1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
82 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer);
83 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
84 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
85 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
86 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
87 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
88 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
89 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
92 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
98 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
100 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
104 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
106 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
109 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
112 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
113 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
114 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
116 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
122 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
123 * present and that the first entry is in place */
124 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
126 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
127 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
129 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
132 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
133 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
136 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
137 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
138 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
140 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
144 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
145 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
151 /* If we have enough, we break */
152 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
153 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
154 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
158 /* If we are self signed, we break */
159 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
160 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
162 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
163 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
165 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
168 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
170 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
173 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
174 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
175 ctx->last_untrusted++;
178 /* reparse the full chain for
186 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
187 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
188 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
190 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
194 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
195 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
196 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
197 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
199 /* we have a self signed certificate */
200 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
202 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
203 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
204 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
206 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
207 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
209 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
211 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
212 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
219 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
220 * so we get any trust settings.
224 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
225 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
230 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
231 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
232 ctx->last_untrusted--;
234 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
238 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
241 /* If we have enough, we break */
242 if (depth < num) break;
244 /* If we are self signed, we break */
245 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
246 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
248 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
250 if (ok < 0) return ok;
254 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
263 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
264 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
266 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
267 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
269 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
271 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
272 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
274 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
280 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
282 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
283 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
284 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
288 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
294 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
295 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
299 /* Check name constraints */
301 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
305 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
307 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
311 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
312 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
314 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
315 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
318 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
321 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
322 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
325 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
329 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
330 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
332 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
336 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
337 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
338 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
343 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
345 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
346 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
351 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
354 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
358 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
360 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
361 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
367 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
369 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
372 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
373 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
375 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
376 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
380 ctx->current_cert = x;
381 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
382 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
386 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
388 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
390 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
393 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
401 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
402 * with the supplied purpose
405 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
407 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
410 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
412 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
413 int proxy_path_length = 0;
415 int allow_proxy_certs;
418 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
419 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
420 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
421 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
422 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
423 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
424 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
428 /* CRL path validation */
431 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
432 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
437 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
438 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
440 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
441 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
442 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
445 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
446 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
449 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
450 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
451 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
453 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
454 ctx->error_depth = i;
455 ctx->current_cert = x;
459 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
461 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
462 ctx->error_depth = i;
463 ctx->current_cert = x;
467 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
471 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
472 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
475 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
484 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
491 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
495 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
503 ctx->error_depth = i;
504 ctx->current_cert = x;
508 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
510 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
512 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
515 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
516 ctx->error_depth = i;
517 ctx->current_cert = x;
522 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
523 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
524 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
525 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
527 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
528 ctx->error_depth = i;
529 ctx->current_cert = x;
533 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
534 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
536 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
537 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
538 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
540 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
542 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
545 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
546 ctx->error_depth = i;
547 ctx->current_cert = x;
563 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
567 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
568 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
570 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
571 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
572 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
574 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
575 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
576 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
577 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
579 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
581 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
584 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
588 ctx->error_depth = i;
589 ctx->current_cert = x;
590 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
599 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
601 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
606 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
608 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
609 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
610 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
611 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
612 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
614 ctx->error_depth = i;
615 ctx->current_cert = x;
616 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
619 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
625 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
628 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
630 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
631 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
634 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
636 ctx->error_depth = i;
637 ok = check_cert(ctx);
643 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
645 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
648 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
649 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
650 ctx->current_cert = x;
651 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
652 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
653 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
654 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
659 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
660 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
663 ctx->current_crl = crl;
664 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
666 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
668 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
674 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
676 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
680 ctx->current_crl = crl;
681 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
682 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
686 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
689 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
690 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
696 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
697 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
701 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
703 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
707 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
708 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
714 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
715 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
720 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
725 /* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
726 * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
727 * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
728 * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
729 * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
730 * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
732 * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
734 * a. it must be consistent.
735 * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
736 * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
737 * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
738 * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
739 * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
740 * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
743 /* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
744 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
745 /* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
746 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
748 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
750 #define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
752 /* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
754 #define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
756 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
757 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
759 int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
760 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
761 X509 *crl_issuer, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
762 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
766 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
767 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
769 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
770 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
772 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
774 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
776 if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
777 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
780 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
782 if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, &crl_issuer))
783 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
784 /* If CRL matches criteria and issuer is not different use it */
785 if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL && !crl_issuer)
788 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
792 if (crl_score > best_score)
795 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
796 best_score = crl_score;
802 ctx->current_issuer = best_crl_issuer;
803 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
809 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer)
812 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
816 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
818 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
819 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
821 /* If crl_issuer is self issued we may get a match further along the
824 if (crl_issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
826 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
828 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
829 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
831 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
834 if (!(crl_issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
840 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
842 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
845 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
846 * set of untrusted certificates.
