2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
16 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
17 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include <internal/dane.h>
25 #include <internal/x509_int.h>
28 /* CRL score values */
30 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
32 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
34 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
40 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
42 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
44 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
46 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
54 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
58 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
62 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
66 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
84 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
85 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
86 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
87 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
88 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
89 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
91 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
93 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
94 unsigned int *preasons);
95 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
96 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
97 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
98 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
100 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
102 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
107 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
115 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
116 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
122 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
124 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
126 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
135 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
139 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
158 ctx->error_depth = depth;
159 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
160 if (err != X509_V_OK)
162 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
175 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
178 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
181 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
183 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
186 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
187 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
207 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
217 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
219 (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
220 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
221 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
222 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
225 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
227 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
228 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
232 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
233 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
238 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
239 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
241 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
245 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
246 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
247 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
251 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
253 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
256 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
258 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
262 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
264 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
265 * cannot do another one.
267 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
268 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
273 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
274 * the first entry is in place
276 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
277 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
278 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
279 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
282 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
283 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
285 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
286 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
287 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
290 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
291 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
293 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
296 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
297 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
298 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
300 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
301 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
306 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
308 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
312 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
313 X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
315 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
317 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
323 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
325 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
329 return cert_self_signed(x);
330 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
331 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
334 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
335 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
337 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
338 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
339 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
340 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
346 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
349 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
351 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
353 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
355 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
361 static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
363 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
366 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
367 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
368 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
370 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
371 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
372 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
382 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
383 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
385 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
388 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
391 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
392 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
394 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
395 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
396 * ctx->param->purpose!
398 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
399 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
400 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
401 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
402 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
404 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
405 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
408 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
409 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
412 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
414 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
417 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
423 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
429 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
433 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
437 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
439 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
441 int proxy_path_length = 0;
443 int allow_proxy_certs;
444 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
447 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
448 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
449 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
450 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
451 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
452 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
453 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
457 /* CRL path validation */
459 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
460 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
463 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
464 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
467 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
469 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
470 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
471 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
472 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
473 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
476 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
477 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
478 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
481 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
482 switch (must_be_ca) {
484 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
485 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
487 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
494 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
499 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
501 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
504 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
509 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
511 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
512 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
514 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
515 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
516 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
517 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
518 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
521 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
522 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
525 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
526 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
527 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
529 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
531 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
532 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
533 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
534 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
536 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
537 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
538 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
539 * increment proxy_path_length.
541 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
542 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
543 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
544 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
547 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
557 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
561 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
562 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
563 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
566 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
567 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
571 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
572 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
574 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
576 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
577 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
578 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
579 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
580 int last_object_nid = 0;
582 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
584 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
585 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
586 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
587 goto proxy_name_done;
591 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
592 * there is in issuer.
594 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
595 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
596 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
597 goto proxy_name_done;
601 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
604 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
606 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
607 last_object_loc - 1))) {
608 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
609 goto proxy_name_done;
613 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
614 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
616 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
617 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
618 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
619 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
624 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
626 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
628 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
629 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
630 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
633 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
634 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
638 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
643 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
644 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
645 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
648 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
649 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
652 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
654 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
655 if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0)
656 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
661 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
664 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
674 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
676 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
679 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
682 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
685 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
686 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
687 vpm->peername = NULL;
689 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
690 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
691 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
697 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
699 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
701 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
702 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
705 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
706 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
709 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
710 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
716 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
721 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
722 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
726 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
727 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
729 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
730 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
731 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
732 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
738 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
739 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
740 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
741 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
743 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
744 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
745 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
746 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
747 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
749 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
754 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
755 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
757 if (num_untrusted < num) {
758 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
760 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
763 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
765 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
766 * for a direct trust store match.
