1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
129 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
149 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
151 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
152 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
162 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
171 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
175 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
176 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
185 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
188 int depth, i, ok = 0;
190 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
191 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
192 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
193 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
200 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
201 * the first entry is in place
203 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
204 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
205 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
206 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
209 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
210 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
213 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
214 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
215 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
216 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
221 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
222 depth = param->depth;
225 /* If we have enough, we break */
227 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
228 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
229 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
232 /* If we are self signed, we break */
233 if (cert_self_signed(x))
236 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
238 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
239 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
243 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
252 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
253 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
254 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
256 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
260 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
261 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
262 ctx->last_untrusted++;
266 * reparse the full chain for the next one
274 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
277 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
278 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
284 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
286 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
287 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
288 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
289 /* we have a self signed certificate */
290 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
292 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
293 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
294 * possible impersonation.
296 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
297 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
298 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
299 ctx->current_cert = x;
300 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
309 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
310 * version so we get any trust settings.
314 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
315 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
319 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
321 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
322 ctx->last_untrusted--;
325 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
328 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
330 /* If we have enough, we break */
333 /* If we are self signed, we break */
334 if (cert_self_signed(x))
336 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
343 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
345 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
351 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
352 i = check_trust(ctx);
354 /* If explicitly rejected error */
355 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
358 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
359 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
360 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
364 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
365 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
366 && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
368 STACK_OF(X509) *chtmp = ctx->chain;
369 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
371 * Temporarily set chain to NULL so we don't discount
372 * duplicates: the same certificate could be an untrusted
373 * CA found in the trusted store.
376 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
380 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
383 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
388 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
392 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
395 ctx->last_untrusted--;
405 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
406 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
407 * and set bad_chain == 1
409 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
410 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
411 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
412 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
414 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
415 ctx->current_cert = x;
418 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
420 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
421 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
422 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
426 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
433 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
434 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
439 /* Check name constraints */
441 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
451 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
452 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
455 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
456 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
459 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
463 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
465 if (i != X509_V_OK) {
467 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
473 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
474 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
475 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
477 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
481 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
482 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
485 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
489 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
490 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
491 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
496 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
504 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
507 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
510 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
511 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
512 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
513 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
515 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
522 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
524 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
528 return cert_self_signed(x);
529 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
530 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
533 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
534 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
536 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
537 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
538 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
539 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
545 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
547 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
548 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
552 ctx->current_cert = x;
553 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
554 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
557 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
559 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
561 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
563 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
570 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
574 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
576 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
578 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
579 int proxy_path_length = 0;
581 int allow_proxy_certs;
585 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
586 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
587 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
588 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
589 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
590 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
591 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
595 /* CRL path validation */
597 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
598 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
601 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
603 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
606 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
607 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
608 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
611 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
612 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
615 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
616 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
618 ctx->error_depth = i;
619 ctx->current_cert = x;
624 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
625 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
626 ctx->error_depth = i;
627 ctx->current_cert = x;
632 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
633 switch (must_be_ca) {
635 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
636 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
638 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
645 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
651 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
654 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
660 ctx->error_depth = i;
661 ctx->current_cert = x;
666 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
667 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
669 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
672 ctx->error_depth = i;
673 ctx->current_cert = x;
679 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
680 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
681 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
682 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
683 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
684 ctx->error_depth = i;
685 ctx->current_cert = x;
690 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
691 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
694 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
695 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
696 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
698 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
699 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
700 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
701 ctx->error_depth = i;
702 ctx->current_cert = x;
717 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
721 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
722 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
723 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
724 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
725 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
728 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
729 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
730 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
733 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
734 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
736 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
737 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
739 ctx->error_depth = i;
740 ctx->current_cert = x;
741 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
750 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
752 ctx->error = errcode;
753 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
754 ctx->error_depth = 0;
755 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
758 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
761 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
764 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
765 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
766 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
772 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
774 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
775 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
777 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
778 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
781 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
782 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
785 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
786 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
792 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
796 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
798 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
799 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
800 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
801 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
802 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
803 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
804 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
806 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
809 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
810 ctx->error_depth = i;
811 ctx->current_cert = x;
812 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
815 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
819 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
822 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
824 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
825 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
826 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
827 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
829 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
831 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
832 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
837 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
838 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
840 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
843 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
845 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
846 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
848 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
849 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
851 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
856 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
857 ctx->error_depth = i;
858 ok = check_cert(ctx);
865 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
867 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
869 int ok = 0, cnum = 0;
870 unsigned int last_reasons = 0;
871 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
872 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
873 ctx->current_cert = x;
874 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
875 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
876 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
877 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
878 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
879 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
881 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
883 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
885 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
888 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
889 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
892 ctx->current_crl = crl;
893 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
898 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
901 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
907 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
909 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
919 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
922 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
