1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
129 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
149 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
151 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
152 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
162 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
171 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
175 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
176 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
185 X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
188 int depth, i, ok = 0;
190 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
191 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
192 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
193 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
200 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
201 * the first entry is in place
203 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
204 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
205 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
206 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
209 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
210 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
213 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
214 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
215 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
216 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
221 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
222 depth = param->depth;
225 /* If we have enough, we break */
227 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
228 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
229 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
232 /* If we are self signed, we break */
233 if (cert_self_signed(x))
236 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
238 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
239 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
243 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
252 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
253 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
254 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
256 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
260 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
261 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
262 ctx->last_untrusted++;
266 * reparse the full chain for the next one
275 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
276 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
281 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
284 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
285 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
286 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
287 /* we have a self signed certificate */
288 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
290 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find
291 * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible
294 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
295 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
296 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
297 ctx->current_cert = x;
298 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
307 * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so
308 * we get any trust settings.
312 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
313 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
317 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
319 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
320 ctx->last_untrusted--;
322 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
326 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
328 /* If we have enough, we break */
332 /* If we are self signed, we break */
333 if (cert_self_signed(x))
336 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
344 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
346 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
352 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
354 i = check_trust(ctx);
356 /* If explicitly rejected error */
357 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
360 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
361 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
362 * and set bad_chain == 1
364 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
365 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
366 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
367 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
369 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
370 ctx->current_cert = x;
373 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
375 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
376 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
377 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
381 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
388 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
389 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
394 /* Check name constraints */
396 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
406 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
407 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
410 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
411 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
414 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
418 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
420 if (i != X509_V_OK) {
422 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
428 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
429 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
430 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
432 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
436 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
437 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
440 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
444 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
445 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
446 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
451 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
455 if (chain_ss != NULL)
461 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
464 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
467 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
468 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
469 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
470 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
472 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
479 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
481 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
485 return cert_self_signed(x);
486 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
487 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
490 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
491 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
493 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
494 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
495 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
496 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
502 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
504 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
505 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
509 ctx->current_cert = x;
510 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
511 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
514 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
516 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
518 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
520 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
527 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
531 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
533 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
535 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
536 int proxy_path_length = 0;
538 int allow_proxy_certs;
542 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
543 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
544 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
545 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
546 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
547 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
548 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
552 /* CRL path validation */
554 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
555 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
558 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
560 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
563 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
564 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
565 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
568 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
569 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
571 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
572 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
573 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
574 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
575 ctx->error_depth = i;
576 ctx->current_cert = x;
581 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
582 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
583 ctx->error_depth = i;
584 ctx->current_cert = x;
589 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
590 switch (must_be_ca) {
592 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
593 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
595 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
602 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
608 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
611 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
617 ctx->error_depth = i;
618 ctx->current_cert = x;
623 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
624 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
626 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
628 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
629 ctx->error_depth = i;
630 ctx->current_cert = x;
636 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
637 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
638 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
639 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
641 ctx->error_depth = i;
642 ctx->current_cert = x;
647 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
648 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
651 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
652 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
653 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
655 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
656 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
657 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
658 ctx->error_depth = i;
659 ctx->current_cert = x;
674 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
678 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
679 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
680 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
681 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
682 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
685 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
686 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
687 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
690 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
691 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
693 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
694 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
696 ctx->error_depth = i;
697 ctx->current_cert = x;
698 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
707 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
709 ctx->error = errcode;
710 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
711 ctx->error_depth = 0;
712 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
715 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
718 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
721 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
722 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
723 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
729 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
731 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
732 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
734 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
735 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
738 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
739 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
742 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
743 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
749 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
753 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
755 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
756 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
757 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
758 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
759 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
760 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
761 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
763 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
766 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
767 ctx->error_depth = i;
768 ctx->current_cert = x;
769 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
772 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
776 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
779 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
781 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
782 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
783 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
784 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
786 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
788 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
789 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
794 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
795 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
797 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
800 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
803 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
805 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
806 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
808 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
813 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
814 ctx->error_depth = i;
815 ok = check_cert(ctx);
822 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
824 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
827 unsigned int last_reasons;
828 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
829 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
830 ctx->current_cert = x;
831 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
832 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
833 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
834 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
835 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
836 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
838 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
840 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
842 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
845 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
846 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
849 ctx->current_crl = crl;
850 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
855 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
858 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
864 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
866 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
876 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
879 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
880 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
881 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
889 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
894 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
896 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
901 ctx->current_crl = crl;
902 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
903 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
907 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
