1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
114 #include "cryptlib.h"
115 #include <openssl/bn.h>
116 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119 #include <openssl/fips.h>
124 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
126 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
128 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
129 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
130 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
131 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
132 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
133 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
134 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
135 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
136 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
137 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
138 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
139 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
140 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
142 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
145 RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
149 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
152 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
154 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
157 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
158 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
161 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
162 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
166 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
168 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
172 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
173 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
175 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
180 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
182 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
186 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
188 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
192 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
193 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
195 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
197 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
202 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
205 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
206 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
207 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
208 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
210 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
216 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
217 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
220 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
221 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
224 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
225 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
228 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
231 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
234 if (i <= 0) goto err;
236 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
238 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
240 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
241 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
245 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
246 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
249 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
250 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
252 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
253 * length of the modulus */
255 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
256 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
268 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
274 static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
277 int got_write_lock = 0;
280 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
282 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
284 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
285 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
288 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
289 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
296 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
297 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
299 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
305 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
307 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
308 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
309 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
310 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
313 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
317 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
318 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
322 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
323 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
325 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
330 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
332 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
336 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
340 /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
342 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
345 /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
346 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
348 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
349 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
350 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
355 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
358 /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
359 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
360 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
361 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
362 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
363 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
365 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
369 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
370 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
372 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
373 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
374 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
376 int local_blinding = 0;
377 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
378 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
379 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
380 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
381 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
384 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
386 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
390 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
391 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
393 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
398 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
401 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
402 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
403 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
404 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
406 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
412 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
413 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
415 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
416 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
419 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
421 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
423 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
426 if (i <= 0) goto err;
428 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
430 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
432 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
433 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
437 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
439 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
440 if (blinding == NULL)
442 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
447 if (blinding != NULL)
449 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
451 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
454 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
458 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
461 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
462 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
463 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
465 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
472 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
476 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
481 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
482 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
485 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
486 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
490 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
493 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
495 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
496 if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
504 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
505 * length of the modulus */
507 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
508 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
520 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
526 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
527 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
532 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
534 int local_blinding = 0;
535 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
536 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
537 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
538 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
539 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
542 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
544 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
548 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
549 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
551 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
556 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
559 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
560 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
561 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
562 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
564 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
568 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
569 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
572 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
576 /* make data into a big number */
577 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
579 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
581 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
585 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
587 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
588 if (blinding == NULL)
590 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
595 if (blinding != NULL)
597 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
599 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
602 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
607 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
610 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
611 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
612 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
614 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
621 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
624 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
629 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
630 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
632 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
638 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
642 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
646 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
647 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
650 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
651 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
654 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
655 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
658 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
661 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
665 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
675 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
681 /* signature verification */
682 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
683 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
688 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
692 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
694 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
698 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
699 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
701 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
706 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
708 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
712 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
714 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
718 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
719 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
721 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
723 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
728 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
731 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
732 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
733 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
734 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
736 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
740 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
741 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
744 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
748 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
750 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
752 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
756 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
757 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
760 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
761 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
763 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
764 if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
771 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
772 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
774 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
775 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
778 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
781 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
785 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
795 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
801 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
803 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
804 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
805 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
809 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
810 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
811 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
814 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
815 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
817 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
818 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
820 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
824 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
828 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
836 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
838 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
840 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
845 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
846 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
849 /* compute I mod q */
850 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
853 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
854 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
858 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
861 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
862 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
865 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
869 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
870 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
872 /* compute I mod p */
873 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
876 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
877 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
881 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
884 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
885 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
888 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
892 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
893 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
895 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
896 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
897 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
898 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
899 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
901 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
903 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
904 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
907 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
911 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
913 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
914 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
915 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
916 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
917 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
918 * they ensure p > q [steve]
920 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
921 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
922 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
923 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
925 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
927 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
928 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
929 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
930 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
931 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
932 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
933 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
934 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
935 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
936 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
938 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
939 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
940 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
945 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
948 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
952 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
953 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
962 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
965 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
967 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_INIT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
971 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
975 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
977 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
978 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
979 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
980 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
981 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
982 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);