1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons,
126 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
127 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
128 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
129 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
130 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
132 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
144 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
150 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
152 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
155 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
156 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
158 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
159 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
165 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
167 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
169 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
172 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
173 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
176 /* Look for exact match */
177 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
179 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
180 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
183 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
184 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
187 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
191 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
193 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
195 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
198 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
199 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
200 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
202 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
208 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
209 * present and that the first entry is in place */
210 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
212 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
213 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
215 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
218 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
219 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
222 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
223 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
224 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
226 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
230 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
231 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
237 /* If we have enough, we break */
238 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
239 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
240 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
244 /* If we are self signed, we break */
245 if (cert_self_signed(x))
247 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
248 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
250 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
253 /* If successful for now free up cert so it
254 * will be picked up again later.
263 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
264 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
266 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
269 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
271 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
274 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
275 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
276 ctx->last_untrusted++;
279 /* reparse the full chain for
287 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
288 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
289 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
291 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
295 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
296 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
297 if (cert_self_signed(x))
299 /* we have a self signed certificate */
300 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
302 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
303 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
304 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
306 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
307 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
309 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
311 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
312 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
319 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
320 * so we get any trust settings.
324 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
325 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
330 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
331 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
332 ctx->last_untrusted--;
334 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
338 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
341 /* If we have enough, we break */
342 if (depth < num) break;
344 /* If we are self signed, we break */
345 if (cert_self_signed(x))
348 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
350 if (ok < 0) return ok;
354 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
357 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
363 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
365 i = check_trust(ctx);
367 /* If explicitly rejected error */
368 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
370 /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
371 * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
372 * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
374 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
376 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
378 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
379 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
381 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
387 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
389 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
390 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
391 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
395 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
401 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
402 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
406 /* Check name constraints */
408 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
416 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
417 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
419 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
420 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
423 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
426 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
431 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
437 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
438 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
441 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
445 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
446 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
448 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
452 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
453 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
454 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
459 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
461 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
462 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
467 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
470 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
473 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
474 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
476 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
477 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
480 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
487 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
489 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
493 return cert_self_signed(x);
494 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
495 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
499 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
500 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
502 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
504 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
505 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
507 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
513 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
515 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
516 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
520 ctx->current_cert = x;
521 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
522 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
525 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
527 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
529 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
532 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
540 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
541 * with the supplied purpose
544 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
546 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
549 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
551 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
552 int proxy_path_length = 0;
554 int allow_proxy_certs;
557 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
558 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
559 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
560 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
561 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
562 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
563 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
567 /* CRL path validation */
570 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
571 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
576 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
577 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
579 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
580 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
581 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
584 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
585 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
588 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
589 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
590 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
592 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
593 ctx->error_depth = i;
594 ctx->current_cert = x;
598 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
600 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
601 ctx->error_depth = i;
602 ctx->current_cert = x;
606 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
610 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
611 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
614 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
623 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
630 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
642 ctx->error_depth = i;
643 ctx->current_cert = x;
647 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
649 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
651 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
654 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
655 ctx->error_depth = i;
656 ctx->current_cert = x;
661 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
662 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
663 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
664 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
666 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
667 ctx->error_depth = i;
668 ctx->current_cert = x;
672 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
673 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
675 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
676 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
677 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
679 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
681 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
684 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
685 ctx->error_depth = i;
686 ctx->current_cert = x;
702 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
706 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
707 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
709 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
710 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
711 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
713 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
714 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
715 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
716 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
718 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
720 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
723 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
727 ctx->error_depth = i;
728 ctx->current_cert = x;
729 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
738 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
740 ctx->error = errcode;
741 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
742 ctx->error_depth = 0;
743 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
746 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
749 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
752 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
754 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
755 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags,
762 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
764 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
765 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
767 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
769 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
772 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
774 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
777 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
779 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
785 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
789 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
791 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
792 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
794 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
795 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
796 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
797 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
798 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
799 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
802 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
804 ctx->error_depth = i;
805 ctx->current_cert = x;
806 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
809 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
812 /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
813 * certificate return success.