911 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
912 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
919 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
920 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
924 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
925 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
930 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
931 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
934 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
935 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
938 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
939 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
945 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
950 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
951 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
952 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
954 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
955 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
956 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
957 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
958 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
960 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
961 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
963 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
965 if (crl_score > best_score) {
967 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
968 best_score = crl_score;
969 best_reasons = reasons;
975 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
977 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
978 *pscore = best_score;
979 *preasons = best_reasons;
980 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
982 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
985 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
988 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
995 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
996 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
999 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1001 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1003 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1005 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1006 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1008 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1012 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1016 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1018 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1028 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1034 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1036 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1038 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1039 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1041 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1042 if (!base->crl_number)
1044 /* Issuer names must match */
1045 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1047 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1048 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1050 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1052 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1053 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1055 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1056 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1062 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1063 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1066 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1067 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1071 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1073 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1075 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1076 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1077 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1078 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1079 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1080 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1089 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1090 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1091 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1092 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1093 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1096 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1097 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1101 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1103 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1105 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1106 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1108 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1109 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1110 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1112 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1113 /* If no new reasons reject */
1114 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1117 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1118 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1120 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1121 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1122 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1125 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1127 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1128 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1131 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1132 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1134 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1135 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1137 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1139 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1142 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1144 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1145 /* If no new reasons reject */
1146 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1148 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1149 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1152 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1158 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1159 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1161 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1162 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1163 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1166 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1169 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1171 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1172 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1173 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1174 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1179 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1180 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1181 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1183 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1184 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1185 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1190 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1192 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1196 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1197 * untrusted certificates.
1199 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1200 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1201 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1203 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1204 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1205 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1212 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1213 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1214 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1215 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1218 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1220 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1222 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1225 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1228 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1229 /* Copy verify params across */
1230 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1232 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1233 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1235 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1236 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1241 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1243 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1245 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1250 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1251 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1252 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1253 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1254 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1258 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1259 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1260 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1262 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1263 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1264 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1265 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1271 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1272 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1273 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1274 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1275 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1278 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1280 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1281 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1282 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1289 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1293 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1298 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1300 gens = b->name.fullname;
1301 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1304 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1305 gens = a->name.fullname;
1309 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1311 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1312 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1313 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1315 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1321 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1323 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1324 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1325 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1326 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1327 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1336 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1339 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1340 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1342 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1343 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1344 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1345 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1347 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1353 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1355 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1356 unsigned int *preasons)
1359 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1361 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1362 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1365 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1368 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1369 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1370 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1371 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1372 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1373 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1378 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1379 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1385 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1386 * to find a delta CRL too
1389 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1390 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1393 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1395 unsigned int reasons;
1396 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1397 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1398 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1399 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1400 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1401 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1406 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1408 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1410 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1414 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1416 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1420 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1422 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1423 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1424 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1433 /* Check CRL validity */
1434 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1436 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1437 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1438 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1439 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1440 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1441 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1442 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1443 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1446 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1447 * certificate in chain.
1449 else if (cnum < chnum)
1450 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1452 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1453 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1454 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1455 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1456 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1464 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1466 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1467 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1468 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1469 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1471 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1476 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1477 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1478 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1483 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1484 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1485 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1486 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1492 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1493 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1494 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1501 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1502 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1507 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1508 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1511 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1512 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1517 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1518 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1520 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1524 /* Verify CRL signature */
1525 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1526 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1527 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1537 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1541 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1542 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1547 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1548 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1549 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1550 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1552 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1553 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1555 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1560 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1561 * is not removeFromCRL.