769 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
770 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
772 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
775 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
776 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
778 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
779 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
784 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
785 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
787 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
792 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
793 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
795 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
798 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
799 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
800 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
803 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
804 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
806 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
807 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
808 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
809 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
810 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
813 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
815 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
816 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
818 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
819 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
821 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
826 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
827 ctx->error_depth = i;
828 ok = check_cert(ctx);
835 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
837 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
839 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
840 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
842 ctx->current_cert = x;
843 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
844 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
845 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
847 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
850 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
851 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
853 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
855 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
857 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
859 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
862 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
865 ctx->current_crl = crl;
866 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
871 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
874 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
880 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
882 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
892 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
895 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
896 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
904 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
908 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
910 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
916 ctx->current_crl = crl;
917 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
918 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
919 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
924 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
928 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
935 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
939 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
940 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
945 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
948 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
949 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
952 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
958 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
963 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
964 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
965 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
967 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
968 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
969 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
970 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
971 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
973 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
974 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
976 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
977 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
979 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
980 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
982 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
983 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
986 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
989 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
993 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
994 best_score = crl_score;
995 best_reasons = reasons;
999 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1001 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1002 *pscore = best_score;
1003 *preasons = best_reasons;
1004 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1005 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1007 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1010 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1017 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1018 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1021 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1023 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1025 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1027 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1028 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1030 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1034 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1038 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1040 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1050 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1056 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1058 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1060 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1061 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1063 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1064 if (!base->crl_number)
1066 /* Issuer names must match */
1067 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1069 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1070 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1072 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1074 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1075 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1077 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1078 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1084 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1085 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1088 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1089 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1093 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1095 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1097 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1098 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1099 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1100 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1101 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1102 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1111 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1112 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1113 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1114 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1115 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1118 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1119 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1123 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1125 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1127 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1128 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1130 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1131 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1132 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1134 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1135 /* If no new reasons reject */
1136 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1139 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1140 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1142 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1143 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1144 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1147 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1149 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1150 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1153 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1154 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1156 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1157 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1159 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1161 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1164 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1166 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1167 /* If no new reasons reject */
1168 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1170 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1171 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1174 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1180 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1181 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1183 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1184 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1185 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1188 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1191 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1193 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1194 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1195 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1196 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1201 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1202 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1203 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1205 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1206 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1207 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1212 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1214 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1218 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1219 * untrusted certificates.
1221 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1222 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1223 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1225 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1226 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1227 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1234 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1235 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1236 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1237 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1240 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1242 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1245 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1248 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1251 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1252 /* Copy verify params across */
1253 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1255 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1256 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1258 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1259 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1263 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1264 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1266 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1271 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1272 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1273 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1274 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1275 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1279 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1280 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1281 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1283 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1284 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1285 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1286 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1292 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1293 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1294 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1295 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1296 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1299 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1301 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1302 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1303 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1310 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1314 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1319 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1321 gens = b->name.fullname;
1322 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1325 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1326 gens = a->name.fullname;
1330 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1332 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1333 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1334 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1336 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1342 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1345 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1346 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1347 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1348 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1357 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1360 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1361 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1363 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1364 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1365 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1366 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1368 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1374 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1376 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1377 unsigned int *preasons)
1380 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1382 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1383 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1386 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1389 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1390 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1391 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1392 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1393 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1394 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1399 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1400 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1406 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1407 * to find a delta CRL too
1410 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1411 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1414 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1416 unsigned int reasons;
1417 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1418 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1419 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1421 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1422 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1423 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1427 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1429 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1431 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1435 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1437 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1440 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1442 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1443 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1444 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1452 /* Check CRL validity */
1453 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1455 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1456 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1457 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1458 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1460 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1461 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1462 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1464 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1465 * certificate in chain.
1467 else if (cnum < chnum)
1468 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1470 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1471 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1472 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1473 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1481 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1483 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1484 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1485 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1486 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1487 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1490 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1491 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1494 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1495 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1496 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1499 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1500 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1504 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1505 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1508 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1509 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1512 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1516 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1518 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1520 /* Verify CRL signature */
1521 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1522 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1528 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1529 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1534 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1535 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1536 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1537 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1539 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1540 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1541 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1544 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1545 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1547 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1548 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1550 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1557 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1564 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1565 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1566 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1567 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1568 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1569 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1570 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1571 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1572 * X509_policy_check() call.
1574 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1575 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1576 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1579 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1580 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1581 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1582 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1584 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1585 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1586 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1589 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1590 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1593 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1594 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1595 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1597 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1599 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1600 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1605 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1606 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1607 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1608 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1610 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1611 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1615 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1616 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1618 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1619 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1620 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1621 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1623 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1631 * Check certificate validity times.
1632 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1633 * the validation status.
1635 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1637 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1642 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1643 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1644 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1649 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1650 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1652 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1653 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1655 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1658 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1659 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1661 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1662 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1664 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1669 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1671 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1672 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1676 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1677 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1678 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1680 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1686 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1689 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1694 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1695 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1697 ctx->error_depth = n;
1698 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1702 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1703 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1709 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1710 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1711 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1712 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1714 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1715 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1716 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1717 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1719 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1720 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1721 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1727 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1728 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1732 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1735 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1736 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1737 ctx->error_depth = n;
1738 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1743 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1749 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1751 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1754 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1759 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1760 int i, j, remaining;
1763 remaining = ctm->length;
1764 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1766 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
1767 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1768 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1769 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1771 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1772 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
1773 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1774 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
1775 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1782 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
1783 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
1784 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
1785 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
1793 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1804 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
1805 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
1806 * Can we just kill them altogether?
