1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
60 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
61 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
62 #include <openssl/objects.h>
63 #include <openssl/x509.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
65 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
67 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
70 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
74 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
77 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
80 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
81 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
83 unsigned long ret = 0;
84 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
90 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
91 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
93 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
97 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
98 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
100 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
102 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
103 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
106 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
111 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
113 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
116 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
118 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
121 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
123 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
126 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
128 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
131 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
133 return (a->cert_info.issuer);
136 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
138 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
142 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
144 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
148 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
150 return (a->cert_info.subject);
153 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
155 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
158 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
160 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
164 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
166 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
171 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
172 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
173 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
174 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
175 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
176 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
178 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
181 /* ensure hash is valid */
182 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
183 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
185 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
188 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
189 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
190 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
192 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
194 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
195 a->cert_info.enc.len);
200 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
204 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
206 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
207 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
212 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
213 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
218 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
223 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
227 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
229 unsigned long ret = 0;
230 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
232 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
233 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
234 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
238 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
239 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
246 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
247 * this is reasonably efficient.
250 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
252 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
253 unsigned long ret = 0;
254 unsigned char md[16];
259 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
260 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
261 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
262 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
263 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
264 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
265 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
266 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
268 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
274 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
275 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
276 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
279 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
284 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
285 x.cert_info.issuer = name;
287 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
288 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
289 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
295 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
300 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
301 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
302 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
308 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(X509 *x)
312 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
315 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
319 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
322 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
327 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
330 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
338 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
341 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
344 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
352 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
353 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
354 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
359 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
361 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
363 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
364 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
366 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
367 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
368 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
369 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
371 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
373 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
374 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
375 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
376 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
377 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
378 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
379 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
380 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
381 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
382 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
383 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
385 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
390 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
395 unsigned long tflags = flags;
397 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
400 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
402 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
407 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
410 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
411 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
412 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
413 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
416 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
418 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
419 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
420 /* Correct error depth */
425 /* Check EE key only */
426 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
427 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
428 /* Correct error depth */
432 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
433 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
434 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
435 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
436 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
439 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
440 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
445 /* Final check: root CA signature */
446 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
448 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
449 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
450 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
451 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
454 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
455 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
457 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
458 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
465 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
468 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
470 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
471 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
475 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
481 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
488 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
489 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
490 * each X509 structure.
492 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
496 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
497 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
498 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);