->error_depth = i;
569 ctx->current_cert = x;
573 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
575 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
576 ctx->error_depth = i;
577 ctx->current_cert = x;
581 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
585 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
586 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
589 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
598 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
605 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
609 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
617 ctx->error_depth = i;
618 ctx->current_cert = x;
622 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
624 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
626 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
629 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
630 ctx->error_depth = i;
631 ctx->current_cert = x;
636 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
637 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
638 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
639 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
641 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
642 ctx->error_depth = i;
643 ctx->current_cert = x;
647 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
648 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
650 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
651 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
652 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
654 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
656 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
659 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
660 ctx->error_depth = i;
661 ctx->current_cert = x;
677 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
681 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
682 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
684 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
685 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
686 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
688 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
689 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
690 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
691 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
693 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
695 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
698 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
702 ctx->error_depth = i;
703 ctx->current_cert = x;
704 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
713 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
715 ctx->error = errcode;
716 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
717 ctx->error_depth = 0;
718 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
721 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
724 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
727 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
729 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
730 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags,
737 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
739 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
740 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
742 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
744 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
747 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
749 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
752 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
754 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
760 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
764 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
766 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
767 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
769 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
770 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
771 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
772 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
773 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
774 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
777 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
779 ctx->error_depth = i;
780 ctx->current_cert = x;
781 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
784 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
787 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
788 * certificate return success.
790 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
793 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
794 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
795 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
796 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
799 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
801 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
802 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
806 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
807 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
809 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
812 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
815 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
817 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
818 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
821 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
826 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
828 ctx->error_depth = i;
829 ok = check_cert(ctx);
835 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
837 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
840 unsigned int last_reasons;
841 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
842 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
843 ctx->current_cert = x;
844 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
845 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
846 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
847 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
849 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
850 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
852 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
854 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
855 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
860 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
861 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
864 ctx->current_crl = crl;
865 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
871 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
874 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
881 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
884 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
893 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
894 * another iteration, so exit loop.
896 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
898 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
899 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
907 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
912 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
914 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
919 ctx->current_crl = crl;
920 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
921 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
925 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
930 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
931 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
939 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
940 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
944 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
946 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
952 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
953 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
956 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
957 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
961 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
962 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
968 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
973 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
974 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
975 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
977 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
978 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
979 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
980 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
981 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
983 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
985 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
987 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
989 if (crl_score > best_score)
992 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
993 best_score = crl_score;
994 best_reasons = reasons;
1001 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1003 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1004 *pscore = best_score;
1005 *preasons = best_reasons;
1006 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1009 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1012 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1015 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1021 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1022 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1025 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1027 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1029 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1032 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1033 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1035 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1040 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1045 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1047 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1059 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1065 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1067 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1069 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1070 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1072 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1073 if (!base->crl_number)
1075 /* Issuer names must match */
1076 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1077 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1079 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1080 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1082 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1084 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1085 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1087 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1088 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1093 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1094 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1097 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1098 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1102 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1104 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1106 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1108 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1109 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1111 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1112 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1113 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1121 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1122 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1123 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1124 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1125 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1128 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1129 unsigned int *preasons,
1130 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1134 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1136 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1138 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1139 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1141 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1142 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1144 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1147 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1149 /* If no new reasons reject */
1150 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1153 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1154 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1156 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1157 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1159 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1163 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1165 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1166 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1169 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1170 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1172 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1173 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1175 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1177 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1180 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1182 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1184 /* If no new reasons reject */
1185 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1187 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1188 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1191 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1197 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1198 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1200 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1201 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1202 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1205 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1208 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1210 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1212 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1214 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1215 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1220 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1222 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1223 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1225 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1227 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1228 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1233 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1235 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1238 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1239 * set of untrusted certificates.
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1243 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1244 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1246 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1248 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1249 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1255 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1256 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1257 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1258 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1262 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1264 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1266 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1269 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1272 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1273 /* Copy verify params across */
1274 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1276 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1277 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1279 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1280 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1285 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1287 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1289 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1293 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1294 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1295 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1296 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1297 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1298 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1301 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1302 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1303 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1305 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1306 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1307 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1308 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1313 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1314 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1315 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1316 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1317 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1321 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1323 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1324 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1325 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1333 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1338 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1343 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1345 gens = b->name.fullname;
1347 else if (b->type == 1)
1351 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1352 gens = a->name.fullname;
1356 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1359 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1361 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1362 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1364 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1370 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1372 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1374 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1375 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1377 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1378 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1387 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1390 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1391 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1393 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1394 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1396 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1397 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1399 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1405 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1407 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1408 unsigned int *preasons)
1411 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1413 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1415 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1420 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1423 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1424 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1426 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1427 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1430 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1432 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1437 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1442 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1443 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1446 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1447 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1450 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1452 unsigned int reasons;
1453 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1454 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1455 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1456 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1457 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1458 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1463 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1465 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1467 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1471 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1473 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1477 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1480 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1481 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1482 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1491 /* Check CRL validity */
1492 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1494 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1495 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1496 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1497 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1498 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1499 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1500 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1501 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1503 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1504 * is next certificate in chain.