923 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
924 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
932 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
937 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
939 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
944 ctx->current_crl = crl;
945 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
946 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
950 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
954 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
955 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
962 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
963 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
967 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
968 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
973 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
974 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
977 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
978 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
981 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
982 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
988 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
993 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
994 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
995 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
997 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
998 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
999 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1000 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1001 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1003 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1004 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1005 reasons = *preasons;
1006 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1008 if (crl_score > best_score) {
1010 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1011 best_score = crl_score;
1012 best_reasons = reasons;
1017 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1019 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1020 *pscore = best_score;
1021 *preasons = best_reasons;
1022 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1023 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1025 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1028 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1035 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1036 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1039 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1041 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1043 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1045 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1046 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1048 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1052 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1056 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1058 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1068 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1074 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1076 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1078 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1079 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1081 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1082 if (!base->crl_number)
1084 /* Issuer names must match */
1085 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1087 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1088 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1090 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1092 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1093 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1095 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1096 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1102 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1103 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1106 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1107 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1111 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1113 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1115 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1116 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1117 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1118 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1119 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1120 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1129 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1130 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1131 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1132 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1133 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1136 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1137 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1141 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1143 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1145 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1146 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1148 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1149 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1150 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1152 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1153 /* If no new reasons reject */
1154 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1157 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1158 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1160 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1161 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1162 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1165 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1167 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1168 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1171 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1172 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1174 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1175 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1177 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1179 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1182 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1184 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1185 /* If no new reasons reject */
1186 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1188 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1189 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1192 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1198 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1199 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1201 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1202 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1203 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1206 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1209 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1211 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1212 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1213 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1214 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1219 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1220 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1221 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1223 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1224 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1225 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1230 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1232 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1236 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1237 * untrusted certificates.
1239 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1240 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1241 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1243 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1244 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1245 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1252 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1253 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1254 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1255 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1258 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1260 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1262 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1265 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1268 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1269 /* Copy verify params across */
1270 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1272 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1273 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1275 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1276 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1281 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1283 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1285 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1290 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1291 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1292 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1293 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1294 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1298 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1299 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1300 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1302 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1303 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1304 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1305 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1311 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1312 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1313 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1314 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1315 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1318 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1320 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1321 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1322 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1329 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1333 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1338 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1340 gens = b->name.fullname;
1341 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1344 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1345 gens = a->name.fullname;
1349 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1351 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1352 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1353 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1355 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1361 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1363 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1364 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1365 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1366 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1367 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1376 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1379 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1380 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1382 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1383 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1384 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1385 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1387 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1393 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1395 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1396 unsigned int *preasons)
1399 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1401 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1402 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1405 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1408 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1410 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1411 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1412 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1413 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1418 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1419 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1425 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1426 * to find a delta CRL too
1429 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1430 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1433 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1435 unsigned int reasons;
1436 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1437 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1438 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1439 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1440 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1441 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1446 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1448 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1450 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1454 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1456 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1460 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1462 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1463 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1464 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1473 /* Check CRL validity */
1474 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1476 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1477 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1478 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1479 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1480 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1481 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1482 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1483 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1486 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1487 * certificate in chain.
1489 else if (cnum < chnum)
1490 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1492 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1493 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1494 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1495 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1496 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1504 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1506 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1507 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1508 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1509 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1511 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1516 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1517 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1518 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1523 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1524 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1525 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1526 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1532 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1534 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1541 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1542 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1547 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1548 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1552 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1557 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1558 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1560 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1564 /* Verify CRL signature */
1565 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1566 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1567 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1577 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1581 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1582 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1587 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1588 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1589 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1590 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1592 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1593 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1594 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1595 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1600 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1601 * is not removeFromCRL.
