1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
124 unsigned int *preasons,
125 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
129 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
131 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
133 unsigned int *preasons);
134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
136 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
140 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
155 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
157 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
159 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
162 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
163 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
166 /* Look for exact match */
167 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
169 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
170 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
173 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
174 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
177 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
181 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
183 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
185 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
188 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
189 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
190 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
192 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
198 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
199 * present and that the first entry is in place */
200 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
202 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
203 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
205 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
208 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
209 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
212 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
213 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
214 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
216 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
221 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
227 /* If we have enough, we break */
228 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
229 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
230 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
234 /* If we are self signed, we break */
235 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
237 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
238 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
240 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
243 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
244 * will be picked up again later.
253 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
254 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
256 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
259 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
261 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
264 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
265 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
266 ctx->last_untrusted++;
269 /* reparse the full chain for
277 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
278 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
279 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
281 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
285 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
286 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
287 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
289 /* we have a self signed certificate */
290 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
292 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
293 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
294 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
296 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
297 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
299 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
301 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
302 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
309 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
310 * so we get any trust settings.
314 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
315 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
320 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
321 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
322 ctx->last_untrusted--;
324 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
328 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
331 /* If we have enough, we break */
332 if (depth < num) break;
334 /* If we are self signed, we break */
335 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
337 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
339 if (ok < 0) return ok;
343 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
346 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
352 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
354 i = check_trust(ctx);
356 /* If explicitly rejected error */
357 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
359 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
360 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
362 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
364 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
365 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
367 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
373 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
375 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
376 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
377 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
381 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
387 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
388 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
392 /* Check name constraints */
394 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
402 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
403 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
405 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
406 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
409 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
412 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
417 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
423 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
424 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
427 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
431 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
432 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
434 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
438 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
439 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
440 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
445 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
447 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
448 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
453 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
456 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
460 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
462 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
463 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
469 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
471 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
474 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
475 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
477 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
478 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
482 ctx->current_cert = x;
483 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
484 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
488 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
490 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
492 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
495 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
503 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
504 * with the supplied purpose
507 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
509 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
512 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
514 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
515 int proxy_path_length = 0;
517 int allow_proxy_certs;
520 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
521 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
522 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
523 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
524 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
525 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
526 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
530 /* CRL path validation */
533 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
534 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
539 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
540 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
542 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
543 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
544 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
547 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
548 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
551 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
552 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
553 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
556 ctx->error_depth = i;
557 ctx->current_cert = x;
561 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
563 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
564 ctx->error_depth = i;
565 ctx->current_cert = x;
569 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
573 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
574 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
577 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
586 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
593 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
597 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
605 ctx->error_depth = i;
606 ctx->current_cert = x;
610 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
612 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
614 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
618 ctx->error_depth = i;
619 ctx->current_cert = x;
624 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
625 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
626 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
627 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
629 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
630 ctx->error_depth = i;
631 ctx->current_cert = x;
635 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
636 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
638 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
639 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
640 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
642 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
644 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
647 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
648 ctx->error_depth = i;
649 ctx->current_cert = x;
665 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
669 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
670 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
672 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
673 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
674 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
676 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
677 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
678 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
679 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
681 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
683 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
686 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
690 ctx->error_depth = i;
691 ctx->current_cert = x;
692 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
701 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
703 ctx->error = errcode;
704 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
705 ctx->error_depth = 0;
706 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
709 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
711 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
712 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
714 if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
716 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
719 if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
721 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
724 if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
726 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
732 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
736 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
738 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
739 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
741 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
742 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
743 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
744 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
745 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
746 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
749 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
751 ctx->error_depth = i;
752 ctx->current_cert = x;
753 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
756 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
759 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
760 * certificate return success.
762 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
765 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
766 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
767 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
768 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
771 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
773 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
774 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
778 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
779 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
781 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
784 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
787 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
789 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
790 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
793 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
798 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
800 ctx->error_depth = i;
801 ok = check_cert(ctx);
807 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
809 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
812 unsigned int last_reasons;
813 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
814 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
815 ctx->current_cert = x;
816 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
817 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
818 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
819 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
821 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
822 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
824 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
826 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
827 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
832 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
833 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
836 ctx->current_crl = crl;
837 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
843 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
846 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
853 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
856 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
865 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
866 * another iteration, so exit loop.
