1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
115 #include "cryptlib.h"
116 #include <openssl/bn.h>
117 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include <openssl/fips.h>
125 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
126 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
127 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
128 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
129 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
130 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
131 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
132 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
133 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
134 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
135 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
136 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
137 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
138 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
139 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
140 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
141 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
143 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
146 RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
150 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
153 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
155 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
158 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
159 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
162 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
163 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
167 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
169 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
173 if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
175 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
180 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
182 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
186 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
188 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
192 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
193 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
195 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
197 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
202 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
205 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
206 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
207 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
208 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
210 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
216 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
217 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
220 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
221 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
224 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
225 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
228 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
231 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
234 if (i <= 0) goto err;
236 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
238 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
240 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
241 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
245 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
246 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
249 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
250 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
252 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
253 * length of the modulus */
255 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
256 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
268 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
274 static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
277 int got_write_lock = 0;
280 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
282 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
284 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
285 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
288 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
289 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
296 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
297 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
299 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
305 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
307 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
308 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
309 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
310 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
313 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
317 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
318 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
322 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
323 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
325 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
330 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
332 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
336 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
337 BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
340 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
344 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
345 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
346 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
351 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
352 BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
355 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
359 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
360 ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
361 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
367 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
368 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
370 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
371 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
372 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
374 int local_blinding = 0;
375 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
378 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
380 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
384 if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
386 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
391 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
394 br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
395 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
396 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
397 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
398 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
400 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
406 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
407 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
409 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
410 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
413 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
415 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
417 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
420 if (i <= 0) goto err;
422 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
424 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
426 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
427 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
431 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
433 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
434 if (blinding == NULL)
436 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
441 if (blinding != NULL)
442 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
445 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
448 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
449 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
450 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
452 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
459 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
463 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
468 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
469 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
472 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
473 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
477 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
480 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
482 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
491 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
492 * length of the modulus */
494 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
495 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
507 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
513 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
514 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
516 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
519 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
521 int local_blinding = 0;
522 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
525 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
527 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
531 if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
533 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
538 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
541 br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
542 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
543 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
544 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
545 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
547 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
551 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
552 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
555 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
559 /* make data into a big number */
560 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
562 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
564 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
568 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
570 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
571 if (blinding == NULL)
573 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
578 if (blinding != NULL)
579 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
583 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
586 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
587 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
588 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
590 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
597 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
600 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
605 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
606 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
608 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
614 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
618 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
622 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
623 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
626 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
627 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
630 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
631 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
634 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
637 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
641 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
651 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
657 /* signature verification */
658 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
659 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
664 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
668 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
670 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
674 if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
676 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
681 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
683 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
687 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
689 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
693 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
694 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
696 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
698 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
703 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
706 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
707 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
708 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
709 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
711 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
715 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
716 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
719 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
723 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
725 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
727 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
731 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
732 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
735 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
736 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
738 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
739 if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
746 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
747 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
749 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
750 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
753 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
756 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
760 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
770 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
776 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
778 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
779 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
780 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
784 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
785 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
786 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
789 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
790 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
792 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
793 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
795 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
799 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
803 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
811 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
813 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
815 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
820 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
821 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
824 /* compute I mod q */
825 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
828 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
829 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
833 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
836 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
837 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
840 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
844 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
845 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
847 /* compute I mod p */
848 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
851 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
852 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
856 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
859 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
860 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
863 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
867 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
868 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
870 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
871 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
872 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
873 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
874 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
876 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
878 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
879 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
882 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
886 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
888 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
889 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
890 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
891 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
892 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
893 * they ensure p > q [steve]
895 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
896 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
897 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
898 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
900 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
902 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
903 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
904 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
905 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
906 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
907 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
908 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
909 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
910 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
911 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
913 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
914 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
915 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
920 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
923 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
927 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
928 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
937 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
940 FIPS_selftest_check();
942 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
946 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
948 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
949 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
950 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
951 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
952 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
953 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);