1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
82 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
83 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
84 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
87 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
93 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
95 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
99 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
101 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
104 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
107 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
108 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
109 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
111 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
117 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
118 * present and that the first entry is in place */
119 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
121 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
122 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
124 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
127 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
128 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
131 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
132 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
133 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
135 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
139 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
140 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
146 /* If we have enough, we break */
147 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
148 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
149 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
153 /* If we are self signed, we break */
154 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
155 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
157 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
158 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
160 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
163 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
168 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
169 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
170 ctx->last_untrusted++;
173 /* reparse the full chain for
181 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
182 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
183 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
185 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
189 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
190 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
191 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
192 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
194 /* we have a self signed certificate */
195 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
197 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
198 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
199 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
201 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
202 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
204 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
206 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
207 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
214 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
215 * so we get any trust settings.
219 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
220 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
225 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
226 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
227 ctx->last_untrusted--;
229 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
233 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
236 /* If we have enough, we break */
237 if (depth < num) break;
239 /* If we are self signed, we break */
240 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
241 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
243 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
245 if (ok < 0) return ok;
249 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
252 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
258 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
259 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
261 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
262 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
264 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
266 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
269 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
275 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
277 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
278 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
279 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
283 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
289 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
290 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
294 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
296 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
300 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
301 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
303 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
304 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
307 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
310 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
311 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
314 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
318 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
319 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
321 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
325 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
326 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
327 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
332 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
334 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
335 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
340 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
343 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
347 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
349 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
350 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
356 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
358 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
361 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
362 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
364 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
365 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
369 ctx->current_cert = x;
370 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
371 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
375 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
377 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
379 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
382 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
390 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
391 * with the supplied purpose
394 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
396 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
399 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
401 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
402 int proxy_path_length = 0;
403 int allow_proxy_certs =
404 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
407 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
408 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
409 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
410 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
411 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
412 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
413 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
417 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
419 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
420 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
422 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
423 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
426 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
427 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
428 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
430 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
431 ctx->error_depth = i;
432 ctx->current_cert = x;
436 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
439 ctx->error_depth = i;
440 ctx->current_cert = x;
444 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
448 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
449 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
452 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
461 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
468 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
472 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
480 ctx->error_depth = i;
481 ctx->current_cert = x;
485 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
487 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
490 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
493 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
494 ctx->error_depth = i;
495 ctx->current_cert = x;
500 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
501 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
502 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
503 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
506 ctx->error_depth = i;
507 ctx->current_cert = x;
511 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
512 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
514 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
515 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
516 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
518 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
520 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
523 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
524 ctx->error_depth = i;
525 ctx->current_cert = x;
541 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
543 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
548 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
550 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
551 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
552 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
553 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
554 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
556 ctx->error_depth = i;
557 ctx->current_cert = x;
558 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
561 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
567 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
570 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
572 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
573 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
576 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
578 ctx->error_depth = i;
579 ok = check_cert(ctx);
585 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
587 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
590 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
591 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
592 ctx->current_cert = x;
593 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
594 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
595 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
600 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
601 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
604 ctx->current_crl = crl;
605 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
607 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
609 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
615 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
617 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
621 ctx->current_crl = crl;
622 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
623 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
627 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
630 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
631 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
637 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
638 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
642 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
644 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
648 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
649 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
655 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
656 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
661 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
666 /* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
667 * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
668 * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
669 * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
670 * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
671 * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
673 * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
675 * a. it must be consistent.
676 * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
677 * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
678 * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
679 * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
680 * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
681 * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
684 /* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
685 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
686 /* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
687 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
689 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
691 #define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
693 /* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
695 #define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
697 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
698 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
700 int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
701 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
702 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
705 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
706 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
708 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
709 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
711 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
713 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
715 if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
716 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
719 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
723 if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
724 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
727 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
729 if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
732 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
736 if (crl_score > best_score)
739 best_score = crl_score;
745 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
751 static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
753 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
754 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
756 if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
762 /* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
764 static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
767 GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
768 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
770 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
772 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
777 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
780 if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
782 if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
786 inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
787 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
789 GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
790 for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
792 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
793 /* We don't handle these at present */
794 if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
796 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
798 dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
799 for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
802 sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
803 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
811 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
812 * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
813 * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
816 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
819 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
820 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
822 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
823 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
830 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
832 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
834 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
845 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
847 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
849 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
859 /* Check CRL validity */
860 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
863 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
864 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
865 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
866 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
867 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
868 * is next certificate in chain.