1808 if (remaining && *str == '.') {
1811 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
1812 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
1821 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
1830 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1832 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
1835 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
1836 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
1838 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1839 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1843 atm.type = ctm->type;
1845 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1846 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1848 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1851 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1852 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1854 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1855 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1864 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1865 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1871 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1873 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1876 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1878 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1881 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1882 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1891 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1892 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1893 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1894 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1895 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1897 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1900 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1902 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1905 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1908 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1909 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1911 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1912 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1915 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1919 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1920 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1924 /* first, populate the other certs */
1925 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1926 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1927 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1931 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1935 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1937 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1938 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1940 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1942 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1943 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1944 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1945 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1948 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1949 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1950 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1953 /* Issuer names must match */
1954 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1955 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1958 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1959 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1960 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1963 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1964 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1967 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1968 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1969 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1972 /* CRLs must verify */
1973 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1974 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1975 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1978 /* Create new CRL */
1979 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1980 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1982 /* Set issuer name */
1983 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1986 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
1988 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
1991 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1993 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1997 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1998 * number to correct value too.
2001 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2002 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2003 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2004 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2008 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2010 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2012 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2013 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2014 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2016 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2017 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2019 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
2020 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2023 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2024 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2029 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2031 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2037 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2042 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2044 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2047 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2049 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2052 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2057 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2062 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2064 return ctx->error_depth;
2067 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2069 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2072 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2074 return ctx->current_cert;
2077 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2079 ctx->current_cert = x;
2082 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2087 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2091 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2094 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2096 return ctx->current_issuer;
2099 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2101 return ctx->current_crl;
2104 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2109 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2114 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2119 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2122 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2123 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2124 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2126 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2129 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2132 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2133 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2135 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2139 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2140 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2141 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2142 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2143 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2144 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2145 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2149 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2150 int purpose, int trust)
2153 /* If purpose not set use default */
2155 purpose = def_purpose;
2156 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2159 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2161 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2162 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2165 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2166 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2167 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2169 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2170 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2171 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2174 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2175 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2178 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2180 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2182 trust = ptmp->trust;
2185 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2187 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2188 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2193 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2194 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2195 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2196 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2200 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2202 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2205 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2211 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2216 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2220 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2221 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2227 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2229 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2230 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2234 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2235 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2236 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2237 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2238 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2239 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2240 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2244 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2245 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2246 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2248 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2250 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2254 if (store && store->check_issued)
2255 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2257 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2259 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2260 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2262 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2264 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2265 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2267 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2269 if (store && store->verify)
2270 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2272 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2274 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2275 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2277 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2279 if (store && store->get_crl)
2280 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2282 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2284 if (store && store->check_crl)
2285 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2287 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2289 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2290 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2292 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2294 if (store && store->check_policy)
2295 ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2297 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2299 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2300 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2302 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2304 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2305 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2307 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2309 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2310 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2311 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2316 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2319 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2321 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2324 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2325 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2328 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2333 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2334 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2336 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2337 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2338 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2341 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2344 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2347 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2351 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2352 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2354 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2359 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2360 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2362 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2364 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2365 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2366 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2369 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2372 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2373 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2374 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2375 * pointers below after they're freed!
2377 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2378 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2380 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2382 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2383 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2384 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2387 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2389 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2391 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2392 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2395 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2397 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2400 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2402 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2405 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2408 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2411 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2416 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2418 return ctx->untrusted;
2421 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2423 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2426 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2428 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2432 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2433 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2435 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2438 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2440 return ctx->verify_cb;
2443 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2444 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2446 ctx->verify = verify;
2449 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2454 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2456 return ctx->get_issuer;
2459 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2461 return ctx->check_issued;
2464 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2466 return ctx->check_revocation;
2469 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2471 return ctx->get_crl;
2474 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2476 return ctx->check_crl;
2479 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2481 return ctx->cert_crl;
2484 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2486 return ctx->check_policy;
2489 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2491 return ctx->lookup_certs;
2494 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2496 return ctx->lookup_crls;
2499 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2501 return ctx->cleanup;
2504 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2509 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2511 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2514 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2516 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2519 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2521 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2522 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2525 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2528 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2533 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2535 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2539 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2544 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2547 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2549 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2553 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2556 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2557 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2559 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2560 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2563 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2567 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2568 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2572 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2576 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2578 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2580 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2581 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2582 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2583 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2584 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2585 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2586 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2587 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2588 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2589 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2593 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2596 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2599 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2601 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2602 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2605 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2606 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2607 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2609 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2610 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2613 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2614 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2615 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2616 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2618 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2619 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2620 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2621 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2623 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2624 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2625 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2627 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2628 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2629 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2630 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2631 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2632 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2633 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2635 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2636 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2637 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2638 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2640 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2641 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2642 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2643 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2645 if (t->usage != usage) {
2648 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2649 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2650 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2652 if (t->selector != selector) {
2653 selector = t->selector;
2655 /* Update per-selector state */
2656 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2657 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2661 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2662 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2663 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2664 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2668 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2670 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2671 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2672 * other than "Full".
