2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
12 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
16 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
18 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
21 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
25 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
28 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
31 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
32 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
34 unsigned long ret = 0;
35 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
41 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
42 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
44 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
48 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
49 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
51 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
53 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
54 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
62 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
64 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
67 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
69 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
72 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
74 return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
77 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
79 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
82 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
84 return a->cert_info.issuer;
87 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
89 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer);
92 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
93 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
95 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
99 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
101 return a->cert_info.subject;
104 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
106 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
109 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
111 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
114 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
116 return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject);
119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
120 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
122 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
127 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
128 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
129 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
130 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
131 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
132 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
134 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
137 /* ensure hash is valid */
138 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
139 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
141 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
144 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
145 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
146 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
148 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
150 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
151 a->cert_info.enc.len);
156 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
160 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
162 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
163 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
168 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
169 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
174 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
176 if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
179 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
183 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
185 unsigned long ret = 0;
186 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
188 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
189 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
190 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
194 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
195 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
202 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
203 * this is reasonably efficient.
206 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
208 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
209 unsigned long ret = 0;
210 unsigned char md[16];
215 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
216 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
217 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
218 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
219 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
220 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
221 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
222 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
224 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
230 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
231 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
232 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
235 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
240 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
241 x.cert_info.issuer = name;
243 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
244 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
245 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
251 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
256 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
257 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
258 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
264 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
268 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
271 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
275 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
278 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
283 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
286 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
294 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
297 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
300 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
308 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
309 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
310 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
315 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
317 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
319 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
320 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
322 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
323 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
324 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
325 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
327 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
329 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
330 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
331 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
332 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
333 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
334 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
335 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
336 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
337 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
338 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
339 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
341 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
346 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
351 unsigned long tflags = flags;
353 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
356 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
358 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
363 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
366 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
367 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
368 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
369 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
372 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
374 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
375 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
376 /* Correct error depth */
381 /* Check EE key only */
382 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
383 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
384 /* Correct error depth */
388 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
389 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
390 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
391 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
392 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
395 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
396 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
401 /* Final check: root CA signature */
402 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
404 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
405 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
406 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
407 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
410 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
411 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
413 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
414 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
421 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
424 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
426 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
427 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
431 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
437 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
444 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
445 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
446 * each X509 structure.
448 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
452 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
453 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
454 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);