2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
12 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
16 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
17 #include "crypto/x509.h"
21 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
24 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
32 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
35 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
38 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
39 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
41 unsigned long ret = 0;
42 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
48 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
49 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
51 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
55 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
56 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
58 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
60 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
61 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
69 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
71 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
74 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
76 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
79 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
81 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
84 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
86 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
89 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
91 return a->cert_info.issuer;
94 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
96 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer);
99 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
100 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
102 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
106 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
108 return a->cert_info.subject;
111 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
113 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
116 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
118 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
121 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
123 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject);
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
127 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
129 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
134 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
135 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
136 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
137 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
138 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
139 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
141 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
145 /* ensure hash is valid */
146 if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1)
148 if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1)
151 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
154 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
155 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
156 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
158 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
160 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
161 a->cert_info.enc.len);
166 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
175 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
176 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
177 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
182 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
183 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
188 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
190 if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
193 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
197 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(const X509_NAME *x)
199 unsigned long ret = 0;
200 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
202 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
203 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
204 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
208 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
209 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
216 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
217 * this is reasonably efficient.
220 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
222 EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
223 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
224 unsigned long ret = 0;
225 unsigned char md[16];
227 if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
230 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
231 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
232 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
233 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
234 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
235 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
236 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
240 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
247 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
248 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
249 const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
252 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
257 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
258 x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
260 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
261 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
262 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
268 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
273 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
274 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
275 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
281 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
285 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
288 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
292 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
295 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
300 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
303 ret = EVP_PKEY_eq(xk, k);
311 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
314 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
317 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
325 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
326 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
327 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
332 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
334 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
336 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
337 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
339 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
340 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
341 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
342 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
344 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
346 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
347 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
348 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
349 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
350 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
351 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
352 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
353 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
354 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
355 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
356 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
358 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
363 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
368 unsigned long tflags = flags;
370 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
373 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
375 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
380 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
383 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
384 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
385 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
386 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
389 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
391 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
392 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
393 /* Correct error depth */
398 /* Check EE key only */
399 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
400 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
401 /* Correct error depth */
405 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
406 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
407 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
408 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
409 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
412 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
413 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
418 /* Final check: root CA signature */
419 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
421 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
422 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
423 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
424 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
427 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
428 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
430 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
431 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
438 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
441 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
443 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
444 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
448 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
454 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
461 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
462 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
463 * each X509 structure.
465 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
469 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
472 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
473 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
480 X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i));