1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
62 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
63 #include <openssl/objects.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509.h>
65 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
67 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
74 i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
77 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
80 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
81 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
83 unsigned long ret = 0;
88 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
89 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
90 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
92 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
96 (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
97 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
99 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
101 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
102 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
105 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
110 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
112 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
115 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
117 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
120 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
122 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
126 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
128 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
132 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
134 return (a->cert_info->issuer);
137 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
139 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
143 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
145 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
149 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
151 return (a->cert_info->subject);
154 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
156 return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
159 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
161 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
165 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
167 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
173 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
174 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
175 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
176 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
177 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
178 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
180 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
183 /* ensure hash is valid */
184 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
185 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
187 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
190 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
191 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
192 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
195 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
196 a->cert_info->enc.len);
202 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
206 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
208 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
209 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
214 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
215 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
220 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
225 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
229 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
231 unsigned long ret = 0;
232 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
234 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
235 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
236 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
240 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
241 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
248 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
249 * this is reasonably efficient.
252 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
255 unsigned long ret = 0;
256 unsigned char md[16];
258 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
259 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
260 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
261 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
262 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
263 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
264 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
265 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
266 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
268 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
274 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
275 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
276 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
280 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
286 cinf.serialNumber = serial;
289 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
290 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
291 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
297 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
302 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
303 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
304 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
310 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
312 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
314 return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
317 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
321 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
324 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
329 xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
332 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
340 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
343 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
346 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
356 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
357 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
358 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
363 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
365 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
367 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
368 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
370 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
371 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
372 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
373 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
375 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
377 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
378 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
379 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
380 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
381 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
382 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
383 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
384 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
385 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
386 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
387 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
389 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
394 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
399 unsigned long tflags;
400 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
403 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
405 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
410 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
411 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
412 /* Correct error depth */
417 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
418 /* Check EE key only */
419 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
420 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
421 /* Correct error depth */
425 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
426 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
427 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
428 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
429 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
433 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
434 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
439 /* Final check: root CA signature */
440 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
444 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
445 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
446 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
447 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
450 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
451 * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
453 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
454 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
461 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
464 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
466 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
467 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
471 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
477 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
484 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
485 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
486 * each X509 structure.
488 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
492 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
493 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
494 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
495 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);