1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
64 #include <openssl/engine.h>
68 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
69 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
70 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
71 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
72 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
73 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
74 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
75 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
76 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
77 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
78 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
79 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
80 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
81 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
82 RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
83 RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
84 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
86 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
93 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
95 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
98 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
99 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
101 const RSA_METHOD *meth;
103 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
104 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
107 meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
110 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
111 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
112 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
114 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
120 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
121 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
124 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
125 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
128 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
129 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
132 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
135 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
138 if (i <= 0) goto err;
140 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
142 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
144 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
145 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
147 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
148 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
150 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
153 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
155 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
156 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
159 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
161 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
164 if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
165 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
167 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
168 * length of the modulus */
169 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
170 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
171 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
176 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
187 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
188 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
190 const RSA_METHOD *meth;
192 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
193 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
196 meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
200 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
201 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
202 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
204 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
210 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
211 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
214 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
216 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
218 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
221 if (i <= 0) goto err;
223 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
225 if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
226 RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
227 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
228 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
230 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
233 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
234 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
235 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
236 { if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
239 if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
242 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
243 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
245 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
246 * length of the modulus */
247 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
248 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
249 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
254 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
265 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
266 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
268 const RSA_METHOD *meth;
272 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
275 meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
279 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
281 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
283 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
285 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
289 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
290 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
293 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
297 /* make data into a big number */
298 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
300 if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
301 RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
302 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
303 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
306 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
309 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
310 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
311 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
312 { if (!meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
315 if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
319 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
320 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
323 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
327 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
328 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
331 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
332 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
335 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
336 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
339 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
342 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
346 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
349 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
360 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
361 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
363 const RSA_METHOD *meth;
367 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
370 meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
374 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
376 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
377 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
380 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
384 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
385 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
388 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
392 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
394 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
396 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
397 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
399 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
400 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
402 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
405 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
407 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
408 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
411 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
413 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
416 if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
417 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
424 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
425 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
428 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
431 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
435 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
438 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
449 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
451 const RSA_METHOD *meth;
456 meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(rsa->engine);
457 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
461 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
463 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
465 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
466 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
468 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
469 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
471 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
474 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
476 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
477 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
480 rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
482 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
484 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
486 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
487 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
489 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
490 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
492 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
495 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
497 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
498 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
501 rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
503 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
507 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
508 if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
509 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
511 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
512 if (!meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
513 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
515 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
516 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
517 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
519 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
521 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
522 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
523 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
524 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
525 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
526 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
527 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
528 * they ensure p > q [steve]
531 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
532 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
533 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
543 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
545 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
549 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
551 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
552 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
553 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
554 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
555 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
556 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);