868 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
870 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
871 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
879 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
884 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
886 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
891 ctx->current_crl = crl;
892 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
893 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
897 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
902 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
903 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
911 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
912 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
916 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
918 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
924 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
925 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
928 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
929 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
933 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
934 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
940 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
945 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
946 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
947 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
949 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
950 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
951 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
952 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
953 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
955 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
957 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
959 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
961 if (crl_score > best_score)
964 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
965 best_score = crl_score;
966 best_reasons = reasons;
973 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
975 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
976 *pscore = best_score;
977 *preasons = best_reasons;
978 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
981 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
984 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
987 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
993 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
994 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
997 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
999 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1001 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1004 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1005 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1007 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1012 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1017 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1019 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1031 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1037 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1039 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1041 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1042 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1044 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1045 if (!base->crl_number)
1047 /* Issuer names must match */
1048 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1049 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1051 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1052 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1054 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1056 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1057 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1059 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1060 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1065 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1066 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1069 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1070 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1074 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1076 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1078 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1080 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1081 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1083 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1084 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1085 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1093 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1094 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1095 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1096 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1097 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1100 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1101 unsigned int *preasons,
1102 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1106 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1108 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1110 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1111 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1113 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1114 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1116 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1119 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1121 /* If no new reasons reject */
1122 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1125 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1126 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1128 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1129 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1131 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1135 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1137 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1138 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1141 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1142 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1144 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1145 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1147 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1149 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1152 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1154 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1156 /* If no new reasons reject */
1157 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1159 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1160 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1163 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1169 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1170 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1172 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1173 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1174 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1177 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1180 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1182 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1184 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1186 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1187 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1192 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1194 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1195 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1197 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1199 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1200 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1205 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1207 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1210 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1211 * set of untrusted certificates.
1213 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1215 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1216 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1218 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1220 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1221 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1227 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1228 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1229 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1230 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1234 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1236 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1238 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1241 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1244 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1245 /* Copy verify params across */
1246 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1248 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1249 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1251 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1252 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1257 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1259 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1261 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1265 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1266 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1267 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1268 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1269 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1270 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1273 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1274 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1275 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1277 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1278 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1279 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1280 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1285 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1286 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1287 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1288 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1289 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1293 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1295 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1296 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1297 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1305 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1310 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1315 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1317 gens = b->name.fullname;
1319 else if (b->type == 1)
1323 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1324 gens = a->name.fullname;
1328 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1331 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1333 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1334 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1336 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1342 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1346 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1347 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1349 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1350 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1359 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1362 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1363 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1365 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1368 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1369 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1371 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1377 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1379 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1380 unsigned int *preasons)
1383 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1385 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1387 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1392 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1395 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1396 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1398 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1399 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1402 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1404 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1409 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1414 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1415 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1418 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1419 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1422 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1424 unsigned int reasons;
1425 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1426 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1427 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1428 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1429 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1430 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1435 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1437 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1439 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1443 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1445 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1449 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1452 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1453 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1454 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1463 /* Check CRL validity */
1464 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1466 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1467 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1468 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1469 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1470 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1471 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1472 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1473 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1475 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1476 * is next certificate in chain.
