1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
82 const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
85 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
99 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
102 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
106 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
107 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
109 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
115 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
116 * present and that the first entry is in place */
117 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
119 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
120 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
122 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
125 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
126 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
129 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
130 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
131 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
133 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
137 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
138 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
144 /* If we have enough, we break */
145 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
146 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
147 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
151 /* If we are self signed, we break */
152 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
153 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
155 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
156 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
158 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
161 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
163 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
166 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
167 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
168 ctx->last_untrusted++;
171 /* reparse the full chain for
179 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
180 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
181 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
183 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
187 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
188 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
189 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
190 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
192 /* we have a self signed certificate */
193 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
195 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
196 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
197 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
199 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
200 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
202 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
204 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
205 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
212 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
213 * so we get any trust settings.
217 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
218 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
223 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
224 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
225 ctx->last_untrusted--;
227 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
231 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
234 /* If we have enough, we break */
235 if (depth < num) break;
237 /* If we are self signed, we break */
238 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
239 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
241 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
243 if (ok < 0) return ok;
247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
250 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
256 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
257 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
259 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
260 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
262 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
264 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
265 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
273 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
275 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
276 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
277 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
281 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
287 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
288 if (param->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
292 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
294 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
298 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
299 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
301 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
302 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
305 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
308 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
309 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
312 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
315 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
316 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
317 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
322 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
324 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
325 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
330 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
333 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
337 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
339 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
340 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
346 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
348 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
351 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
352 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
354 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
355 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
359 ctx->current_cert = x;
360 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
361 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
365 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
367 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
369 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
372 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
380 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
381 * with the supplied purpose
384 static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
386 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
393 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
394 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
397 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
398 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
399 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
402 ctx->error_depth = i;
403 ctx->current_cert = x;
407 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose, i);
409 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
413 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
415 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
416 ctx->error_depth = i;
417 ctx->current_cert = x;
422 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
423 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
425 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
426 ctx->error_depth = i;
427 ctx->current_cert = x;
438 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
440 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
447 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
448 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
449 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
450 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
451 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
453 ctx->error_depth = i;
454 ctx->current_cert = x;
455 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
456 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
458 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
464 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
467 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
469 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
470 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
473 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
475 ctx->error_depth = i;
476 ok = check_cert(ctx);
482 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
484 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
487 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
488 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
489 ctx->current_cert = x;
490 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
491 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
492 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
498 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
501 ctx->current_crl = crl;
502 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
504 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
506 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
512 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
514 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
518 ctx->current_crl = crl;
519 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
520 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
524 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
527 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
528 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
534 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
535 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
539 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
541 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
545 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
546 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
552 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
553 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
558 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
563 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
564 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
565 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
566 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
570 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
571 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
574 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
575 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
577 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
578 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
580 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
583 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
591 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
597 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
598 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
600 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
603 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
606 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
607 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
614 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
618 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
627 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
633 /* Check CRL validity */
634 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
637 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
638 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
639 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
640 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
641 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
642 * is next certificate in chain.
645 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
648 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
649 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
650 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
652 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
653 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
660 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
661 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
662 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
664 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
665 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
669 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
670 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
674 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
675 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
680 /* Verify CRL signature */
681 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
683 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
684 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
690 if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
700 /* Check certificate against CRL */
701 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
705 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
707 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
708 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
709 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
710 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
711 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
715 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
716 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
720 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
723 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
724 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
726 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
730 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
732 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
734 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
735 if (ext->critical > 0)
738 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
739 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
747 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
750 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit, ctx->chain,
751 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
754 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
757 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
760 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
765 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
767 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
768 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
770 ctx->current_cert = x;
771 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
772 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
778 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
779 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
780 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
783 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
785 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
786 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
787 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
794 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
799 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
800 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
804 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
807 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
809 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
815 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
817 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
821 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
824 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
826 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
832 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
834 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
841 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
850 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
851 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
853 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
855 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
861 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
862 ctx->current_cert=xi;
870 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
874 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
880 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
882 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
883 ctx->current_cert=xi;
887 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
888 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
889 * this is a waste of time. That check should
890 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
891 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
892 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
893 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
894 * been declared trusted. */
896 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
897 ctx->current_cert=xs;
911 if (!check_cert_time(ctx, xs))
914 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
915 ctx->current_cert=xs;
923 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
931 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
933 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
936 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
941 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
946 str=(char *)ctm->data;
947 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
949 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
956 if (i < 13) return 0;
962 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
963 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
968 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
972 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
983 if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
985 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
986 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
991 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
992 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
994 X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
996 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
998 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
999 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1000 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1003 if (i < j) return -1;
1004 if (i > j) return 1;
1006 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1007 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1013 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1015 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1018 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1023 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1027 if (s) type = s->type;
1028 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1029 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1030 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1033 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1035 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1038 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1040 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1042 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1045 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1048 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1052 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1058 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1062 /* first, populate the other certs */
1063 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1065 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1066 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1067 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1070 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1071 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1075 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1076 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1078 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1079 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1080 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1081 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1084 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1086 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1089 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1091 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1094 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1099 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1104 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1106 return ctx->error_depth;
1109 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1111 return ctx->current_cert;
1114 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1119 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1123 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1124 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1125 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1127 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1128 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1133 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1138 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1143 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1148 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1150 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1153 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1155 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1158 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1159 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1160 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1161 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1162 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1163 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1164 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1165 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1168 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1169 int purpose, int trust)
1172 /* If purpose not set use default */
1173 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1174 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1178 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1181 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1182 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1185 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1186 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1188 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1191 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1192 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1195 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1197 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1198 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1202 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1205 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1206 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1211 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1212 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1216 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1218 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1219 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1222 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1225 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1229 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1231 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1235 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1236 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1240 ctx->current_method=0;
1242 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1244 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1245 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1251 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1252 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1255 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1259 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1263 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1269 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1271 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1275 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1276 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1282 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1283 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1287 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1291 if (store && store->check_issued)
1292 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1294 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1296 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1297 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1299 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1301 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1302 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1304 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1306 if (store && store->verify)
1307 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1309 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1311 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1312 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1314 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1316 if (store && store->get_crl)
1317 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1319 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1321 if (store && store->check_crl)
1322 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1324 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1326 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1327 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1329 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1331 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1334 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1335 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1336 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1337 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1338 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1342 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1348 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1349 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1352 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1354 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1355 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1358 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1360 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1361 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1363 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1364 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1366 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1369 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1370 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1373 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1375 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1378 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1380 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1383 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1385 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1388 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1389 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1391 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1394 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1399 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1401 return ctx->explicit;
1404 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1406 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1407 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1410 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1413 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1418 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1421 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1425 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1426 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1428 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1430 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1431 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)