1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81 const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
84 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
90 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
92 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
96 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
98 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
103 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
105 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
107 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
113 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
114 * present and that the first entry is in place */
115 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
117 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
118 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
120 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
123 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
124 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
127 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
128 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
129 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
131 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
135 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
136 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
142 /* If we have enough, we break */
143 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
144 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
145 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
149 /* If we are self signed, we break */
150 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
151 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
153 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
154 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
156 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
159 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
161 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
164 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
165 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
166 ctx->last_untrusted++;
169 /* reparse the full chain for
177 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
178 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
179 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
181 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
185 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
186 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
187 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
188 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
190 /* we have a self signed certificate */
191 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
193 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
194 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
195 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
197 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
198 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
200 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
202 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
203 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
209 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
210 * so we get any trust settings.
214 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
215 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
220 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
221 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
222 ctx->last_untrusted--;
224 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
228 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 if (depth < num) break;
234 /* If we are self signed, we break */
235 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
236 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
238 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
240 if (ok < 0) return ok;
244 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
247 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
253 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
254 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
256 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
257 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
259 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
261 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
262 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
264 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
270 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
272 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
273 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
274 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
278 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
283 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
284 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
288 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
290 if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
294 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
295 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
297 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
298 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
301 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
304 /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
305 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
308 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
312 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
314 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
315 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
320 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
323 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
327 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
329 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
330 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
336 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
338 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
341 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
342 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
344 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
345 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
349 ctx->current_cert = x;
350 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
351 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
355 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
357 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
359 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
362 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
370 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
371 * with the supplied purpose
374 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
376 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
379 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
384 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
385 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
386 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
387 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
388 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
389 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
390 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
393 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
394 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
397 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
398 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
399 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
402 ctx->error_depth = i;
403 ctx->current_cert = x;
407 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
411 if ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
412 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
415 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
424 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
431 || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
435 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
443 ctx->error_depth = i;
444 ctx->current_cert = x;
448 if (ctx->purpose > 0)
450 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose,
453 || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
456 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
457 ctx->error_depth = i;
458 ctx->current_cert = x;
464 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
465 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
467 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
468 ctx->error_depth = i;
469 ctx->current_cert = x;
473 /* The next certificate must be a CA */
482 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
491 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
492 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
493 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
494 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
495 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
497 ctx->error_depth = i;
498 ctx->current_cert = x;
499 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
500 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
508 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
511 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
513 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
514 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
517 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
519 ctx->error_depth = i;
520 ok = check_cert(ctx);
526 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
528 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
531 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
532 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
533 ctx->current_cert = x;
534 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
535 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
536 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
541 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
542 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
545 ctx->current_crl = crl;
546 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
548 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
550 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
556 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
557 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
558 * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
560 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
564 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
566 *crl = xobj.data.crl;
570 /* Check CRL validity */
571 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
574 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
575 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
577 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
578 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
579 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
580 * is next certificate in chain.
583 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
586 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
587 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
588 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
590 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
591 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
598 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
599 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
600 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
602 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
603 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
607 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
608 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
612 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
613 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
618 /* Verify CRL signature */
619 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
621 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
622 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
628 /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
629 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
630 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
634 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
637 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
638 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
644 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
645 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
649 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
651 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
655 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
656 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
662 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
663 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
675 /* Check certificate against CRL */
676 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
680 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
682 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
683 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
684 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
685 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
687 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
689 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
690 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
691 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
693 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
694 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
695 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
699 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
700 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
704 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
707 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
708 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
710 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
714 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
716 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
718 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
719 if (ext->critical > 0)
722 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
723 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
731 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
741 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
742 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
744 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
745 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
746 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
749 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
755 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
756 ctx->current_cert=xi;
764 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
768 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
774 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
776 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
777 ctx->current_cert=xi;
781 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
782 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
783 * this is a waste of time. That check should
784 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
785 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
786 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
787 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
788 * been declared trusted. */
790 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
791 ctx->current_cert=xs;
802 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
805 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
806 ctx->current_cert=xs;
812 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
813 ctx->current_cert=xs;
820 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
823 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
824 ctx->current_cert=xs;
831 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
832 ctx->current_cert=xs;
837 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
838 ctx->current_cert=xs;
846 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
854 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
856 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
859 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
864 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
869 str=(char *)ctm->data;
870 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
872 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
879 if (i < 13) return 0;
885 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
886 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
891 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
895 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
906 if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
908 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
909 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
914 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
915 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
917 X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
919 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
921 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
922 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
923 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
926 if (i < j) return -1;
929 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
930 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
936 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
938 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
941 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
946 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
950 if (s) type = s->type;
951 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
952 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
953 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
956 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
958 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
961 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
963 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
965 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
968 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
971 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
981 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
985 /* first, populate the other certs */
986 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
988 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
989 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
990 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
993 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
998 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
999 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1001 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1002 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1003 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1004 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1007 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1009 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1012 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1014 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1017 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1022 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1027 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1029 return ctx->error_depth;
1032 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1034 return ctx->current_cert;
1037 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1042 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1046 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1047 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1048 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1050 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1051 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1056 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1061 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1066 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1068 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1071 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1073 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1076 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1077 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1078 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1079 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1080 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1081 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1082 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1083 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1086 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1087 int purpose, int trust)
1090 /* If purpose not set use default */
1091 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1092 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1096 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1099 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1100 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1103 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1104 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1106 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1109 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1110 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1113 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1115 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1116 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1120 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1123 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1124 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1129 if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
1130 if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
1134 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1136 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1137 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1140 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1143 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1147 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1149 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1153 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1154 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1157 ctx->current_method=0;
1159 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1160 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1162 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1168 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1169 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1171 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1178 ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
1179 ctx->trust=store->trust;
1180 ctx->flags = store->flags;
1181 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1191 if (store && store->check_issued)
1192 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1194 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1196 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1197 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1199 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1201 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1202 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1204 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1206 if (store && store->verify)
1207 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1209 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1211 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1212 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1214 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1216 if (store && store->get_crl)
1217 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1219 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1221 if (store && store->check_crl)
1222 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1224 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1226 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1227 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1229 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1232 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1233 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1234 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1235 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1236 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1240 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1246 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1247 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1250 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1252 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1253 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1256 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1258 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1259 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1261 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1264 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1265 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1268 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
1270 ctx->flags |= flags;
1273 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
1275 ctx->check_time = t;
1276 ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
1279 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1280 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1282 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1285 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1286 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1288 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1290 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1291 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)