1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
82 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
83 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
84 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
87 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
93 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
95 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
99 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
101 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
104 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
107 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
108 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
109 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
111 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
117 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
118 * present and that the first entry is in place */
119 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
121 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
122 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
124 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
127 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
128 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
131 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
132 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
133 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
135 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
139 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
140 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
146 /* If we have enough, we break */
147 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
148 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
149 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
153 /* If we are self signed, we break */
154 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
155 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
157 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
158 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
160 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
163 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
168 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
169 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
170 ctx->last_untrusted++;
173 /* reparse the full chain for
181 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
182 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
183 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
185 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
189 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
190 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
191 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
192 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
194 /* we have a self signed certificate */
195 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
197 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
198 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
199 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
201 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
202 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
204 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
206 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
207 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
214 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
215 * so we get any trust settings.
219 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
220 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
225 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
226 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
227 ctx->last_untrusted--;
229 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
233 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
236 /* If we have enough, we break */
237 if (depth < num) break;
239 /* If we are self signed, we break */
240 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
241 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
243 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
245 if (ok < 0) return ok;
249 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
252 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
258 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
259 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
261 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
262 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
264 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
266 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
269 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
275 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
277 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
278 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
279 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
283 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
289 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
290 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
294 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
296 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
300 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
301 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
303 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
304 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
307 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
310 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
311 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
314 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
318 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
319 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
321 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
325 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
326 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
327 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
332 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
334 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
335 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
340 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
343 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
347 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
349 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
350 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
356 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
358 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
361 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
362 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
364 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
365 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
369 ctx->current_cert = x;
370 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
371 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
375 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
377 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
379 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
382 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
390 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
391 * with the supplied purpose
394 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
396 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
399 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
401 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
402 int proxy_path_length = 0;
403 int allow_proxy_certs =
404 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
407 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
408 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
409 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
410 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
411 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
412 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
413 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
417 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
419 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
420 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
422 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
423 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
426 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
427 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
428 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
430 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
431 ctx->error_depth = i;
432 ctx->current_cert = x;
436 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
439 ctx->error_depth = i;
440 ctx->current_cert = x;
444 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
448 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
449 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
452 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
461 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
468 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
472 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
480 ctx->error_depth = i;
481 ctx->current_cert = x;
485 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
487 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
490 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
493 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
494 ctx->error_depth = i;
495 ctx->current_cert = x;
501 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
502 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
504 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
505 ctx->error_depth = i;
506 ctx->current_cert = x;
510 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
511 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
512 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
514 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
516 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
519 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
520 ctx->error_depth = i;
521 ctx->current_cert = x;
537 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
539 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
544 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
546 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
547 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
548 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
549 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
550 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
552 ctx->error_depth = i;
553 ctx->current_cert = x;
554 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
555 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
557 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
563 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
566 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
568 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
569 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
572 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
574 ctx->error_depth = i;
575 ok = check_cert(ctx);
581 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
583 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
586 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
587 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
588 ctx->current_cert = x;
589 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
590 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
591 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
596 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
597 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
600 ctx->current_crl = crl;
601 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
603 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
605 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
611 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
613 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
617 ctx->current_crl = crl;
618 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
619 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
623 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
626 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
627 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
633 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
634 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
638 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
640 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
644 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
645 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
651 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
652 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
657 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
662 /* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
663 * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
664 * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
665 * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
666 * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
667 * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
669 * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
671 * a. it must be consistent.
672 * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
673 * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
674 * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
675 * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
676 * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
677 * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
680 /* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
681 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
682 /* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
683 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
685 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
687 #define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
689 /* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
691 #define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
693 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
694 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
696 int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
697 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
698 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
701 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
702 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
704 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
705 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
707 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
709 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
711 if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
712 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
715 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
719 if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
720 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
723 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
725 if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
728 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
732 if (crl_score > best_score)
735 best_score = crl_score;
741 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
747 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
749 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
750 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
752 if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
758 /* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
760 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
763 GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
764 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
766 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
768 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
773 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
776 if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
778 if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
782 inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
783 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
785 GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
786 for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
788 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
789 /* We don't handle these at present */
790 if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
792 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
794 dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
795 for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
798 sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
799 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
807 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
808 * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
809 * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
812 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
815 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
816 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
818 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
819 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
826 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
828 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
830 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
841 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
843 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
845 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
855 /* Check CRL validity */
856 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
859 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
860 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
861 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
862 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
863 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
864 * is next certificate in chain.
