1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
82 const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
85 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
99 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
102 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
106 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
107 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
109 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
115 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
116 * present and that the first entry is in place */
117 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
119 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
120 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
122 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
125 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
126 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
129 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
130 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
131 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
133 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
137 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
138 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
144 /* If we have enough, we break */
145 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
146 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
147 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
151 /* If we are self signed, we break */
152 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
153 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
155 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
156 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
158 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
161 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
163 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
166 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
167 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
168 ctx->last_untrusted++;
171 /* reparse the full chain for
179 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
180 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
181 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
183 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
187 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
188 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
189 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
190 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
192 /* we have a self signed certificate */
193 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
195 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
196 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
197 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
199 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
200 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
202 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
204 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
205 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
212 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
213 * so we get any trust settings.
217 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
218 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
223 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
224 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
225 ctx->last_untrusted--;
227 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
231 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
234 /* If we have enough, we break */
235 if (depth < num) break;
237 /* If we are self signed, we break */
238 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
239 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
241 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
243 if (ok < 0) return ok;
247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
250 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
256 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
257 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
259 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
260 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
262 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
264 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
265 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
273 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
275 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
276 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
277 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
281 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
287 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
288 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
292 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
294 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
298 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
299 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
301 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
302 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
305 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
308 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
309 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
312 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
315 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
316 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
317 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
322 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
324 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
325 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
330 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
333 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
337 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
339 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
340 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
346 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
348 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
351 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
352 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
354 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
355 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
359 ctx->current_cert = x;
360 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
361 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
365 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
367 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
369 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
372 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
380 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
381 * with the supplied purpose
384 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
386 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
389 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
394 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
395 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
396 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
397 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
398 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
399 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
400 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
403 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
404 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
407 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
408 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
409 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
411 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
412 ctx->error_depth = i;
413 ctx->current_cert = x;
417 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
421 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
422 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
425 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
434 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
441 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
445 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
453 ctx->error_depth = i;
454 ctx->current_cert = x;
458 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
460 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
463 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
466 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
467 ctx->error_depth = i;
468 ctx->current_cert = x;
474 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
475 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
477 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
478 ctx->error_depth = i;
479 ctx->current_cert = x;
483 /* The next certificate must be a CA */
492 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
501 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
502 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
503 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
504 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
505 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
507 ctx->error_depth = i;
508 ctx->current_cert = x;
509 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
512 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
518 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
521 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
523 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
524 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
527 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
529 ctx->error_depth = i;
530 ok = check_cert(ctx);
536 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
538 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
541 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
542 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
543 ctx->current_cert = x;
544 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
545 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
546 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
552 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
555 ctx->current_crl = crl;
556 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
558 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
560 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
566 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
568 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
572 ctx->current_crl = crl;
573 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
574 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
578 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
581 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
582 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
588 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
589 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
593 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
595 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
599 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
600 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
606 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
607 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
612 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
617 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
618 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
619 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
620 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
624 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
625 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
628 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
629 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
631 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
632 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
634 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
637 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
645 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
651 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
652 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
654 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
657 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
660 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
661 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
668 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
672 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
681 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
687 /* Check CRL validity */
688 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
691 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
692 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
693 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
694 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
695 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
696 * is next certificate in chain.
699 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
702 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
703 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
704 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
706 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
707 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
714 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
715 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
716 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
718 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
719 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
723 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
724 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
728 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
729 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
734 /* Verify CRL signature */
735 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
737 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
738 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
744 if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
754 /* Check certificate against CRL */
755 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
759 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
761 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
762 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
763 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
764 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
766 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
768 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
769 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
770 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
772 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
773 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
774 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
778 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
779 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
783 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
786 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
787 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
789 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
793 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
795 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
797 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
798 if (ext->critical > 0)
801 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
802 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
810 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
813 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
814 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
817 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
820 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
823 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
828 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
830 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
831 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
833 ctx->current_cert = x;
834 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
835 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
841 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
842 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
843 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
846 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
848 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
849 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
850 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
857 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
862 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
863 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
867 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
870 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
872 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
878 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
880 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
884 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
887 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
889 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
895 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
897 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
904 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
913 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
914 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
916 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
918 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
924 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
925 ctx->current_cert=xi;
933 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
937 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
943 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
945 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
946 ctx->current_cert=xi;
950 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
951 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
952 * this is a waste of time. That check should
953 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
954 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
955 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
956 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
957 * been declared trusted. */
959 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
960 ctx->current_cert=xs;
974 if (!check_cert_time(ctx, xs))
977 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
978 ctx->current_cert=xs;
986 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
994 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
996 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
999 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1004 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1009 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1010 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1012 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1019 if (i < 13) return 0;
1025 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1026 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1031 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1035 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1046 if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
1048 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1049 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1054 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1055 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1057 X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
1059 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1061 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1062 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1063 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1066 if (i < j) return -1;
1067 if (i > j) return 1;
1069 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1070 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1076 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1078 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1081 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1086 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1090 if (s) type = s->type;
1091 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1092 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1093 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1096 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1098 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1101 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1103 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1105 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1108 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1111 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1115 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1121 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1125 /* first, populate the other certs */
1126 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1128 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1129 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1130 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1133 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1134 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1138 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1139 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1141 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1142 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1143 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1144 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1147 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1149 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1152 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1154 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1157 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1162 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1167 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1169 return ctx->error_depth;
1172 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1174 return ctx->current_cert;
1177 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1182 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1186 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1187 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1188 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1190 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1191 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1196 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1201 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1206 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1211 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1213 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1216 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1218 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1221 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1222 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1223 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1224 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1225 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1226 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1227 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1228 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1231 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1232 int purpose, int trust)
1235 /* If purpose not set use default */
1236 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1237 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1241 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1244 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1245 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1248 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1249 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1251 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1254 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1255 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1258 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1260 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1261 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1265 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1268 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1269 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1274 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1275 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1279 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1281 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1282 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1285 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1288 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1292 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1294 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1298 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1299 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1303 ctx->current_method=0;
1305 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1307 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1308 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1312 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1314 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1315 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1318 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1322 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1326 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1332 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1334 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1338 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1339 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1345 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1346 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1350 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1354 if (store && store->check_issued)
1355 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1357 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1359 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1360 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1362 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1364 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1365 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1367 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1369 if (store && store->verify)
1370 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1372 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1374 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1375 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1377 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1379 if (store && store->get_crl)
1380 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1382 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1384 if (store && store->check_crl)
1385 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1387 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1389 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1390 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1392 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1394 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1397 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1398 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1399 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1400 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1401 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1405 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1411 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1412 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1415 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1417 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1418 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1421 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1423 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1424 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1426 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1427 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1429 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1432 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1433 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1436 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1438 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1441 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1443 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1446 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1448 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1451 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1452 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1454 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1457 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1462 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1464 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1467 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1469 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1470 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1473 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1476 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1481 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1484 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1488 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1489 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1491 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1493 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1494 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)