815 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
818 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
819 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
820 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
821 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
824 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
826 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
827 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
831 /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
832 * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
834 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
837 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
840 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
842 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
843 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
846 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
851 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
853 ctx->error_depth = i;
854 ok = check_cert(ctx);
860 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
862 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
865 unsigned int last_reasons;
866 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
867 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
868 ctx->current_cert = x;
869 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
870 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
871 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
872 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
874 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
875 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
877 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
879 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
880 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
885 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
886 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
889 ctx->current_crl = crl;
890 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
896 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
899 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
906 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
909 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
918 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
919 * another iteration, so exit loop.
921 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
923 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
924 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
932 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
937 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
939 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
944 ctx->current_crl = crl;
945 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
946 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
950 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
955 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
956 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
964 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
965 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
969 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
971 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
977 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
978 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
981 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
982 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
986 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
987 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
993 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
998 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
999 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1000 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1002 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1003 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1004 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1005 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1006 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1008 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1010 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1011 reasons = *preasons;
1012 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1014 if (crl_score > best_score)
1017 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1018 best_score = crl_score;
1019 best_reasons = reasons;
1026 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1028 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1029 *pscore = best_score;
1030 *preasons = best_reasons;
1031 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1034 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1037 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1040 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1046 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1047 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1050 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1052 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1054 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1057 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1058 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1060 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1065 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1070 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1072 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1084 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1090 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1092 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1094 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1095 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1097 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1098 if (!base->crl_number)
1100 /* Issuer names must match */
1101 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1102 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1104 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1105 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1107 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1109 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1110 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1112 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1113 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1118 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1119 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1122 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1123 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1127 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1129 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1131 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1133 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1134 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1136 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1137 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1138 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1146 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1147 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1148 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1149 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1150 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1153 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1154 unsigned int *preasons,
1155 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1159 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1161 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1163 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1164 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1166 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1167 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1169 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1172 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1174 /* If no new reasons reject */
1175 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1178 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1179 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1181 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1182 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1184 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1188 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1190 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1191 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1194 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1195 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1197 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1198 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1200 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1202 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1205 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1207 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1209 /* If no new reasons reject */
1210 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1212 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1213 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1216 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1222 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1223 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1225 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1226 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1227 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1230 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1233 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1235 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1237 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1239 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1240 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1245 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1247 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1248 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1250 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1252 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1253 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1258 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1260 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1263 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1264 * set of untrusted certificates.
1266 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1268 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1269 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1271 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1273 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1274 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1280 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1281 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1282 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1283 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1287 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1289 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1291 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1294 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1297 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1298 /* Copy verify params across */
1299 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1301 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1302 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1304 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1305 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1310 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1312 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1314 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1318 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1319 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1320 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1321 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1322 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1323 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1326 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1327 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1328 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1330 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1331 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1332 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1333 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1338 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1339 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1340 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1341 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1342 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1346 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1348 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1349 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1350 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1358 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1363 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1368 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1370 gens = b->name.fullname;
1372 else if (b->type == 1)
1376 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1377 gens = a->name.fullname;
1381 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1386 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1387 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1389 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1395 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1397 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1399 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1400 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1402 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1403 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1412 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1415 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1416 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1418 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1419 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1421 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1422 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1424 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1430 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1432 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1433 unsigned int *preasons)
1436 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1438 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1440 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1445 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1448 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1449 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1451 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1452 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1455 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1457 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1462 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1467 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1468 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1471 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1472 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1475 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1477 unsigned int reasons;
1478 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1479 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1480 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1481 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1482 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1483 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1488 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1490 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1492 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1496 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1498 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1502 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1505 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1506 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1507 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1516 /* Check CRL validity */
1517 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1519 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1520 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1521 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1522 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1523 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1524 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1525 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1526 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1528 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1529 * is next certificate in chain.