867 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
870 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
871 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
872 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
874 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
875 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
882 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
883 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
884 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
886 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
887 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
891 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
893 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
895 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
896 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
899 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
901 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
902 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
905 if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
907 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
908 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
913 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
914 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
918 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
919 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
924 /* Verify CRL signature */
925 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
927 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
928 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
934 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
945 /* Check certificate against CRL */
946 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
949 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
950 * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
951 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
953 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
955 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
956 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
961 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
963 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
965 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
966 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
974 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
977 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
978 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
981 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
984 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
987 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
992 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
994 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
995 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
997 ctx->current_cert = x;
998 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
999 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1005 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1006 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1007 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1010 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1012 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1013 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1014 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1021 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1026 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1027 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1031 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1034 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1035 ctx->current_cert=x;
1036 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1042 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1043 ctx->current_cert=x;
1044 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1048 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1051 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1052 ctx->current_cert=x;
1053 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1059 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1060 ctx->current_cert=x;
1061 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1068 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1072 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1073 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1077 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1078 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1080 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1082 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1088 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1089 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1097 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1101 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1107 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1109 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1110 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1114 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1115 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1116 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1117 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1118 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1119 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1120 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1121 * been declared trusted. */
1123 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1124 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1128 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1132 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1138 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1142 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1143 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1144 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1152 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1160 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1162 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1165 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1170 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1175 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1176 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1178 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1185 if (i < 13) return 0;
1191 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1192 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1197 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1201 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1212 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1214 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1215 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1220 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1221 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1223 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1226 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1228 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1229 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1230 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1233 if (i < j) return -1;
1234 if (i > j) return 1;
1236 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1237 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1243 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1245 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1248 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1253 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1257 if (s) type = s->type;
1258 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1259 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1260 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1263 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1265 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1268 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1270 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1272 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1275 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1278 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1282 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1288 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1292 /* first, populate the other certs */
1293 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1295 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1296 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1297 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1300 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1301 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1305 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1306 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1308 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1309 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1310 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1311 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1314 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1316 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1319 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1321 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1324 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1329 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1334 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1336 return ctx->error_depth;
1339 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1341 return ctx->current_cert;
1344 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1349 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1353 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1354 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1355 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1357 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1358 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1363 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1368 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1373 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1378 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1380 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1383 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1385 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1388 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1389 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1390 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1391 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1392 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1393 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1394 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1395 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1398 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1399 int purpose, int trust)
1402 /* If purpose not set use default */
1403 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1404 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1408 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1411 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1412 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1415 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1416 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1418 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1421 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1422 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1425 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1427 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1428 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1432 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1435 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1436 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1441 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1442 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1446 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1448 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1449 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1452 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1455 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1459 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1461 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1465 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1466 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1470 ctx->current_method=0;
1472 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1474 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1475 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1479 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1481 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1482 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1485 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1489 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1493 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1499 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1501 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1505 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1506 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1512 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1513 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1517 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1521 if (store && store->check_issued)
1522 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1524 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1526 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1527 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1529 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1531 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1532 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1534 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1536 if (store && store->verify)
1537 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1539 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1541 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1542 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1544 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1546 if (store && store->get_crl)
1547 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1549 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1551 if (store && store->check_crl)
1552 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1554 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1556 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1557 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1559 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1561 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
1562 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
1564 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
1566 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
1567 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
1569 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
1571 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1574 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1575 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1576 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1577 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1578 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1582 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1588 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1589 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1592 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1594 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1595 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1598 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1600 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1601 if (ctx->param != NULL)
1603 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1606 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
1608 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1611 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1613 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1616 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1617 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1620 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1622 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1625 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1627 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1630 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1632 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1635 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1636 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1638 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1641 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1646 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1648 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1651 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1653 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1654 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1657 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1660 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1665 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1668 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1672 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1673 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1675 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1677 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1678 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)