1506 else if (cnum < chnum)
1507 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1510 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1511 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1512 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1514 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1515 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1522 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1525 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1527 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1528 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1529 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1531 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1532 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1536 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1538 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1539 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1543 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1545 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1547 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1548 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1553 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1556 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1563 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1565 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1570 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1571 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1575 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1576 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1582 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1583 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1586 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1590 /* Verify CRL signature */
1591 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1593 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1594 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1603 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1607 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1608 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1612 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1613 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1614 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1615 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1617 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1618 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1620 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1621 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1625 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1626 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1628 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1630 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1632 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1633 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1641 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1646 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1647 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1650 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1653 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1656 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1661 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1663 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1664 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1666 ctx->current_cert = x;
1667 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1668 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1675 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1676 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1677 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1680 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1682 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1683 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1684 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1691 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1696 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1697 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1701 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1704 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1705 ctx->current_cert=x;
1706 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1712 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1713 ctx->current_cert=x;
1714 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1718 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1721 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1722 ctx->current_cert=x;
1723 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1729 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1730 ctx->current_cert=x;
1731 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1738 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1742 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1743 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1747 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1748 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1750 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1752 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1756 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
1763 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1764 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1772 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1776 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1781 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1782 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1785 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1787 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1789 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1790 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1794 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1796 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1797 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1801 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1805 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1812 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1816 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1817 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1818 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1826 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1834 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1836 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1839 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1844 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1849 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1850 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1852 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1859 if (i < 13) return 0;
1865 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1866 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1871 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1875 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1886 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1888 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1889 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1895 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1896 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1898 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1901 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1903 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1904 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1905 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1908 if (i < j) return -1;
1909 if (i > j) return 1;
1911 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1912 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1918 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1920 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1923 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1925 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1928 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1929 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1933 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1936 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1938 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1939 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1940 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1941 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1944 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1947 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1949 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1952 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1954 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1956 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1959 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1962 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1966 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1972 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1976 /* first, populate the other certs */
1977 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1979 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1980 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1981 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1984 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1985 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1989 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1991 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1992 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1994 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1996 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1997 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1998 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
2000 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2003 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2004 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
2006 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2009 /* Issuer names must match */
2010 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
2011 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2013 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2016 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2017 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
2019 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2022 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
2024 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2027 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2028 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2030 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2033 /* CRLs must verify */
2034 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2035 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2037 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2040 /* Create new CRL */
2041 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2042 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2044 /* Set issuer name */
2045 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2048 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2050 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2053 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2055 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2058 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2059 * CRL number to correct value too.
2062 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2064 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2065 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2066 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2070 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2072 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2074 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2076 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2077 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2078 /* Add only if not also in base.
2079 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2080 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2082 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2084 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2087 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2089 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2094 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2096 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2102 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2108 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2109 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2111 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2112 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2113 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2114 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2117 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2119 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2122 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2124 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2127 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2132 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2137 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139 return ctx->error_depth;
2142 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144 return ctx->current_cert;
2147 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2152 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2156 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2159 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2161 return ctx->current_issuer;
2164 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2166 return ctx->current_crl;
2169 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2174 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2179 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2184 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2189 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2191 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2194 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2196 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2199 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2200 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2201 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2202 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2203 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2204 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2205 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2206 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2209 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2210 int purpose, int trust)
2213 /* If purpose not set use default */
2214 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2215 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2219 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2222 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2223 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2226 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2227 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2229 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2232 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2233 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2236 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2238 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2239 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2243 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2246 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2247 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2252 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2253 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2257 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2259 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2260 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2263 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2266 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2270 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2272 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2276 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2277 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2281 ctx->current_method=0;
2283 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2285 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2286 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2290 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2292 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2293 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2294 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2295 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2296 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2300 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2304 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2308 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2314 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2316 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2320 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2321 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2327 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2328 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2332 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2336 if (store && store->check_issued)
2337 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2339 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2341 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2342 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2344 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2346 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2347 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2349 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2351 if (store && store->verify)
2352 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2354 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2356 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2357 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2359 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2361 if (store && store->get_crl)
2362 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2364 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2366 if (store && store->check_crl)
2367 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2369 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2371 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2372 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2374 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2376 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2377 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2379 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2381 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2382 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2384 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2386 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2389 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2390 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2391 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2392 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2393 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2397 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2403 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2404 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2407 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2409 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2410 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2413 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2415 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2416 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2418 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2419 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2422 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2424 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2427 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2429 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2432 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2433 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2436 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2438 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2441 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2443 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2446 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2448 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2451 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2452 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2454 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2457 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2462 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2464 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2467 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2469 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2470 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2473 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2476 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2481 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2484 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2488 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2489 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2491 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2493 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2494 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)