1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
67 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
68 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
69 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
70 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
71 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
72 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
73 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
74 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
75 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
76 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
77 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
78 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
79 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
80 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
81 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
82 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
83 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
92 RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
94 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
97 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
98 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
101 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
102 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
107 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
108 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
109 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
111 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
117 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
118 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
121 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
122 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
125 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
126 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
129 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
132 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
135 if (i <= 0) goto err;
137 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
139 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
141 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
142 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
146 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
148 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
149 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
151 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
153 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
156 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
158 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
159 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
161 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
164 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
167 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
170 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
171 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
173 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
174 * length of the modulus */
175 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
176 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
177 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
182 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
194 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
195 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
198 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
199 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
205 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
206 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
207 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
209 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
215 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
216 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
219 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
221 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
223 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
226 if (i <= 0) goto err;
228 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
230 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
232 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
233 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
237 if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
238 RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
239 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
240 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
242 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
245 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
246 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
247 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
248 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
251 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
254 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
255 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
257 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
258 * length of the modulus */
259 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
260 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
261 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
266 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
277 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
278 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
283 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
289 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
291 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
293 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
295 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
299 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
300 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
303 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
307 /* make data into a big number */
308 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
310 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
312 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
316 if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
317 RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
318 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
319 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
322 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
325 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
326 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
327 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
328 { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
331 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
335 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
336 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
339 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
343 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
344 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
347 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
348 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
351 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
352 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
355 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
358 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
362 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
365 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
376 /* signature verification */
377 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
378 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
383 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
389 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
391 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
392 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
395 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
399 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
400 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
403 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
407 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
409 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
411 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
416 if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
418 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
419 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
421 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
423 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
426 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
428 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
429 if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
431 rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
434 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
437 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
440 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
441 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
448 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
449 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
452 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
455 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
459 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
462 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
473 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
479 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
484 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
486 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
488 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
489 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
491 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
493 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
496 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
498 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
499 if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
501 rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
504 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
507 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
510 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
512 BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
513 if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
515 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
517 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
520 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
522 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
523 if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
525 rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
528 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
531 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
535 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
536 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
537 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
539 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
540 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
541 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
543 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
544 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
545 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
547 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
549 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
550 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
551 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
552 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
553 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
554 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
555 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
556 * they ensure p > q [steve]
559 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
560 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
561 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
563 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
565 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
566 if (BN_cmp(I, &vrfy) != 0)
568 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
575 BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
580 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
582 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
586 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
588 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
589 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
590 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
591 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
592 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
593 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);