2674 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2679 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2680 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2682 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2683 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2689 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2697 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2698 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2701 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2702 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2703 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2705 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2706 dane->mdpth = depth;
2708 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2716 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2717 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2721 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2723 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2727 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2728 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2731 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2732 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2733 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2735 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2736 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2737 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2739 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2740 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2743 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2746 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2748 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2750 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2751 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2752 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2755 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2756 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2757 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2758 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2759 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2760 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2763 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2764 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2767 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2768 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2769 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2772 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2773 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2774 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2775 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2777 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2780 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2783 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2786 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2788 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2795 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2797 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2799 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2801 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2804 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2806 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2807 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2814 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2815 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2816 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2817 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2818 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2820 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2821 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2822 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2823 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2825 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2826 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2829 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2832 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2833 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2835 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2836 if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2839 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2840 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2841 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2842 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2846 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2847 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2848 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2853 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2854 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2856 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2860 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2861 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2863 return verify_chain(ctx);
2866 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2867 static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2869 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2873 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2874 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2879 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2881 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2882 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2883 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2884 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2885 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2886 unsigned int search;
2887 int may_trusted = 0;
2888 int may_alternate = 0;
2889 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2890 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2895 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2896 OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
2898 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2899 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2900 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2902 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2903 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2904 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2905 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2906 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2908 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2909 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2910 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2911 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2912 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2918 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2919 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2920 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2922 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2923 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2924 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2929 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2930 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2931 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2932 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2933 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2934 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2935 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2938 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2939 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2940 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2941 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2944 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2945 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2946 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2947 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2948 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2955 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2956 * might be reasonable.
2958 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2959 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2962 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2963 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2964 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2966 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2968 while (search != 0) {
2973 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2974 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2975 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2976 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2978 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2979 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2980 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2981 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2982 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2983 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2984 * would be a-priori too long.
2986 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
2987 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2988 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2990 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2991 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2992 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2993 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2994 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2995 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2996 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2997 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2998 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2999 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3001 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3002 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3006 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
3008 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
3011 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3012 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
3019 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3020 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3021 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3022 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3023 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3024 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3025 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3026 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3028 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3029 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3030 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3032 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3033 OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
3034 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
3035 for (; num > i; --num)
3036 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3037 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3039 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3040 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3042 X509_free(dane->mcert);
3045 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3046 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3051 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3052 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3055 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3057 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3058 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3059 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3063 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3064 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3066 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3067 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3068 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3069 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3071 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3072 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3077 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3078 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3083 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3084 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3085 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3086 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3088 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3089 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3090 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3091 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3092 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3093 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3096 OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
3097 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3098 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3099 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3100 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3110 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3111 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3112 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3113 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3115 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3116 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3117 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3119 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3120 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3121 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3123 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3124 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3125 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3131 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3133 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3134 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3135 OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
3136 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3139 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3140 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3142 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3144 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3146 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3150 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3151 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3153 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3154 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3155 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3156 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3161 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
3162 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3163 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3166 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3168 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3169 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3170 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3176 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3179 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3180 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3182 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3184 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3185 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3186 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3187 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3191 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3193 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3194 /* Callback already issued */
3196 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3198 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3200 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3201 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3202 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3203 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3204 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3205 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3206 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3207 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3209 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3210 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3211 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3212 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3213 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3214 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3215 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3219 static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3220 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3223 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3226 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3228 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3230 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3231 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3233 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3239 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3240 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3242 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3246 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3247 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3248 * self-signed or otherwise).
3250 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3252 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3254 int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
3255 int mdnid = NID_undef;
3257 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3261 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3262 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3264 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3265 if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
3268 /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
3269 if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
3270 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3273 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];