849 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
851 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
852 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer),
853 X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
855 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
857 if (check_crl_path(ctx, crl_issuer))
859 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
868 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
869 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
870 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
871 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
875 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
877 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
881 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
884 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
885 /* Copy verify params across */
886 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
888 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
889 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
891 /* Verify CRL issuer */
892 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
894 /* Maybe send path check result back to parent? */
898 /* Check chain is acceptable */
900 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
903 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
907 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
908 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
909 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
910 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
911 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
912 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
915 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
916 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
917 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
919 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
920 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
921 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
922 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
927 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
928 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
929 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
930 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
934 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
936 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
937 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
938 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
944 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
949 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
954 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
956 gens = b->name.fullname;
958 else if (b->type == 1)
962 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
963 gens = a->name.fullname;
967 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
970 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
972 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
973 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
975 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
981 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
983 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
985 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
986 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
988 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
989 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
998 /* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
1000 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
1003 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1005 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1007 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1012 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1015 if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
1019 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1021 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1022 /* We don't handle these at present */
1023 if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
1025 if (idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1031 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
1032 * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
1033 * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
1036 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
1039 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1040 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1042 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1043 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
1050 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1052 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1054 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1065 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
1067 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1069 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1079 /* Check CRL validity */
1080 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1082 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1083 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1084 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1085 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1086 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1087 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1088 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1089 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1090 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1091 * is next certificate in chain.
1093 else if (cnum < chnum)
1094 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1097 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1098 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1099 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1101 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1102 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1109 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1110 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1111 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1113 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1114 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1118 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
1120 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1122 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1123 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1126 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
1128 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
1129 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1132 if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
1134 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1135 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1140 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1141 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1145 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1146 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1151 /* Verify CRL signature */
1152 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1154 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1155 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1161 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1168 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1172 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1173 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1176 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1177 * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
1178 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
1180 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
1182 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1183 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1188 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1190 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1192 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1193 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1201 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1206 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1207 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1210 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1213 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1216 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1221 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1223 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1224 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1226 ctx->current_cert = x;
1227 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1228 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1235 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1236 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1237 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1240 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1242 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1243 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1244 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1251 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1256 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1257 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1261 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1264 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1265 ctx->current_cert=x;
1266 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1272 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1273 ctx->current_cert=x;
1274 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1278 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1281 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1282 ctx->current_cert=x;
1283 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1289 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1290 ctx->current_cert=x;
1291 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1298 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1302 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1303 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1307 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1308 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1310 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1312 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1318 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1319 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1327 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1331 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1337 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1339 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1340 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1344 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1345 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1346 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1347 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1348 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1349 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1350 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1351 * been declared trusted. */
1353 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1354 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1358 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1362 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1368 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1372 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1373 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1374 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1382 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1390 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1392 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1395 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1400 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1405 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1406 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1408 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1415 if (i < 13) return 0;
1421 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1422 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1427 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1431 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1442 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1444 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1445 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1450 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1451 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1453 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1456 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1458 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1459 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1460 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1463 if (i < j) return -1;
1464 if (i > j) return 1;
1466 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1467 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1473 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1475 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1478 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1483 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1487 if (s) type = s->type;
1488 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1489 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1490 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1493 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1495 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1498 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1500 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1502 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1505 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1508 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1512 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1518 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1522 /* first, populate the other certs */
1523 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1525 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1526 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1527 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1530 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1531 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1535 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1536 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1538 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1539 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1540 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1541 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1544 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1546 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1549 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1551 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1554 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1559 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1564 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1566 return ctx->error_depth;
1569 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1571 return ctx->current_cert;
1574 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1579 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1583 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1584 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1585 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1587 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1588 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1593 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1598 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1603 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1608 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1610 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1613 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1615 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1618 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1619 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1620 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1621 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1622 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1623 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1624 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1625 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1628 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1629 int purpose, int trust)
1632 /* If purpose not set use default */
1633 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1634 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1638 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1641 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1642 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1645 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1646 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1648 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1651 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1652 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1655 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1657 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1658 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1662 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1665 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1666 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1671 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1672 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1676 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1678 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1679 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1682 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1685 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1689 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1691 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1695 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1696 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1700 ctx->current_method=0;
1702 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1704 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1705 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1709 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1711 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1712 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1716 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1720 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1724 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1730 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1732 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1736 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1737 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1743 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1744 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1748 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1752 if (store && store->check_issued)
1753 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1755 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1757 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1758 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1760 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1762 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1763 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1765 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1767 if (store && store->verify)
1768 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1770 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1772 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1773 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1775 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1777 if (store && store->get_crl)
1778 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1780 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1782 if (store && store->check_crl)
1783 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1785 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1787 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1788 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1790 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1792 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
1793 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
1795 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
1797 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
1798 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
1800 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
1802 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1805 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1806 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1807 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1808 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1809 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1813 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1819 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1820 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1823 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1825 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1826 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1829 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1831 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1832 if (ctx->param != NULL)
1834 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
1835 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1838 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
1840 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1843 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1845 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1848 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1849 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1852 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1854 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1857 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1859 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1862 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1864 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1867 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1868 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1870 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1873 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1878 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1880 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1883 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1885 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1886 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1889 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1892 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1897 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1900 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1904 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1905 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1907 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1909 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1910 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)