1531 else if (cnum < chnum)
1532 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1535 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1536 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1537 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1540 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1547 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1550 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1552 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1553 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1554 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1556 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1557 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1561 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1563 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1564 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1568 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1570 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1572 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1578 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1580 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1581 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1588 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1590 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1595 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1596 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1600 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1601 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1607 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1608 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1611 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1615 /* Verify CRL signature */
1616 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1618 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1619 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1628 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1632 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1633 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1637 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1638 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1639 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1640 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1642 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1643 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1646 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1650 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1651 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1653 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1655 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1657 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1658 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1666 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1671 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1672 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1675 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1678 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1681 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1686 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1688 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1689 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1691 ctx->current_cert = x;
1692 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1693 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1700 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1701 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1702 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1705 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1707 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1708 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1709 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1716 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1721 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1722 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1726 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1731 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1732 ctx->current_cert=x;
1733 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1741 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1742 ctx->current_cert=x;
1743 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1747 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1752 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1753 ctx->current_cert=x;
1754 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1762 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1763 ctx->current_cert=x;
1764 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1771 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1775 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1776 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1780 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1781 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1783 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1785 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1789 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
1796 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1797 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1805 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1809 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1814 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1815 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1818 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1820 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1822 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1823 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1827 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1829 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1830 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1834 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1838 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1845 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1849 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1850 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1851 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1859 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1867 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1869 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1872 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1877 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1882 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1883 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1885 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1892 if (i < 13) return 0;
1898 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1899 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1904 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1908 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1919 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1921 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1922 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1928 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1929 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1931 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1934 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1936 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1937 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1938 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1941 if (i < j) return -1;
1942 if (i > j) return 1;
1944 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1945 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1951 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1953 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1956 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1958 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1961 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1962 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1966 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1969 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1971 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1972 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1973 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1974 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1977 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1980 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1982 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1985 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1987 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1989 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1992 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1995 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1999 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2005 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2009 /* first, populate the other certs */
2010 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
2012 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
2013 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
2014 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2017 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
2018 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2022 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2024 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2025 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2027 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2029 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2030 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2031 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
2033 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2036 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2037 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
2039 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2042 /* Issuer names must match */
2043 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
2044 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2046 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2049 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2050 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
2052 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2055 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
2057 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2060 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2061 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2063 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2066 /* CRLs must verify */
2067 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2068 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2070 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2073 /* Create new CRL */
2074 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2075 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2077 /* Set issuer name */
2078 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2081 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2083 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2086 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2088 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2091 /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2092 * CRL number to correct value too.
2095 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2097 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2098 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2099 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2103 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2105 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2107 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2109 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2110 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2111 /* Add only if not also in base.
2112 * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2113 * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2115 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2117 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2120 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2122 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2127 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2129 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2135 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2141 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2142 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2144 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2145 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2146 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2147 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2150 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2152 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2155 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2157 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2160 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2165 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2170 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2172 return ctx->error_depth;
2175 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2177 return ctx->current_cert;
2180 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2185 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2189 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2192 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2194 return ctx->current_issuer;
2197 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2199 return ctx->current_crl;
2202 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2207 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2212 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2217 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2222 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2224 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2227 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2229 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2232 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2233 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2234 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2235 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2236 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2237 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2238 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2239 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2242 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2243 int purpose, int trust)
2246 /* If purpose not set use default */
2247 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2248 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2252 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2255 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2256 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2259 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2260 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2262 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2265 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2266 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2269 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2271 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2272 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2276 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2279 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2280 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2285 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2286 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2290 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2292 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2293 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2296 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2299 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2303 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2305 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2309 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2310 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2314 ctx->current_method=0;
2316 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2318 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2319 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2323 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2325 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2326 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2327 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2328 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2329 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2333 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2337 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2341 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2347 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2349 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2353 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2354 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2360 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2361 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2365 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2369 if (store && store->check_issued)
2370 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2372 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2374 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2375 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2377 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2379 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2380 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2382 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2384 if (store && store->verify)
2385 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2387 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2389 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2390 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2392 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2394 if (store && store->get_crl)
2395 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2397 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2399 if (store && store->check_crl)
2400 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2402 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2404 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2405 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2407 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2409 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2410 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2412 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2414 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2415 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2417 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2419 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2422 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2423 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2424 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2425 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2426 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2430 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2436 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2437 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2440 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2442 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2443 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2446 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2448 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2449 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2451 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2452 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2455 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2457 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2460 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2462 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2465 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2466 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2469 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2471 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2474 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2476 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2479 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2481 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2484 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2485 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2487 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2490 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2495 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2497 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2500 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2502 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2503 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2506 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2509 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2514 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2517 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2521 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2522 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2524 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2526 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2527 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)