1478 else if (cnum < chnum)
1479 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1482 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1483 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1484 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1486 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1487 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1494 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1497 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1499 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1500 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1501 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1504 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1508 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1511 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1515 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1517 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1520 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1525 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1527 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1528 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1535 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1537 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1542 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1543 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1547 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1548 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1554 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1555 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1558 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1562 /* Verify CRL signature */
1563 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1565 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1566 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1575 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1579 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1580 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1584 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1585 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1586 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1587 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1589 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1590 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1592 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1593 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1597 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1598 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1600 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1602 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1604 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1605 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1613 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1618 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1619 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1622 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1625 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1628 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1633 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1635 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1636 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1638 ctx->current_cert = x;
1639 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1640 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1647 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1648 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1649 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1652 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1654 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1655 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1656 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1663 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1668 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1669 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1673 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1676 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1677 ctx->current_cert=x;
1678 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1684 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1685 ctx->current_cert=x;
1686 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1690 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1693 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1694 ctx->current_cert=x;
1695 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1701 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1702 ctx->current_cert=x;
1703 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1710 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1714 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1715 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1719 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1720 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1722 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1724 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1728 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
1735 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1736 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1744 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1748 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1753 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1754 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1757 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1759 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1761 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1762 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1766 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1768 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1769 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1773 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1777 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1784 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1788 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1789 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1790 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1798 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1806 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1808 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1811 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1816 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1821 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1822 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1824 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1831 if (i < 13) return 0;
1837 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1838 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1843 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1847 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1858 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1860 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1861 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1867 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1868 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1870 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1873 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1875 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1876 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1877 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1880 if (i < j) return -1;
1881 if (i > j) return 1;
1883 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1884 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1890 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1892 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1895 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1897 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1900 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1901 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1905 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1908 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1910 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1911 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1912 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1913 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1916 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1919 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1921 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1924 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1926 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1928 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1931 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1934 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1938 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1944 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1948 /* first, populate the other certs */
1949 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1951 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1952 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1953 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1956 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1957 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1961 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1963 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1964 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1966 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1968 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1969 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1970 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
1972 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1975 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1976 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
1978 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1981 /* Issuer names must match */
1982 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1983 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1985 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1988 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1989 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1991 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1994 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1996 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1999 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2000 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2002 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2005 /* CRLs must verify */
2006 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2007 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2009 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2012 /* Create new CRL */
2013 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2014 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2016 /* Set issuer name */
2017 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2020 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2022 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2025 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2027 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2030 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2031 * CRL number to correct value too.
2034 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2036 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2037 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2038 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2042 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2044 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2046 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2048 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2049 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2050 /* Add only if not also in base.
2051 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2052 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2054 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2056 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2059 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2061 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2066 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2068 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2074 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2080 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2081 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2083 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2084 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2085 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2086 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2089 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2091 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2094 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2096 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2099 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2104 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2109 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2111 return ctx->error_depth;
2114 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2116 return ctx->current_cert;
2119 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2124 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2128 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2131 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2133 return ctx->current_issuer;
2136 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2138 return ctx->current_crl;
2141 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2146 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2151 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2161 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2163 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2166 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2168 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2171 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2172 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2173 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2174 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2175 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2176 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2177 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2178 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2181 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2182 int purpose, int trust)
2185 /* If purpose not set use default */
2186 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2187 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2191 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2194 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2195 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2198 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2199 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2201 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2204 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2205 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2208 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2210 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2211 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2215 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2218 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2219 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2224 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2225 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2229 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2231 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2232 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2235 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2238 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2242 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2244 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2248 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2249 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2253 ctx->current_method=0;
2255 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2257 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2258 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2262 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2264 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2265 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2266 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2267 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2268 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2272 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2276 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2280 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2286 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2288 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2292 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2293 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2299 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2300 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2304 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2308 if (store && store->check_issued)
2309 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2311 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2313 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2314 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2316 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2318 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2319 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2321 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2323 if (store && store->verify)
2324 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2326 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2328 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2329 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2331 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2333 if (store && store->get_crl)
2334 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2336 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2338 if (store && store->check_crl)
2339 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2341 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2343 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2344 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2346 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2348 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2349 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2351 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2353 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2354 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2356 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2358 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2361 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2362 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2363 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2364 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2365 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2369 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2375 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2376 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2379 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2381 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2382 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2385 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2387 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2388 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2390 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2391 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2394 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2396 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2399 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2401 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2404 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2405 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2408 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2410 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2413 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2415 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2418 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2420 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2423 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2424 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2426 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2429 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2434 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2436 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2439 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2441 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2442 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2445 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2448 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2453 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2456 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2460 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2461 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2463 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2465 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2466 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)