1563 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1564 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1566 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1567 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1575 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1580 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1581 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1583 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1586 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1589 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1593 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1594 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1595 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1597 ctx->current_cert = x;
1598 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1599 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1605 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1606 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1607 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1610 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1611 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1612 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1613 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1620 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1625 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1626 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1630 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1635 ctx->current_cert = x;
1636 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1644 ctx->current_cert = x;
1645 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1649 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1653 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1654 ctx->current_cert = x;
1655 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1663 ctx->current_cert = x;
1664 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1671 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1675 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1676 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1678 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1680 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1681 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1683 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1685 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1688 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1693 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1694 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1699 ctx->error_depth = n;
1700 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1704 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1706 ctx->error_depth = n;
1709 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1710 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1715 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1716 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1717 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1718 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1719 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1722 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1723 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1724 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1725 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1727 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1731 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1738 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1742 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1743 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1744 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1745 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1752 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1760 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1762 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1765 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1770 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1775 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1776 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1777 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
1790 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1796 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1799 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
1810 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1812 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1813 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1817 atm.type = ctm->type;
1819 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1820 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1822 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1825 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1826 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1828 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1829 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1838 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1839 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1845 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1847 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1850 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1852 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1855 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1856 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1865 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1866 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1867 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1868 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1869 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1871 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1874 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1876 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1879 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1882 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1883 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1885 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1886 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1889 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1892 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1897 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1898 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1902 /* first, populate the other certs */
1903 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1904 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1905 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1906 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1910 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1911 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1915 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1917 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1918 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1920 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1922 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1923 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1924 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1925 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1928 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1929 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1930 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1933 /* Issuer names must match */
1934 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1935 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1938 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1939 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1940 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1943 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1944 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1947 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1948 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1949 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1952 /* CRLs must verify */
1953 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1954 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1955 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1958 /* Create new CRL */
1959 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1960 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1962 /* Set issuer name */
1963 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1966 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1968 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1971 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1973 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1977 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1978 * number to correct value too.
1981 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
1982 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
1983 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
1984 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
1988 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1990 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
1992 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
1993 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
1994 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
1996 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1997 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1999 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2000 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2003 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2004 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2009 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2011 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2017 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2023 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2024 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2025 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2026 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2029 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2030 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2032 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2033 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2036 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2038 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2041 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2043 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2046 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2051 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2056 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2058 return ctx->error_depth;
2061 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2063 return ctx->current_cert;
2066 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2071 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2075 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2078 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2080 return ctx->current_issuer;
2083 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2085 return ctx->current_crl;
2088 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2093 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2098 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2100 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2103 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2108 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2110 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2113 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2115 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2119 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2120 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2121 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2122 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2123 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2124 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2125 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2129 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2130 int purpose, int trust)
2133 /* If purpose not set use default */
2135 purpose = def_purpose;
2136 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2139 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2141 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2142 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2145 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2146 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2147 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2149 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2150 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2153 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2155 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2157 trust = ptmp->trust;
2160 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2162 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2163 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2168 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2169 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2170 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2171 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2175 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2177 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2178 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2180 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2183 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2187 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2189 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2193 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2194 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2198 ctx->current_method = 0;
2200 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2202 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2203 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2207 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2208 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2209 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2210 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2211 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2212 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2213 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2217 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2220 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2225 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2229 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2231 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2234 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2235 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2240 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2241 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2244 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2248 if (store && store->check_issued)
2249 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2251 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2253 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2254 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2256 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2258 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2259 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2261 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2263 if (store && store->verify)
2264 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2266 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2268 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2269 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2271 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2273 if (store && store->get_crl)
2274 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2276 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2278 if (store && store->check_crl)
2279 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2281 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2283 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2284 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2286 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2288 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2289 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2291 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2293 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2294 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2296 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2298 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2301 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2302 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2303 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2305 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2306 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2309 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2316 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2317 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2320 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2322 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2323 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2326 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2330 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2331 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2332 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2335 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2336 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2339 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2340 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2343 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2344 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2347 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2349 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2352 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2354 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2357 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2360 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2363 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2364 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2366 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2369 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2374 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2376 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2379 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2381 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2382 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2385 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2388 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2393 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2396 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2400 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2402 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)