1 /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
62 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
63 #include <openssl/objects.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509.h>
65 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
67 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
74 i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
76 return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
79 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
80 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
87 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
88 f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
89 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
91 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
94 if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
95 (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
97 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
99 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
100 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
103 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
108 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
110 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
113 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
115 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
118 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
120 return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
124 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
126 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
130 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
132 return(a->cert_info->issuer);
135 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
137 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
141 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
143 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
147 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
149 return(a->cert_info->subject);
152 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
154 return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
157 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
159 return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
163 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
165 return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
170 /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
171 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
172 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
173 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
174 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
175 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
176 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
179 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
182 /* ensure hash is valid */
183 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
184 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
186 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
189 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
190 if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified)
192 rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
195 return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
196 a->cert_info->enc.len);
203 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
207 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
209 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
211 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
216 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
218 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
223 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
228 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
232 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
235 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
237 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
238 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
239 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
243 ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
244 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
251 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
252 * this is reasonably efficient. */
254 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
258 unsigned char md[16];
260 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
261 i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
262 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
263 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
264 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
265 && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
266 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
267 ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
268 ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
270 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
276 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
277 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
278 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
287 cinf.serialNumber=serial;
290 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
292 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
293 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
299 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
304 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
306 x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
307 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
313 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
315 if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
317 return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
320 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
323 return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
327 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
332 xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
335 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
344 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
347 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
350 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
359 /* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
360 * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
361 * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
367 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
369 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
371 if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
372 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
374 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
375 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
376 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
377 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
379 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
382 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
383 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
384 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
385 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
386 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
387 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
389 else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
391 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
392 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
393 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
394 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
397 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
402 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
407 unsigned long tflags;
408 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
411 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
414 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
420 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
422 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
423 /* Correct error depth */
428 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
429 /* Check EE key only */
430 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
433 /* Correct error depth */
437 for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
439 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
440 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
441 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
443 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
447 pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
448 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
453 /* Final check: root CA signature */
454 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
460 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
461 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
462 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
464 /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
465 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
467 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
468 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
475 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
478 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
480 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
481 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
485 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
491 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
497 /* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
498 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
499 * of each X509 structure.
501 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
505 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
506 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
508 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
509 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);