2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
14 #include <openssl/objects.h>
15 #include <openssl/x509.h>
16 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
17 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
19 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
22 const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
26 i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
29 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
32 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
33 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
35 unsigned long ret = 0;
36 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
42 f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
43 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
45 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
49 (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
50 (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
52 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
54 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
55 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
63 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
65 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
68 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
70 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
73 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
75 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
78 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
80 return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
83 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
85 return (a->cert_info.issuer);
88 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
90 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
93 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
94 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
96 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
100 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
102 return (a->cert_info.subject);
105 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
107 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
110 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
112 return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
115 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
117 return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
121 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
123 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
128 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
129 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
130 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
131 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
132 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
133 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
135 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
138 /* ensure hash is valid */
139 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
140 X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
142 rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
145 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
146 if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
147 if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
149 if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
151 return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
152 a->cert_info.enc.len);
157 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
161 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
163 if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
164 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
169 if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
170 ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
175 ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
180 return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
184 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
186 unsigned long ret = 0;
187 unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
189 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
190 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
191 if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
195 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
196 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
203 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
204 * this is reasonably efficient.
207 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
209 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
210 unsigned long ret = 0;
211 unsigned char md[16];
216 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
217 i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
218 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
219 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
220 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
221 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
222 ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
223 ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
225 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
231 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
232 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
233 ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
236 X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
241 x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
242 x.cert_info.issuer = name;
244 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
245 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
246 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
252 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
257 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
258 x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
259 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
265 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
269 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
272 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
276 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
279 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
284 xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
287 ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
295 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
298 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
301 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
309 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
310 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
311 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
316 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
318 const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
320 if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
321 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
323 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
324 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
325 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
326 if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
328 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
330 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
331 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
332 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
333 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
334 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
335 *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
336 } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
337 if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
338 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
339 if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
340 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
342 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
347 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
352 unsigned long tflags = flags;
354 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
357 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
359 x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
364 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
367 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
368 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
369 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
370 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
373 return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
375 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
376 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
377 /* Correct error depth */
382 /* Check EE key only */
383 rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
384 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
385 /* Correct error depth */
389 for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
390 sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
391 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
392 if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
393 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
396 pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
397 rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
402 /* Final check: root CA signature */
403 rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
405 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
406 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
407 if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
408 || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
411 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
412 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
414 if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
415 rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
422 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
425 if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
427 sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
428 return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
432 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
438 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
445 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
446 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
447 * each X509 structure.
449 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
453 ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
454 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
455 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);