871 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
874 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
875 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
876 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
878 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
879 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
886 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
887 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
888 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
890 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
891 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
895 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
897 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
899 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
900 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
903 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
905 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
906 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
909 if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
911 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
912 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
917 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
918 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
922 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
923 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
928 /* Verify CRL signature */
929 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
931 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
932 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
938 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
949 /* Check certificate against CRL */
950 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
953 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
954 * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
955 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
957 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
959 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
960 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
965 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
967 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
969 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
970 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
978 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
981 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
982 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
985 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
991 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
996 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
998 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
999 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1001 ctx->current_cert = x;
1002 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1003 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1009 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1010 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1011 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1014 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1016 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1017 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1018 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1025 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1030 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1031 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1035 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1038 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1039 ctx->current_cert=x;
1040 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1046 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1047 ctx->current_cert=x;
1048 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1052 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1055 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1056 ctx->current_cert=x;
1057 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1063 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1064 ctx->current_cert=x;
1065 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1072 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1076 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1077 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1081 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1082 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1084 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1086 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1092 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1093 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1101 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1105 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1111 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1113 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1114 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1118 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1119 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1120 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1121 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1122 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1123 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1124 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1125 * been declared trusted. */
1127 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1128 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1132 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1136 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1142 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1146 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1147 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1148 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1156 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1164 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1166 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1169 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1174 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1179 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1180 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1182 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1189 if (i < 13) return 0;
1195 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1196 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1201 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1205 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1216 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1218 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1219 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1224 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1225 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1227 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1230 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1232 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1233 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1234 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1237 if (i < j) return -1;
1238 if (i > j) return 1;
1240 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1241 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1247 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1249 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1252 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
1257 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1261 if (s) type = s->type;
1262 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
1263 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
1264 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
1267 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1269 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1272 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1274 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1276 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1279 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1282 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1286 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1292 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1296 /* first, populate the other certs */
1297 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1299 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1300 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1301 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1304 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1305 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1309 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1310 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1312 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1313 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1314 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1315 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1318 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1320 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1323 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1325 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1328 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1333 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1338 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1340 return ctx->error_depth;
1343 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1345 return ctx->current_cert;
1348 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1353 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1357 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1358 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1359 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1361 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1362 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1367 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1372 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1377 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1382 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1384 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1387 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1389 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1392 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1393 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1394 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1395 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1396 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1397 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1398 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1399 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1402 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1403 int purpose, int trust)
1406 /* If purpose not set use default */
1407 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1408 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1412 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1415 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1416 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1419 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1420 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1422 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1425 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1426 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1429 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1431 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1432 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1436 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1439 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1440 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1445 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1446 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1450 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1452 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1453 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1456 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1459 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1463 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1465 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1469 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1470 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1474 ctx->current_method=0;
1476 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1478 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1479 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1483 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1485 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1486 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1489 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1493 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1497 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1503 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
1505 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
1509 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1510 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1516 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
1517 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1521 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1525 if (store && store->check_issued)
1526 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1528 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1530 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1531 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1533 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1535 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1536 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1538 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1540 if (store && store->verify)
1541 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1543 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1545 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1546 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1548 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1550 if (store && store->get_crl)
1551 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1553 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1555 if (store && store->check_crl)
1556 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1558 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1560 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1561 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1563 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1565 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
1566 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
1568 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
1570 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
1571 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
1573 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
1575 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
1578 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1579 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1580 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1581 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1582 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1586 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1592 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1593 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1596 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1598 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1599 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1602 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1604 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1605 if (ctx->param != NULL)
1607 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1610 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
1612 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
1615 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1617 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1620 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1621 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1624 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
1626 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
1629 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
1631 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
1634 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
1636 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
1639 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1640 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1642 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1645 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1650 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1652 return ctx->explicit_policy;
1655 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
1657 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
1658 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
1661 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
1664 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1669 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
1672 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
1676 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1677 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1679 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1681 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1682 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)