1603 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1604 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1606 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1607 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1615 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1620 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1621 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1623 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1626 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1629 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1633 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1634 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1635 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1637 ctx->current_cert = x;
1638 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1639 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1645 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1646 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1647 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1650 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1651 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1652 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1653 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1660 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1665 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1666 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1670 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1674 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1675 ctx->current_cert = x;
1676 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1683 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1684 ctx->current_cert = x;
1685 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1689 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1693 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1694 ctx->current_cert = x;
1695 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1702 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1703 ctx->current_cert = x;
1704 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1711 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1715 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1716 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1718 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1720 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1721 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1723 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1725 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1728 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1733 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1734 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1739 ctx->error_depth = n;
1740 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1744 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1746 ctx->error_depth = n;
1749 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1750 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1755 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1756 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1757 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1758 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1759 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1762 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1763 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1764 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1765 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1767 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1771 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1778 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1782 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1783 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1784 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1785 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1792 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1800 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1802 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1805 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1810 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1815 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1816 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1817 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
1830 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1836 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1839 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
1850 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1852 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1853 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1857 atm.type = ctm->type;
1859 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1860 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1862 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1865 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1866 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1868 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1869 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1878 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1879 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1885 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1887 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1890 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1892 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1895 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1896 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1905 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1906 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1907 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1908 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1909 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1911 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1914 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1916 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1919 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1922 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1923 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1925 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1926 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1929 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1931 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1935 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1936 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1940 /* first, populate the other certs */
1941 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1942 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1943 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1944 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1948 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1949 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1953 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1955 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1956 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1958 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1960 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1961 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1962 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1963 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1966 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1967 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1968 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1971 /* Issuer names must match */
1972 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1973 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1976 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1977 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1978 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1981 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1982 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1985 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1986 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1987 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1990 /* CRLs must verify */
1991 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1992 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1993 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1996 /* Create new CRL */
1997 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1998 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2000 /* Set issuer name */
2001 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2004 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2006 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2009 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2011 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2015 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2016 * number to correct value too.
2019 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2020 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2021 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2022 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2026 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2028 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2030 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2031 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2032 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2034 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2035 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2037 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2038 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2041 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2042 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2047 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2049 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2055 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2060 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2061 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2062 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2063 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2066 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2067 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2069 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2070 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2073 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2075 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2078 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2080 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2083 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2088 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2093 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2095 return ctx->error_depth;
2098 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2100 return ctx->current_cert;
2103 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2108 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2112 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2115 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2117 return ctx->current_issuer;
2120 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2122 return ctx->current_crl;
2125 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2130 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2135 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2137 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2140 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2145 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2147 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2150 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2152 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2156 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2157 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2158 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2159 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2160 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2161 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2162 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2166 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2167 int purpose, int trust)
2170 /* If purpose not set use default */
2172 purpose = def_purpose;
2173 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2176 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2178 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2179 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2182 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2183 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2184 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2186 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2187 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2190 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2192 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2194 trust = ptmp->trust;
2197 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2199 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2200 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2205 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2206 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2207 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2208 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2212 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2214 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2217 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2220 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
2224 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2228 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2232 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2233 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2237 ctx->current_method = 0;
2239 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2241 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2242 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2246 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2247 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2248 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2249 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2250 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2251 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2252 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2256 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2259 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2268 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2270 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2273 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2274 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2279 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2280 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2283 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2287 if (store && store->check_issued)
2288 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2290 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2292 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2293 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2295 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2297 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2298 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2300 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2302 if (store && store->verify)
2303 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2305 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2307 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2308 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2310 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2312 if (store && store->get_crl)
2313 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2315 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2317 if (store && store->check_crl)
2318 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2320 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2322 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2323 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2325 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2327 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2328 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2330 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2332 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2333 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2335 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2337 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2340 * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we
2341 * put a corresponding "new" here.
2343 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2346 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2353 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2354 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2357 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2359 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2360 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2363 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2367 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2368 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2369 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2372 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2374 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2376 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2377 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2380 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2382 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2385 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2387 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2390 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2393 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2396 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2397 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2399 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2402 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2407 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2409 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2412 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2414 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2415 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2418 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2421 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2426 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2428 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);